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The harvest of wildlife for human consumption is valued at several billion dollars annually and provides an essential source of meat for hundreds of millions of rural people living in poverty. This harvest is also considered among the greatest threats to biodiversity throughout Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Economic development is often proposed as an essential first step to win–win solutions for poverty alleviation and biodiversity conservation by breaking rural reliance on wildlife. However, increases in wealth may accelerate consumption and extend the scale and efficiency of wildlife harvest. Our ability to assess the likelihood of these two contrasting outcomes and to design approaches that simultaneously consider poverty and biodiversity loss is impeded by a weak understanding of the direction and shape of their interaction. Here, we present results of economic and wildlife use surveys conducted in 2,000 households from 96 settlements in Ghana, Cameroon, Tanzania, and Madagascar. We examine the individual and interactive roles of wealth, relative food prices, market access, and opportunity costs of time spent hunting on household rates of wildlife consumption. Despite great differences in biogeographic, social, and economic aspects of our study sites, we found a consistent relationship between wealth and wildlife consumption. Wealthier households consume more bushmeat in settlements nearer urban areas, but the opposite pattern is observed in more isolated settlements. Wildlife hunting and consumption increase when alternative livelihoods collapse, but this safety net is an option only for those people living near harvestable wildlife.

Protected areas are used to sustain biodiversity and ecosystem services. However, protected areas can create tradeoffs spatially and temporally among ecosystem services, which can affect the welfare of dependent local communities. This study examines the effect of a protected area on the tradeoff between two extractive ecosystem services from mangrove forests: cutting mangroves (fuelwood) and harvesting the shrimp and fish that thrive if mangroves are not cut. We demonstrate the effect in the context of Saadani National Park (SANAPA) in Tanzania, where enforcement of prohibition of mangrove harvesting was strengthened to preserve biodiversity. Remote sensing data of mangrove cover over time are integrated with georeferenced household survey data in an econometric framework to identify the causal effect of mangrove protection on income components directly linked to mangrove ecosystem services. Our findings suggest that many households experienced an immediate loss in the consumption of mangrove firewood, with the loss most prevalent in richer households. However, all wealth classes appear to benefit from long-term sustainability gains in shrimping and fishing that result from mangrove protection. On average, we find that a 10% increase in the mangrove cover within SANAPA boundaries in a 5-km2 radius of the subvillage increases shrimping income by approximately twofold. The creation of SANAPA shifted the future trajectory of the area from one in which mangroves were experiencing uncontrolled cutting to one in which mangrove conservation is providing gains in income for the local villages as a result of the preservation of nursery habitat and biodiversity.

Increasing debt, natural disasters, and extreme weather events claim an ever-larger part of national budgets across the globe, undermining global stability and the capacity of our societies to transition to sustainability. The dominant crisis response policy paradigm treats the economy and the environment as separate domains and is based on a ‘fix-the-economy-first’ principle, i.e., fiscal consolidation and debt sustainability need to be achieved first before addressing other socio-environmental policy goals. This paper demonstrates that this approach entraps countries and the global economy in a vicious cycle. In the absence of an integrated policy framework for addressing these intersecting challenges, our responses to financial stress often exacerbate the environmental crisis and its consequences, adding further financial strain on an already fragile socio-environmental system. Breaking out from this conundrum requires a new crisis response policy paradigm. To this end, this study develops the Unsustainable Growth Vicious Cycle (UGVC) as an analytical framework that exemplifies the incentive structure that governs the dominant crisis response model, and the negative feedback loops that sustain it. Our analysis unfolds in four stages. We analyse how financial stress triggers multidimensional poverty traps and how these impact on the environment. We use the concept of poverty-environment trap 2.0 to capture the emergence of the environmental crisis as a global poverty and inequality trap in its own right. We explicate the limits of the dominant economic policy paradigm through the lens of unsustainable economic growth. We finally discuss the need of transforming ‘economic adjustment programmes’ into ‘sustainability adjustment programmes’, as part of a new global settlement for sustainability transition.

This paper introduces a special feature on biodiversity conservation and poverty traps. We define and explain the core concepts and then identify four distinct classes of mechanisms that define important interlinkages between biodiversity and poverty. The multiplicity of candidate mechanisms underscores a major challenge in designing policy appropriate across settings. This framework is then used to introduce the ensuing set of papers, which empirically explore these various mechanisms linking poverty traps and biodiversity conservation.

One of the greatest challenges in biodiversity conservation today is how to facilitate protection of species that are highly valued at a global scale but have little or even negative value at a local scale. Imperiled species such as large predators can impose significant economic costs at a local level, often in poverty-stricken rural areas where households are least able to tolerate such costs, and impede efforts of local people, especially traditional pastoralists, to escape from poverty. Furthermore, the costs and benefits involved in predator conservation often include diverse dimensions, which are hard to quantify and nearly impossible to reconcile with one another. The best chance of effective conservation relies upon translating the global value of carnivores into tangible local benefits large enough to drive conservation \"on the ground.\" Although human–carnivore coexistence involves significant noneconomic values, providing financial incentives to those affected negatively by carnivore presence is a common strategy for encouraging such coexistence, and this can also have important benefits in terms of reducing poverty. Here, we provide a critical overview of such financial instruments, which we term \"payments to encourage coexistence\"; assess the pitfalls and potentials of these methods, particularly compensation and insurance, revenue-sharing, and conservation payments; and discuss how existing strategies of payment to encourage coexistence could be combined to facilitate carnivore conservation and alleviate local poverty.

Protected areas are the dominant approach to protecting biodiversity and the supply of ecosystem services. Because these protected areas are often placed in regions with widespread poverty and because they can limit agricultural development and exploitation of natural resources, concerns have been raised about their potential to create or reinforce poverty traps. Previous studies suggest that the protected area systems in Costa Rica and Thailand, on average, reduced deforestation and alleviated poverty. We examine these results in more detail by characterizing the heterogeneity of responses to protection conditional on observable characteristics. We find no evidence that protected areas trap historically poorer areas in poverty. In fact, we find that poorer areas at baseline seem to have the greatest levels of poverty reduction as a result of protection. However, we do find that the spatial characteristics associated with the most poverty alleviation are not necessarily the characteristics associated with the most avoided deforestation. We show how an understanding of these spatially heterogeneous responses to protection can be used to generate suitability maps that identify locations in which both environmental and poverty alleviation goals are most likely to be achieved.

Despite its relevance, the economic contribution of small-scale fisheries to poverty alleviation is still poorly understood. This study investigates why some fishers perform economically better in fisheries than others under similar conditions and whether these variations in performance were due to individual adaptive strategies related to fishing technology and effort. A pairwise comparison between fishers’ income from the Brazilian equatorial region in 1994 and 2014 was performed while modeling individual changes related to the fishing activity (Generalized Linear Model, GLM) and the factors that would explain why fishers became richer or poorer over time (Proportional odds model). Fisher’s geographical region, the use of motorized boats and the adoption of hookah compressors explained income in 1994, whereas having larger boats and fishing with hook and line explained it in 2014. Fishers were slightly more likely to gain income if they changed their type of boat. Some fishers are trapped in poverty, and the changes they made were either not enough to leave this condition or made it worse. Escaping poverty traps in fisheries may require efforts beyond those available to the individuals, especially as stocks become increasingly overfished.

Performing a dramatic act of religious devotion, creating an art exhibit, or releasing a new product are all examples of public acts that signal quality and contribute to building a reputation. Signalling theory predicts that these public displays can reliably reveal quality. However, data from ethnographic work in South India suggests that more prominent individuals gain more from reputation-building religious acts than more marginalized individuals. To understand this phenomenon, we extend signalling theory to include variation in people's social prominence or social capital, first with an analytical model and then with an agent-based model. We consider two ways in which social prominence/capital may alter signalling: (i) it impacts observers' priors, and (ii) it alters the signallers' pay-offs. These two mechanisms can result in both a 'reputational shield,' where low quality individuals are able to 'pass' as high quality thanks to their greater social prominence/capital, and a 'reputational poverty trap,' where high quality individuals are unable to improve their standing owing to a lack of social prominence/capital. These findings bridge the signalling theory tradition prominent in behavioural ecology, anthropology and economics with the work on status hierarchies in sociology, and shed light on the complex ways in which individuals make inferences about others. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.

This paper develops a dynamic theoretical model to assess the impact of asset insurance on poverty and the cost of social protection in developing countries. We analyze the model under two technological assumptions: a standard, globally concave production technology, and a fixed cost technology that creates a non-convex production set and admits the possibility of multiple equilibria and a poverty trap. Under both assumptions, the introduction of an asset insurance market reduces poverty and the costs of social protection. Under the non-convex production set, there is a strong public finance case for insurance premium subsidies that target poor and vulnerable households and bring them into the insurance market. While the challenges of making microinsurance markets work are multiple, this analysis suggests the potential gains to solving these challenges are substantial.

Adaptive capacity is the ability of a living system, such as a social–ecological system, to adjust responses to changing internal demands and external drivers. Although adaptive capacity is a frequent topic of study in the resilience literature, there are few formal models. This paper introduces such a model and uses it to explore adaptive capacity by contrast with the opposite condition, or traps. In a social–ecological rigidity trap, strong self-reinforcing controls prevent the flexibility needed for adaptation. In the model, too much control erodes adaptive capacity and thereby increases the risk of catastrophic breakdown. In a social–ecological poverty trap, loose connections prevent the mobilization of ideas and resources to solve problems. In the model, too little control impedes the focus needed for adaptation. Fluctuations of internal demand or external shocks generate pulses of adaptive capacity, which may gain traction and pull the system out of the poverty trap. The model suggests some general properties of traps in social–ecological systems. It is general and flexible, so it can be used as a building block in more specific and detailed models of adaptive capacity for a particular region.