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PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to compare the pricing decisions and earning potential of the software supplier and the smart device manufacturer in different software promotion strategies.Design/methodology/approachBased on game theory, the authors formulate two promotion models, that is, the supplier implements software promotion activities individually (SP model) or outsources the promotion activity to the manufacturer under profit-sharing contract (MP model) when taking different channel power structures into consideration. Besides, in order to test the robustness of the conclusions, the authors also extend the basic model to the following situations: (1) the customers have different price elasticity toward service fee and product price; (2) the revenue sharing contract is employed by the supply chain members; and (3) the manufacturer's product promotion practice is taken into consideration.FindingsThe optimal service fee (product price) of the supplier (manufacturer) under SP model is always lower (higher) than that under MP model. Surprisingly, if the supplier is the channel leader and the profit sharing ratio exceeds certain threshold, the manufacturer's profit decreases in profit sharing ratio, which remains robust in three extension models. Moreover, the supply chain's profit in supplier-led game is always lower than that in Nash game irrespective of the promotion strategy in profit sharing context. When revenue sharing contract is adopted, the result holds only when the revenue sharing ratio is relatively low.Originality/valueThe authors originally explore two promotion strategies of the software supplier when taking the channel power structures into considerations, which has not been explored in the literature to the best of the authors' knowledge.

Purpose:  The aim of this study is to review relevant articles on the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard in profit-sharing contracts in Islamic Banks. Adverse selection and moral hazard problems are problems that occur in profit-sharing contracts, so they impact the low porti on of this contract financing compared to margin-based and fee-based contracts.   Theoretical framework:    The profit sharing contract in an Islamic bank has two potential problems, namely adverse selection and moral hazard that arise due to asymmetric information. Asymmetric information can occur due to limited information owned by Islamic banks as owners of funds (shahibul maal) regarding the business to be run by customers (mudharib). This asymmetric information mainly causes the agency problem. If an agent is negligent in making decisions with negative consequences and does not want to take responsibility for his actions, this can be classified as a moral hazard. Moral hazard can be in the form of self-interest, side effects, fraud, opportunism, and the behaviour of agents who commit willful mistakes, negligence and breach of contract. Meanwhile, adverse selection arises when the principal cannot observe the agent's characteristics because of asymmetric information before the contract is signed.   Design/methodology/approach:  The study uses a qualitative approach by reviewing previous articles relevant to the discussion. The study is aligned with the practices that occur in profit-sharing contracts. Furthermore, discussions are deepened through forum group discussions with experts and practitioners in Islamic banks.   Findings:  The results show that the conflicts in profit-sharing contracts include principal-agent conflicts and principal-principal conflicts due to adverse selection and moral hazards. The study results reveal that signalling and screening measures can be applied to overcome adverse selection problems while monitoring actions and switching to debt contracts can overcome moral hazard problems.   Research, Practical & Social implication:  The study has implications for Islamic banks to draw up a clear and complete profit-sharing contract with the mudharib to reduce the moral hazard committed by the mudharib. In this case, Islamic banks can also ask the mudharib to submit comprehensive financial reports regarding their financial performance. Islamic banks must also pay attention to signalling and screening efforts to prevent adverse selection.   Originality/value:  The value of the study provides a new literacy regarding the potential for agency conflict in the form of moral hazard and adverse selection that will be faced by Islamic banks when applying profit-sharing contracts with other parties as managers (mudharib).

A closed-loop supply chain seeks to enhance the consumers’ environmental consciousness to increase both the profits and the return of past-sold products. Even though, firms have misaligned interests for closing the loop: while all firms exploit consumers environmental consciousness to increase sales, only manufacturers use it for appropriating of returns’ residual value. Starting from a benchmark (no-incentive) scenario where a manufacturer (M) is the leader and a retailer (R) is the follower, we develop two incentive games through a profit-sharing contract to align firms’ motivations for closing the loop. In both incentive games, the incentive takes the form of a share of profits that M transfers to R. Our question is how the sharing fraction should be determined to make both players economically better-off. The first incentive game assumes that R has no-information on the sharing parameter, which is determined by M after R sets her strategies; thus the incentive has an endogenous nature. In the second incentive game the sharing parameter is common knowledge and both players know its values before the game starts, thus the incentive has an exogenous nature. We find that an endogenous incentive is never more economically and environmentally convenient than a no-incentive game. In contrast, an exogenous incentive can make both players economically better-off inside specific sharing parameter ranges. Nevertheless, when other forces (e.g., competition or legislation) impose the adoption of a profit-sharing contract, M should supply an endogenous incentive when the exogenous share is either too high or too low.

This paper investigated the effects of the informational asymmetry phenomenon that occurs in the direct sale of fresh agricultural products (FAP) in an e-commerce environment. A three-level FAP supply chain was proposed, which was composed of a FAP supplier, a logistics service provider, and a large e-commerce platform. Considering the perishable nature of FAP, this paper analyzed the effects of logistics spatio-temporal costs and the freshness of FAP on the profit of each stakeholder in the supply chain. Three scenarios were considered: (1) complete information, (2) partial information, and (3) considering logistics spatio-temporal cost. Analytical models were developed based on the principal-agent theory and the supply chain coordination contract theory to depict the effects of a profit-sharing contract on the operations of the FAP supply chain. Modeling results indicated that under a complete information condition, an increase in the loss rate of FAP correlated to a decrease in the profit of the FAP supply chain. Under a partial information condition, considering the loss rate of FAP and the potential compensation costs to suppliers, when the loss rate of FAP was fixed, the profit of each stakeholder in the FAP supply chain displayed a decreasing trend in relation to compensation ratio. In comparison, when the compensation ratio was fixed, the total profit decreased as the freshness of the FAP degraded. To improve customer satisfaction, this paper recommends adding a front warehouse to improve the freshness of FAP. Although this option increases the logistics costs, it has the potential of increasing the overall profit of the FAP supply chain. Findings from this research have the potential to help the e-commerce platform with coordinating the various stakeholders on the supply chain to determine the optimal quality and quantity of FAPs, eventually improving the operational efficiency of the FAP direct sales supply chain by reducing the logistics costs of FAP.

To reduce resource loss and environmental pollution, green CLSC has become a hot issue that manufacturing enterprises pay attention to. In green CLSC, manufacturers would pay attention to the fairness of profit distribution when making sales efforts. Therefore, this paper studies a green closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) considering manufacturer sales efforts and fairness concerns. Then, the centralized model and decentralized model are built and analyzed. Afterward, a profit-sharing contract between members is designed to coordinate the supply chain. We made the following observations: (1) The manufacturers’ fairness concerns would reduce product green degree, sales effort and recycling rate of used products, which is not conducive to the sustainable development of the green closed-loop supply chain. (2) When the manufacturers’ fairness concerns are gradually strengthened, the optimal decisions would deviate even more from the optimal equilibrium results. (3) When the coefficient of fairness concerns and the ratio of profit-sharing satisfy a certain range, Pareto improvement can be effectively realized.

This article constructed a four-level fresh agricultural product (FAP) supply chain with a two-stage pricing strategy under a “community group purchase (CGP) platform + direct procurement from the FAP supplier” sales model. We investigate the influence of the CGP agency’s participation in the control strategy of FAP freshness preservation efforts on the profits of supply chain stakeholders. This article discusses the effects of the FAP supplier profit-sharing ratio, the CGP agency profit-sharing ratio, and consumers’ sensitivity to FAP freshness on the supply chain stakeholders’ freshness preservation efforts. Moreover, based on the fairness preference theory, this article designed a profit-sharing contract that involves the Nash bargaining game between the FAP supplier and the CGP agency as the supply chain coordination mechanism. Modeling results revealed that: (1) The CGP agency’s freshness preservation efforts increased total supply chain profits. (2) The FAP supplier profit-sharing ratio, CGP agency profit-sharing ratio, and consumers’ sensitivity to FAP freshness have a positive correlation to the profits of the FAP supply chain and promote the coordination of the supply chain. (3) Considering fairness preferences, with the increase in FAP suppliers’ business negotiating ability, their freshness preservation efforts and fairness utility both increased gradually, while the fairness utility of the CGP agency gradually decreased.

This paper proposes a model to study the arrangement of Islamic project finance with the participation of the government as a provider of loan guarantees. The owner-shareholders (musharakah certificate holders) initiate a project and raise funds by issuing Islamic profit-loss sharing mudarabah certificates. The government intervenes in providing financial guarantees in order to enhance the creditworthiness and increase the mudarabah capital capacity of the project. Our work raises several policy implications related to the structuring of Islamic project finance and the participation of both government and multilateral public agencies such as the Islamic Development Bank. It provides a unifying framework for the improvement of access to funds for Islamic projects and gives a rationale for government intervention in the arrangement of these projects.

Construction machinery operations are intrinsically linked to critical societal challenges, including safety risks and carbon emissions. In response to the high incidence of fatal accidents during installation and dismantling phases, the Chinese government has officially promoted integrated installation–dismantling services to enhance construction safety since 2023. However, the economic viability of this policy for leasing companies remains largely underexplored. To address this gap, this paper develops a leasing-oriented closed-loop construction machinery supply chain model that incorporates integrated installation–dismantling services under an industrial internet platform. The study first compares and analyzes the product leasing demand, installation and dismantling demand, and supply chain profits under both centralized and decentralized decision-making scenarios. Based on these analyses, a profit–cost sharing joint contract is designed to coordinate the supply chain. Furthermore, the interrelationships among key parameters are examined through a sensitivity analysis and numerical simulation. The results reveal that enhancing leasing information services increases both the demand for construction machinery and the platform’s operating costs. These costs are positively correlated with the product’s selling price, leading to higher purchasing costs for lessees. Similarly, improving information services for installation and dismantling raises the platform’s operating costs and enhances service levels, which in turn increases installation and dismantling costs for lessees. The findings demonstrate that within a certain range of cost-sharing and leasing-sharing proportional coefficients, the joint contract enables the supply chain to achieve Pareto optimization. This approach simultaneously alleviates economic pressure on lessees, improves construction safety, and promotes the integration of installation and dismantling services.

A supply chain of single manufacturer and single retailer is analyzed when units in warehouse are subject to deterioration at a constant rate. The demand is a decreasing function of selling price and increasing function of credit period offered by the retailer to the customers. Manufacturer follows a lot-for-lot production strategy. The manufacturer ensures delay payment to the retailer with agreement that the retailer will share a fraction of the profit realized during the credit period. The total joint profit of the supply chain is maximized with respect to replenishment time, selling price, and credit period. An algorithm is described to find the best strategy. Numerical examples are given to validate the proposed problem. Sensitivity analysis is carried out to examine important model parameters.

While remanufacturing is highly encouraged worldwide, some original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) in the electrical and electronics industry are still not willing to embrace remanufacturing, for fear of expensive investment or the cannibalization of existing products. Meanwhile, third-party remanufacturers’ (TPRs) remanufactured products are developing quickly. Due to quality reasons, consumers usually have a higher preference for OEM-certified remanufactured products than uncertified ones. As such, remanufacturing certification has become a strategy that OEMs can use to benefit from product remanufacturing. Our paper focuses on the remanufacturing certification contract between an OEM and a TPR. Once certified, the TPR makes payments to the OEM. These payment terms will affect their enthusiasm for participating in remanufacturing certification. By establishing game models among an OEM, a certified TPR, and an uncertified TPR, our paper explores three certification contracts, namely, the lump-sum payment, profit-sharing payment, and piece-rate payment. We identify the conditions for the OEM and certified TPR to reach a win-win outcome. Our results show that when TPRs have a high profit margin and there is no significant difference in consumers’ preferences between certified and non-certified remanufacturing channels, the profit-sharing payment contract yields the highest profit; otherwise, the piece-rate payment contract is best for the OEM.