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Lack of information on the adequacy of fiscal measures undertaken in the COVID19 crisis and its long-term adverse effects on economic growth and labor market outcomes has raised debates about the impact of fiscal austerity and fears of slower recovery from the ongoing economic downturn. This paper analyzes the short and long-term effects ofthe fiscal policy measures undertaken in the COVID19 crisis in the EU-27. For the short-term estimation, we use OkunS law. To examine the long-run effects, we use the concept of potential output using a production function approach. The findings from this paper are that in the short-term, fiscal measures were generally effective. In the long-term, the COVID-19 crisis would have had a negative and permanent effect on the potential GDP growth if the policymakers had undertaken no fiscal measures.

The coronavirus triggered a record fall of GDP in Croatia, 8.1% in 2020, one of the largest declines in the EU. The large macroeconomic shock stemming from the pandemic has affected both supply and demand. On the one hand, government measures have imposed unprecedented supply-side restrictions. On the other hand, growing uncertainty affected domestic and foreign demand. Croatia was particularly affected by a plunge in international tourism demand. Such a major macroeconomic shock poses a challenge for estimating potential GDP, which is difficult to estimate even in stable economic conditions. When estimating potential GDP in the context of the corona crisis, the main issue is the breakdown of the shock into a permanent and a temporary part (supply and demand shock). In this paper, we try to give the most logical breakdown of Croatian data and describe possible methodological approaches to the estimation of potential GDP during the pandemic.

This article explores how reductions in tariffs on imported inputs and final goods affect the productivity of large Chinese trading firms, with the special tariff treatment that processing firms receive on imported inputs. Firm-level input and output tariffs are constructed. Both types of tariff reductions have positive impacts on productivity that are weaker as firms' share of processing imports grows. The impact of input tariff reductions on productivity improvement, overall, is weaker than that of output tariff reductions, although the opposite is true for non-processing firms only. Both tariff reductions are found to contribute at least 14.5% to economy-wide productivity growth.

Fifty years ago, Milton Friedman articulated the natural rate hypothesis. It was composed of two sub-hypotheses: First, the natural rate of unemployment is independent of monetary policy. Second, there is no long-run trade-off between the deviation of unemployment from the natural rate and inflation. Both propositions have been challenged. The paper reviews the arguments and the macro and micro evidence against each. It concludes that, in each case, the evidence is suggestive, but not conclusive. Policymakers should keep the natural rate hypothesis as their null hypothesis, but keep an open mind and put some weight on the alternatives.

In a depressed economy, with short-term nominal interest rates at their zero lower bound, ample cyclical unemployment, and excess capacity, increased government purchases would be neither offset by the monetary authority raising interest rates nor neutralized by supply-side bottlenecks. Then even a small amount of hysteresis—even a small shadow cast on future potential output by the cyclical downturn—means, by simple arithmetic, that expansionary fiscal policy is likely to be self-financing. Even if it is not, it is highly likely to pass the sensible benefit-cost test of raising the present value of future potential output. Thus, at the zero bound, where the central bank cannot or will not but in any event does not perform its full role in stabilization policy, fiscal policy has the stabilization policy mission that others have convincingly argued it lacks in normal times. Whereas many economists have assumed that the path of potential output is invariant to even a deep and prolonged downturn, the available evidence raises a strong fear that hysteresis is indeed a factor. Although nothing in our analysis calls into question the importance of sustainable fiscal policies, it strongly suggests the need for caution regarding the pace of fiscal consolidation.

The evolution of the U.S. economy over the past 55 years is examined through the lens of a microfounded model that allows for changes in the behaviour of the Federal Reserve and in the volatility of structural shocks. Agents are aware of the possibility of regime changes and their beliefs matter for the law of motion underlying the macroeconomy. Monetary policy is identified by repeated fluctuations between a Hawk and a Dove regime, with the latter prevailing in the 1970s and during the recent crisis. To explore the role of agents' beliefs I introduce a new class of counterfactual simulations: beliefs counterf actuals. If, in the 1970s, agents had anticipated the appointment of an extremely conservative Chairman, inflation would have been lower and the inflation-output trade-off more favourable. The large drop in inflation and output at the end of 2008 would have been mitigated if agents had expected the Federal Reserve to be exceptionally active in the near future.

This paper analyzes the performative impact of the European Commission's model for estimating 'potential output', which is used as a yardstick for measuring the 'structural budget balance' of EU countries and, hence, is crucial for coordinating European fiscal policies. In pre-crisis years, potential output estimates promoted the build-up of private debt, housing bubbles and macroeconomic imbalances. After the financial crisis, these model estimates were revised downwards, which increased fiscal consolidation pressures. By focusing on the euro area's economies during 1999-2014, we show how the model's estimates influence actual economic outcomes. We identify two major economic impacts of the potential output model. First, the political implications of the model led to pro-cyclical feedback loops, reinforcing prevailing economic developments. Second, the model has contributed to national lock-ins on path dependent debt trajectories, fueling 'structural polarization' between core and periphery countries.

We test whether and how equity overvaluation affects corporate financing decisions using an ex ante misvaluation measure that filters firm scale and growth prospects from market price. We find that equity issuance and total financing increase with equity overvaluation, but only among overvalued stocks, and that equity issuance is more sensitive than debt issuance to misvaluation. Consistent with managers catering to maintain overvaluation and with investment-scale economy effects, the sensitivity of equity issuance and total financing to misvaluation is stronger among firms with potential growth opportunities (low book-to-market, high R&D, or small size) and high share turnover.

The recent financial crisis and ensuing recession appear to have put the productive capacity of the economy on a lower and shallower trajectory than the one that seemed to be in place prior to 2007. Using a version of an unobserved components model introduced by Fleischman and Roberts, we estimate that potential GDP in late 2014 was about 7 percent below the trajectory it appeared to be on prior to 2007. We argue that a significant portion of the recent damage to the supply side of the economy plausibly was endogenous to the weakness in aggregate demand. Endogeneity of supply with respect to demand provides a strong motivation for a vigorous policy response to a weakening in aggregate demand, and we present optimal-control simulations showing how monetary policy might respond to such endogeneity in the absence of other considerations. We then discuss how other considerations—such as increased risks of financial instability or inflation instability—could cause policymakers to exercise restraint in their response to cyclical weakness.