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Technological innovation is a synthesis of various elements. Faced with actual challenges concerning technological innovation of private economy, along with the analysis of technological innovation elements, we have carried out empirical study on technological innovation and operated benefit data of 34 scaled private enterprises, validate that the input on researchers, fund investment, output efficiency are all at play when it comes to upgrading private economy. In doing so, we advance intension-oriented development, innovation on financing channels, and industry-University-research institute strategic cooperation.

The present paper aims to emphasize the context of the privatization of security in the 20th century and to show the differences between these newly created corporations and the old mercenaries. Moreover, it also highlights the changing the role of mercenaries and their way of action in contemporary peripheries, which erase the idea of what they previously meant and give us a different view regarding their position in the midst of intra-state wars of the period. If in the past centuries the states were contracting mercenaries to take part in hostilities during armed conflicts, whose main motivation was to obtain personal benefits and privileges, now they would rather take into account the private security services. Furthermore, the privatization of violence and the emergence of private military corporations is described, and information is provided on one of the most well-known corporations, namely Blackwater.

Governments are becoming increasingly aware of the important contribution that high performance, world-class universities make to global competitiveness and economic growth. There is growing recognition, in both industrial and developing countries, of the need to establish one or more world-class universities that can compete effectively with the best of the best around the world. Contextualizing the drive for world-class higher education institutions and the power of international and domestic university rankings, this book outlines possible strategies and pathways for establishing globally competitive universities and explores the challenges, costs, and risks involved. Its findings will be of particular interest to policy makers, university leaders, researchers, and development practitioners.

Why does corporate governance--front page news with the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat--vary so dramatically around the world? This book explains how politics shapes corporate governance--how managers, shareholders, and workers jockey for advantage in setting the rules by which companies are run, and for whom they are run. It combines a clear theoretical model on this political interaction, with statistical evidence from thirty-nine countries of Europe, Asia, Africa, and North and South America and detailed narratives of country cases. This book differs sharply from most treatments by explaining differences in minority shareholder protections and ownership concentration among countries in terms of the interaction of economic preferences and political institutions. It explores in particular the crucial role of pension plans and financial intermediaries in shaping political preferences for different rules of corporate governance. The countries examined sort into two distinct groups: diffuse shareholding by external investors who pick a board that monitors the managers, and concentrated blockholding by insiders who monitor managers directly. Examining the political coalitions that form among or across management, owners, and workers, the authors find that certain coalitions encourage policies that promote diffuse shareholding, while other coalitions yield blockholding-oriented policies. Political institutions influence the probability of one coalition defeating another.

Even in the wake of the biggest financial crash of the postwar era, the United States continues to rely on Securities and Exchange Commission oversight and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which set tougher rules for boards, management, and public accounting firms to protect the interests of shareholders. Such reliance is badly misplaced. In Corporate Governance, Jonathan Macey argues that less government regulation--not more--is what's needed to ensure that managers of public companies keep their promises to investors. Macey tells how heightened government oversight has put a stranglehold on what is the best protection against malfeasance by self-serving management: the market itself. Corporate governance, he shows, is about keeping promises to shareholders; failure to do so results in diminished investor confidence, which leads to capital flight and other dire economic consequences. Macey explains the relationship between corporate governance and the various market and nonmarket institutions and mechanisms used to control public corporations; he discusses how nonmarket corporate governance devices such as boards and whistle-blowers are highly susceptible to being co-opted by management and are generally guided more by self-interest and personal greed than by investor interests. In contrast, market-driven mechanisms such as trading and takeovers represent more reliable solutions to the problem of corporate governance. Inefficient regulations are increasingly hampering these important and truly effective corporate controls. Macey examines a variety of possible means of corporate governance, including shareholder voting, hedge funds, and private equity funds.

This article addresses the influence of economic inequality on immigration detention. The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) detains roughly 350,000 migrants each year and maintains more than 30,000 beds each day. This massive detention system raises issues of economic power and powerlessness. This article connects, for the first time, the influence of economic inequality on system-wide immigration detention policy as well as on individual detention decisions. The article begins with a description of the systemic impact that for-profit prisons have had on the federal immigration detention system, by promoting wide-scale detention. The resulting expansion of detention has led to ever-increasing profitability for the private for-profit prison sector, which allows the companies to exercise even more influence over policymakers to achieve yet higher levels of detention. The influence of wealthy private prison corporations also affects the very nature of immigration detention, leading to the use of jail-like facilities that are the product offered by the private prison industry. The article then describes the mechanisms by which economic inequality dictates the likelihood and length of detention in individual cases. The detention or release decisions made by DHS in individual cases must account for the need to keep numerous detention beds full to satisfy the contracts made with powerful private prison companies. DHS regularly sets bond amounts at levels that are not correlated to flight risk or danger, but rather to the length of time that the individual must be held in detention to keep the available space full. The article presents data, obtained from immigration authorities, regarding detention and bond patterns at a specific detention center that demonstrate this point. The research finds an inverse relationship between the number of newly arriving immigrants in the detention center and the bond amounts set by US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). During times when new arrivals were few, the amount required to be released from detention on bond was high; during times when there were many new arrivals, bond amounts were reduced or set at zero. The article also presents another way in which economic inequality affects the likelihood of detention at the individual level. Release and detention are largely controlled through the use of monetary bond requirements, which must be paid in full. The regular use of financial bonds as the exclusive mechanism for release means that those migrants who are most able to pay are most likely to be released, without regard to their likelihood of absconding or endangering the community. Wealth thus determines detention rather than an individualized determination of the necessity of depriving an individual of liberty. The article urges that the role of economic inequality in immigration detention raises troubling issues of democratic governance and the commodification of traditional governmental functions. The current system also leads to an unjustifiable redistribution of wealth from the poor to the rich. Looking at immigration detention through the lens of economic inequality offers new lines of theoretical inquiry into immigration detention. It connects the discussion of immigration detention to scholarly critiques of for-profit prisons and the privatization of state security functions more generally. It also brings a new perspective to prior work in the immigration and criminal justice contexts, questioning the fairness and utility of requiring payment of monetary bonds to obtain liberty from detention. The article concludes with recommendations for reform. These reforms would help to sideline the influence of economic inequality in immigration detention decision making.

Economists and Societies is the first book to systematically compare the profession of economics in the United States, Britain, and France, and to explain why economics, far from being a uniform science, differs in important ways among these three countries. Drawing on in-depth interviews with economists, institutional analysis, and a wealth of scholarly evidence, Marion Fourcade traces the history of economics in each country from the late nineteenth century to the present, demonstrating how each political, cultural, and institutional context gave rise to a distinct professional and disciplinary configuration. She argues that because the substance of political life varied from country to country, people's experience and understanding of the economy, and their political and intellectual battles over it, crystallized in different ways--through scientific and mercantile professionalism in the United States, public-minded elitism in Britain, and statist divisions in France. Fourcade moves past old debates about the relationship between culture and institutions in the production of expert knowledge to show that scientific and practical claims over the economy in these three societies arose from different elites with different intellectual orientations, institutional entanglements, and social purposes. Much more than a history of the economics profession, Economists and Societies is a revealing exploration of American, French, and British society and culture as seen through the lens of their respective economic institutions and the distinctive character of their economic experts.

Traditionally, it has been understood that private corporations cannot be held responsible for human rights violations at the international level. Only States, main subjects of public international law, can be held legally responsible for human rights violations. Today, this classical argument is being increasingly challenged by the force of reality. States remain the entity that is principally responsible for human rights violations, but there is no epistemological reason for denying such responsibility in the case of private corporations at the international level. The increasing number of standards and mechanisms at the regional and international level addressed to enterprises, that enshrine environmental and human rights standards contribute to build this argument. There is a tangible trend that goes beyond corporate social responsibility towards the initial steps of the emergence of international corporate human rights responsibility.

Traditionally, it has been understood that private corporations cannot be held responsible for human rights violations at the international level. Only States, main subjects of public international law, can be held legally responsible for human rights violations. Today, this classical argument is being increasingly challenged by the force of reality. States remain the entity that is principally responsible for human rights violations, but there is no epistemological reason for denying such responsibility in the case of private corporations at the international level. The increasing number of standards and mechanisms at the regional and international level addressed to enterprises, that enshrine environmental and human rights standards contribute to build this argument. There is a tangible trend that goes beyond corporate social responsibility towards the initial steps of the emergence of international corporate human rights responsibility.