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This paper discusses the key sources of vulnerabilities for pension plans and insurance companies in light of the global financial crisis of 2008. It also discusses how these institutional investors transit shocks to the rest of the financial sector and economy. The crisis has re-ignited the policy debate on key issues such as: 1) the need for countercyclical funding and solvency rules; 2) the tradeoffs implied in marked based valuation rules; 3) the need to protect contributors towards retirement from excessive market volatility; 4) the need to strengthen group supervision for large complex financial institutions including insurance and pensions; and 5) the need to revisit the resolution and crisis management framework for insurance and pensions.

This paper provides an assessment of the Polish funded pension system and the quality of the regulatory framework for the accumulation phase. There are two elements that distinguish the Polish pension fund portfolios from other reforming countries: the relatively high component of domestic equity, and the negligible component on international securities. Although this asset allocation has provided relatively high real rates of return in the past, it may not be the case in the future, as further portfolio diversification to other instruments will become necessary to ensure sustainable rates of return. The paper provides a number of recommendations to expand the opportunities of investments to pension funds. Pension fund management companies have been able to exploit scale economies in certain areas of the business, such as collection of revenues. This study proposes mechanisms to enhance them even more by centralizing also the account management system, which may also help to increase portfolio efficiency and competition. With the payout phase starting in 2009, broad definitions in areas such as the role of the public and private sector need to be established. The paper examines products and options that authorities may consider for the design of the payout phase.

Population aging is placing enormous pressures on the pension benefits governments are able to provide. The former transition economies of the countries of Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe (CESE) face unique challenges. The growth of their aging populations outpaces other European countries, while the growth of their financial markets (essential to fund pension provisions) lags behind. With support and direction from the ERSTE Foundation, an Austrian group focused on Central European policy issues, a World Bank team investigated the challenges faced by these countries against the background of international experience from the OECD countries and Latin America. 'Aging Population, Pension Funds, and Financial Markets: Regional Perspectives and Global Challenges for Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe' examines how well the financial systems in the CESE economies were prepared for the challenges of multipillar pension reform, how ready they are for the approaching payout of benefits to the first participants, whether returns from pension funds can be sustained in an aging population, and how determined policy actions might be implemented to complete financial market development.

This paper provides an assessment of the funded pension system and the quality of the regulatory framework for both accumulation and payout phase. It suggests that the lack of portfolio diversification may contribute in the future to low returns and poor pensions and provides a number of recommendations to expand the opportunities of investments to pension funds. The paper also finds that pension fund administrators are not exploiting the scale economies in certain areas of the business such as collection of revenues and account management, and proposes mechanisms to reduce costs and increase efficiency through greater competition. The paper examines the products and options offered at retirement age and finds a bias toward the payment of pensions in the form of lump sums and suggests alternatives for improving the availability of other instruments. Enhancements to the regulatory framework of insurance companies are also proposed.

Empirical analysis of two decades of pioneering pension and social security reform in Latin America and the Caribbean shows that much has been achieved, but that critical challenges remain. In tackling this unfinished agenda, a great deal can be learned from the reform experience of countries in the region. Keeping the Promise, produced by the chief economist's office in the Latin America and Caribbean Region at the World Bank, evaluates policy reforms in 12 countries, points to successes and shortcomings, and proposes priorities and options for future reform. \"Keeping the Promise provides a timely assessment of two decades of pension reform experience-with a wealth of new data, and empirical evaluation of reformed social security systems. Many economists and policymakers will not be persuaded by some of the main conclusions and recommendations-such as the supposed failure to increase coverage, and the call for strengthening a pay-as-you-go defined-benefit scheme for poverty prevention-but they will welcome the book's critical appraisal. This is required reading for pension specialists and policymakers in Latin America and beyond.\" -Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, Chief of Economic Research, Central Bank of Chile \"A heavyweight analysis of the Latin American pension revolution which raises important questions about the optimal scale of compulsory saving when redesigning pension systems.\" -Paul Wallace, The Economist.

Developing Annuities Markets: The Experience of Chile is part of a multicountry World Bank project analyzing the market for retirement products. Among countries that have reformed their pension systems since the early 1990s, the Chilean case has emerged as the most relevant for drawing policy lessons on the role of the private sector in the provision of retirement income for two reasons: the depth, sophistication, and efficiency of the country's retirement products market, and the fact that this market was successfully developed from scratch by a middle-income country. The book examines in detail Chile's efforts to build a sound regulatory framework for the payout phase, concluding that a market for annuities and other retirement instruments can be built from a low base, while also identifying the reform agenda that policy makers need to implement to maximize benefits for their retiring populations. \"This book provides a rigorous analysis, supported by a careful data examination, of the annuity market in Chile. It should be a must-read for policy makers involved in pension reforms.\" Solange Bernstein, Director, Superintendency of Pension Funds, Chile\"This volume offers a fascinating in-depth study of the Chilean annuity marketplace, a topic of direct interest to developing and developed nations as they prepare to design and regulate financial markets for the decumulation phase of life.\" Olivia S. Mitchell, Executive Director, Pension Research Council, The Wharton School.

In this article we analyze the expected risk of pension funds with different risk profiles in the proxy life-cycle model of investments for the 2nd pillar pension scheme in Croatia. The benefits of implementing proxy life-cycle investments, compared to the previous model of mandatory pension funds investments, are clearly visible in the total expected amount of accumulated savings from the risk/return perspective. However, those benefits are partially diminished by the fact that the expected risk of a pension fund with the lowest risk profile is not substantially different from the expected risk of a pension fund with a medium risk profile, due to the lack of diversification. Additionally, we analyze the robustness of the proxy life-cycle model to a sudden and severe market shock, where we determine the presence of risk for those members who choose to switch to a pension fund with a lower risk profile at an unfavorable moment.

We introduce a new measure of active portfolio management, Active Share, which represents the share of portfolio holdings that differ from the benchmark index holdings. We compute Active Share for domestic equity mutual funds from 1980 to 2003. We relate Active Share to fund characteristics such as size, expenses, and turnover in the cross-section, and we also examine its evolution over time. Active Share predicts fund performance: funds with the highest Active Share significantly outperform their benchmarks, both before and after expenses, and they exhibit strong performance persistence. Nonindex funds with the lowest Active Share underperform their benchmarks.

Institutional investors exhibit substantial home-state bias in private equity. This effect is particularly pronounced for public pension funds, where overweighting amounts to 9.8% of aggregate private-equity investments and 16.5% for the average limited partner. Public pension funds' in-state investments achieve performance that is lower by two to four percentage points than both their own similar out-of-state investments and similar investments in their state by out-of-state investors. Overweighting in home-state investments by public pension funds is greater in venture capital and real estate than in buyout funds. States with political climates characterized by more self-dealing invest a larger share of their portfolio in local investments, although a given local investment performs only as poorly in these states as in other states. Relative to the performance of the rest of the private equity universe, overweighting and underperformance in local investments reduce public pension fund resources by $1.2 billion per year.

Financial economics and corporate governance have long focused on the agency problems between corporate managers and shareholders that result from the dispersion of ownership in large publicly traded corporations. In this paper, we focus on how the rise of institutional investors over the past several decades has transformed the corporate landscape and, in turn, the governance problems of the modern corporation. The rise of institutional investors has led to increased concentration of equity ownership, with most public corporations now having a substantial proportion of their shares held by a small number of institutional investors. At the same time, these institutions are controlled by investment managers, which have their own agency problems vis-à-vis their own beneficial investors. We develop an analytical framework for understanding the agency problems of institutional investors, and apply it to examine the agency problems and behavior of several key types of investment managers, including those that manage mutual funds—both index funds and actively managed funds—and activist hedge funds. We show that index funds have especially poor incentives to engage in stewardship activities that could improve governance and increase value. Activist hedge funds have substantially better incentives than managers of index funds or active mutual funds. While their activities may partially compensate, we show that they do not provide a complete solution for the agency problems of other institutional investors.