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This book deals with the evolution and context of the Bank policy for projects on international waterways. It starts with a brief description of how the Bank faced the challenges stemming from such projects, and the different approaches deliberated by the Bank that led to the issuance of the first policy in 1956. The Book then reviews the implementation experience and analyzes the principles and procedures, as well as the main features of each of the policies issued in 1956, 1965 and 1985. The principles of international water law prevailing at each stage of the policy updates are examined and compared with those of Bank policy.The book also discusses in details the notification process: its basis, by whom, to whom, its content, different riparians’ responses, and the exceptions to the notification requirement. It analyzes how the Bank handles an objection from one or more of the riparians to projects proposed for Bank financing. It also examines how the Bank has dealt with transboundary groundwater, as well as the linkages between the policy for projects on international waterways and the policies on disputed areas and environmental impact assessment. The conclusion provides an overview of the main findings of the book, and highlights some of the lessons drawn from the implementation experience of the policy.

Against the backdrop of the US and EU academic debate on share classes or preferential treatments in investment funds, the paper focuses on an Italian case study. In this jurisdiction, ‘reserved’ alternative investment funds (AIFs) issue Class A and Class B shares, where Class A are granted preferential rights in the form of nonexposure to risk of losses (seniority privilege) and/or a guaranteed minimum interest related to the nominal value of contributions (minimum interest privilege). In details, the seniority privilege entails that, if the net asset value (NAV) of the fund at T1 is lower than at T0, this will only impact on the aggregate value of Class B shares. Thanks to the minimum interest privilege, if the fund at T1 has yielded no returns (or a return lower than the minimum interest), the aggregate value of Class A shares will nevertheless increase by an amount equal to the minimum interest (e.g., 10% of the value of the contributions to the fund). In either case, the aggregate value of Class B shares is correspondingly (proportionately) reduced. The paper analyses such preferential rights under the ‘non-contagion’ principle, according to which, features specific to one share class shall not have a potentially adverse impact on other share classes of the same fund. According to the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) (as well as the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)), such a principle is an expression of the broader fairness standard. The outcome of the analysis is that preferential treatment shall be permitted as long as it has the effect of increasing the overall welfare of the relevant fund’s investors, whereas any preferential treatment resulting in a ‘wealth shift’ from one investor (or class) to another runs counter to the ‘non-contagion’ principle and is therefore unfair. Investment funds, reserved AIFs, share classes, fair treatment, seniority privilege, minimum interest privilege, non-contagion principle, preferential treatment, shift of wealth

The stalling of WTO multilateralism and the proliferation of preferential trade agreements in recent decades have drawn substantial attention to the impacts of preferential liberalization. A critical question is how they affect the trade barriers imposed against outsiders. I examine the relationship between preferential trade liberalization and protection against non-member countries by testing the predictions of a political–economy model based on the previous literature. Focusing on a specific model allows me to uncover the mechanisms via which preferential liberalization affects external import protection, whereas most of the existing literature has focused on establishing the sign of the effect only. Furthermore, I focus on not only tariffs, as most studies do, but also on the temporary trade barriers of antidumping and safeguards. I test the predictions for Latin America and obtain results that provide solid evidence supporting two mechanisms from the theory, which lead to lower protection against non-members of a preferential trade agreement. First, a lower preferential import protection level means that the increase in preferential imports from increasing the external tariff creates a smaller increase in tariff revenue. Second, as preferential import protection is cut, there is a decrease in the markup and sales of domestic firms, and thus raising the external import protection generates less profit. Moreover, this second effect is present when the political motivation of the government is sufficiently strong.

The article addresses the differential recruitment advantages of individual candidates in regional assembly elections. The authors argue that in a multi-level polity different types of incumbency exist that are reflected in the recruitment process, favour officeholders over newcomers, and at the same time differentiate the accessibility of regional offices for officeholders at various system levels. Moreover, it is argued that the effect of multi-level incumbency can be well observed even in proportional electoral systems. Empirically, the impact of incumbency on a candidate’s chances to succeed in the recruitment process and to obtain preferential votes is analysed using regional assembly elections in the Czech Republic as an example. The authors demonstrate that regional incumbents enjoy by a huge margin advantage during the candidate nomination phase and they are the most favoured group at the ballot followed by national-level politicians and big city mayors.