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Governments and law enforcement agencies around the world seek to identify and confiscate the ‘proceeds of crime’ on the assertion that doing so will deter offending and symbolise to citizens and communities that ‘crime does not pay’. In the UK such assertions have underpinned the enactment of legislation, the investment in law enforcement agents and the development of wide ranging new technologies to facilitate the identification of assets and their recovery. This paper critically considers two key concepts which fundamentally drive the post-conviction confiscation regime in the UK. First, ‘criminal benefit’ which is the amount that a defendant is adjudged to have made from ‘criminal conduct’. Second, the ‘available amount’ which is the amount that the state hopes to recover from a defendant via the court ordered ‘confiscation order’. In so doing, this paper explores the assumptions at the heart of the 2002 Proceeds of Crime Act and their application in practice, concentrating on the nature of the powers accorded to financial investigators and how these powers have been interpreted and applied. It is argued that far from representing the ‘profit’ generated from crime these values are constructs founded in the relationship between legislation, the discretional practice of police officers and financial investigators, organisational restrictions and constraints and informal negotiation and compromise between the defence and prosecution. This has implications for both conceptualising the nature of the post-conviction confiscation regime as well as for shaping what the state might expect to recover from defendants.

Over the last two decades official and media discourses have paid increasing attention to the proceeds of 'organized crime'. However, although there is a relatively sound understanding of finance-related issues in the drug markets, not much is known about other illegal markets. Drawing on a diverse set of original empirical data, including interviews with active criminal entrepreneurs involved in the trade, this article provides an account of the financial management of the illicit tobacco business in the United Kingdom. The study has two main objectives. First, to increase knowledge on the financial management of 'organized crime' by using the illegal tobacco trade in the United Kingdom as a case study and second, to further knowledge of the trade's social organization. The findings suggest a critical departure from the discourses on 'Organized crime' and crime money.

Purpose This paper aims to show how financial services firms determine whether customer transactions or behaviours meet the threshold for suspicious activity reporting mandated by the Terrorism Act 2000 and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, and how suspicious activity reporting is executed in practice. Design/methodology/approach Semi-structured interviews have been carried out among compliance professionals in UK financial services. Findings Two issues related to suspicious activity reporting have been identified. Firstly, a widespread misunderstanding about the tipping-off offence under s. 333 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 has been identified, which appears to be a root cause for poor quality as well as over-reporting of suspicious activity. Secondly, issues related to the notice and moratorium periods used by the UK’s National Crime Agency appear to deter reporting of suspicious activity related to live transactions. Practical implications The paper makes suggestions for changes financial services firms and the UK’s National Crime Agency can make to improve the effectiveness of suspicious activity reporting. Originality/value The paper provides valuable insights which can be used to limit the flow of criminal funds, improve the quality of suspicious activity reporting and enhance the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies.

Purpose This paper aims to focus on the concept of money laundering and explores the evolution and expansion of criminalization of predicate offences to the money laundering within the international anti-money laundering (AML) regime over the time. It proposes how to limit the size and scope of predicate offences in designing a balanced legal definition. Design/methodology/approach This paper opted a content analysis focussed on the criminalization aspect of offences to money laundering in the international AML regime under the United Nations Conventions (Vienna, Palermo and Corruption Convention) and Financial Action Task Force Standards. Findings This paper provides how the criminalization of money laundering has evolved and its definition expanded over the time. The international definition is widely drafted with wide range of predicate offences from proceeds of drug money to corruption, including terrorist financing and terrorist acts; however, the two phenomena – money laundering and terrorist financing are quiet distinct apart. This continual expansion of predicate offences quite leads legality issues such as over-criminalization and conflict with principles of criminal law. This paper suggests an approach to limit the size and scope of predicate offences to money laundering. Practical implications This paper includes implications for the development of a balanced approach in defining predicate offences through a qualitative limitation approach consistent with the minimalist theory of penalization of criminal law. Originality/value This paper attains an identified issue how the legal definition of the money laundering offence can be improved while considering rule of law and principles of criminal law concerns.

This article summarises briefly what is known internationally about how ‘organised crimes’ are financed and how this differs from the financing of licit businesses. It shows how illicit financing might and does operate, noting that a key issue is the social capital of offenders and their access to illicit finance which ironically, may be easier if controls make it harder to launder money. It then reviews international evidence on how proceeds of crime are laundered, concluding with an examination of the implications of these observations for the study of organised crime and the effects of anti-money laundering efforts. In money laundering cases internationally, the most commonly prosecuted cases are not complicated. This is not evidence that there are no complicated cases, since the proportion of crime proceeds and crime financing that have been subjected to serious investigation is modest. There is a core contradiction between general economic policy pushed hard multilaterally for liberalisation of financial flows and a crime control policy intent on hampering them. No-one could rationally think that AML controls in general or financial investigation in particular will ‘solve’ organised crime completely or eliminate high-level offending: for there even to be a chance to achieve that, there would need to be a step change in transparency and effective action against high-level corruption along all possible supply chains. However more action (not just legislation) on these could facilitate interventions against the more harmful individuals, networks and crime enablers. The less complex financial activities of local drug-dealing gangs can be intervened against, without needing international cooperation or familiarity with sophisticated money laundering typologies.

The policy and practice of confiscating criminal assets to control crime and recover illicit wealth has come to occupy a central position in national and international policing and security agendas. However, this practice has raised many questions about agencies’ abilities to measure success and also the social impacts of asset confiscation. This article contributes to the crime control debates by exploring contemporary literature and drawing upon a subset of data from the Joint Asset Recovery Database (JARD). The first part of the article briefly outlines the key legislative provisions of asset recovery in the UK. The second part explores what the JARD data tells us about the performance of the confiscation of proceeds of crime approach and it will argue that seizing illicit wealth has not been the main priority for government. It will argue instead that the proceeds of crime approach, originally designed to target the most serious and organised crime, has effectively become a disciplining and symbolic tool against relatively lower level acquisitive crimes. It concludes that while technical measures of impact remain inconclusive, it is more important to subject the ideological underpinnings of the proceeds of crime law to critical scrutiny.

This article analyses how the monies generated for, and from, corporate financial crimes are controlled, concealed, and converted through the use of organisational structures in the form of otherwise legitimate corporate entities and arrangements that serve as vehicles for the management of illicit finances. Unlike the illicit markets and associated 'organised crime groups' and 'criminal enterprises' that are the normal focus of money laundering studies, corporate financial crimes involve ostensibly legitimate businesses operating within licit, transnational markets. Within these scenarios, we see corporations as primary offenders, as agents, and as facilitators of the administration of illicit finances. In all cases, organisational structures provide opportunities for managing illicit finances that individuals alone cannot access, but which require some element of third-party collaboration. In this article, we draw on data generated from our Partnership for Conflict, Crime, and Security Research (PaCCS)-funded project on the misuse of corporate structures and entities to manage illicit finances to make a methodological and substantive addition to the literature in this area. We analyse two cases from our research-corporate bribery in international business and corporate tax fraud-before discussing three main findings: (1) the ostensible legitimacy created through abuse of otherwise lawful business arrangements; (2) the effective anonymity and insulation afforded through such misuse; and (3) the necessity for facilitation by third-party professionals operating within a stratified market. The analysis improves our understanding of how and why business offenders misuse what are otherwise legitimate business structures, arrangements, and practices in their criminal enterprise.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is twofold. Firstly, it highlights areas of disconnect between how the financial services sector in the UK approaches the requirement to evidence source of wealth when conducting customer due diligence; the requirements of the UK’s laws and regulations in relation to evidence source of wealth; and the expectations of the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) in this regard. It then proposes an alternative approach to evidencing source of wealth. Design/methodology/approach Semi-structured interviews have been carried out among compliance professionals in UK financial services. Findings This paper provides rare insight into the anti-money laundering arrangements of UK banks, an area that has not yet been widely researched in the academic literature. It highlights a lack of legal certainty in the UK’s laws and regulation around anti-money laundering and argues that the expectations of the FCA exceed both the letter and the spirit of the laws. It suggests that mixed messages disseminated by the FCA have incentivised banks to shift their focus from financial crime risk (i.e. preventing money laundering and terrorist financing, etc.) towards regulatory risk (i.e. the risk of falling foul of regulatory expectations) and proposes a change to the law and regulatory guidance to enhance the level of legal certainty needed for the law to be effective. Practical implications The paper makes suggestions for a more practical and risk-based approach to anti-money laundering compliance and for a much-needed change in the law. Originality/value It provides unique insight into the due diligence challenges of financial services firms and argues for the FCA to propagate a more risk-based approach to enhanced due diligence.

Purpose This paper aims to raise, and consider, first-order questions about the United Kingdom’s anti-money laundering (AML) regime. Design/methodology/approach The paper contrasts the original rationale for introducing AML and asset recovery to the UK with data on the assets recovered from organised crime and those involved in drug trafficking. It does this by analysing historical and contemporaneous literature – both official and academic. Findings When assessed against its original aims of combating drugs and organised crime, the tentative conclusion is that the UK’s AML system does not appear to be worth the candle. Research limitations/implications While based upon publicly available information that is far from ideal, the analysis raises credible questions as to whether the UK’s AML regime is worthwhile and whether it could be done differently. Practical implications Raises the question of whether the impact of the AML regime could be made worthwhile by investing a great deal more in those law enforcement agencies that use the suspicious activity reporting regime. It also raises the question as to whether the AML regime could be re-purposed to achieve aims that are different from the original. Social implications Given the financial costs, which run into billions of pounds, and the fact that the regime has failed to have a significant impact on the level of drug trafficking or the revenue of organised criminals, the paper raises questions as to when the policy can be re-designed or abandoned. Originality/value While most other analytical work simply makes suggestions as to how to improve the number of inputs into the AML system, this paper provides a critical analysis of the costs and benefits of the AML regime in the UK.

Purpose This study aims to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of auditor mandatory suspicious activity reporting versus the exercise of professional judgement in the anti-money laundering regimes of the UK and the USA. Design/methodology/approach The research draws upon the following sources. Firstly, statistics provided by the UK National Crime Agency, 2019 (NCA) regarding suspicious activity report (SAR) filing rates. Secondly, anti-money laundering legislation in the USA and UK. Thirdly, statements made in the political domain in the USA, particularly those which raised constitutional concerns during the progress of the Patriot Act 2001. Finally, statements and recommendations by a UK Parliamentary Commission enquiring into the effectiveness of the suspicious activity reporting regime. Findings The UK reporting regime does not accommodate professional judgement, resulting in the filing of SARs with limited intelligence value. This contrasts with discretionary reporting in the USA: voluntary reporting guides and influences auditor behaviour rather than mandating it. Defensive filing by UK auditors (defence to anti-money launderings [DAMLs]) has increased in recent years but the number of SARs filed has declined. Originality/value The study evaluates auditor behavioural responses to legislative regimes which mandate or alternatively accommodate discretion in the reporting suspicion of money laundering. Consideration of constitutional and judicial activism in this context is a novel contribution to the literature. For its theoretical framework the study uses Foucault’s concept of discipline of the self to evaluate auditor behaviour under both regimes.