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Prosecutors will seek a grand jury indictment of former FBI director James B. Comey on allegations that he lied to Congress.

Law professor and former prosecutor Mushtaq Gunja explains how the grand jury works in criminal prosecution.

On March 5, 2020, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC) decided to authorize the prosecutor to commence a proprio motu investigation into the alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the Afghanistan War since 2003. This decision is the first case where the requirements for the authorization of an investigation under Article 15(4) of the ICC Rome Statute (Statute) were tested on appeal. The case lays down a marker as to how the ICC sees the division of roles between the Pre-Trial Chamber and the Office of the Prosecutor. The Appeals Chamber proved willing to give the prosecutor broad discretion at the investigation stage. Without limiting principles, this approach may eventually expand the role of the Court beyond what the Statute permits.

Objective: The prosecutor's office in making policies to represent the public interest is a form of realization of law enforcement and justice. Not all public interests can be represented by the Prosecutor's Office when filing for bankruptcy. The public interest that can be represented by the Prosecutor's Office as a basis for submitting a bankruptcy application is the interest of the majority. The aim is to formulate the nature of the public interest as the basis for the Prosecutor's authority to file for Bankruptcy.   Methode:This research is a type of normative research.   Result: The essence of the public interest as the basis for the Prosecutor's authority to file for bankruptcy is the Prosecutor's policy in making decisions that represent the interests of the majority, so that the Prosecutor can realize the hope of implementing law enforcement and achieving justice.

We examine whether elections of public prosecutors influence the mix of cases taken to trial versus plea bargained. A theoretical model is constructed wherein voters use outcomes of the criminal justice system as a signal of prosecutors' quality, leading to a distortion in the mix of cases taken to trial. Using data from North Carolina we test whether reelection pressures lead to (a) an increase in the number and proportion of convictions from jury trials and (b) a decrease in the average sanction obtained in both jury trials and pleas. Our empirical findings are consistent with our theoretical predictions.

The Supreme Court will hear oral arguments about whether a man involved in the Jan. 6, 2021, assault on the Capitol can be charged with obstructing an official proceeding. The case could also impact Trump’s own prosecution for allegedly trying to remain in power after his 2020 defeat.

El tema de la justicia transicional mexicana, materializado a través de una Fiscalía Especial que funcionó entre 2001 y 2006, sigue siendo ignorado en la academia. La mayoría de los estudios existentes supone que la Fiscalía Especial fue creada para generar resultados que contribuirían a la consolidación de la democracia mexicana: particularmente, verdad y justicia. También señalan que esta institución fracasó, porque no obtuvo verdad ni justicia. No coinciden, sin embargo, sobre las razones detrás de dicho fracaso: falta de voluntad política, ausencia de personal capacitado, elaboración de estrategias jurídicas torpes. Este artículo se aleja de estas interpretaciones y rastrea la genealogía de la Fiscalía Especial. Para hacerlo, analiza críticamente el papel crucial que desempeñó en la justicia transicional la Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos (CNDH), institución que hasta ahora ha sido ignorada en los estudios sobre el tema. El argumento que enmarca esta investigación es que, en México, la justicia transicional fue diseñada por la CNDH de tal manera que contribuyó a perpetuar la injusticia. Este artículo busca mostrar que no es que la Fiscalía Especial haya fracasado en la marcha, sino que desde su origen fue pensada para otorgar un indulto a los perpetradores de crímenes. The issue of transitional justice in Mexico, through the Special Prosecutor’s Office that functioned between 2001 and 2006, continues to be ignored in academia. Most existing studies assume that the Special Prosecutor’s Office was created to generate results to contribute to the consolidation of Mexican democracy, in particular truth and justice. They also point out that this institution failed because it did not achieve truth or justice. They do not agree, however, on the reasons for this failure, such as lack of political will, lack of trained personnel, and clumsy legal strategies. This article moves away from these interpretations and traces the genealogy of the Special Prosecutor’s Office. It critically analyzes the crucial role played in transitional justice by the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH), an institution that has so far been ignored in studies on the subject. The argument framing this research is that, in Mexico, transitional justice was designed by the CNDH in such a way that it contributed to the perpetuation of injustice. This article seeks to show that it is not that the Special Prosecutor’s Office has failed on the ground, but that from its inception was designed to generate impunity.

International justice has become a crucial part of the ongoing political debates about the future of shattered societies like Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda, Cambodia, and Chile. Why do our governments sometimes display such striking idealism in the face of war crimes and atrocities abroad, and at other times cynically abandon the pursuit of international justice altogether? Why today does justice seem so slow to come for war crimes victims in the Balkans? In this book, Gary Bass offers an unprecedented look at the politics behind international war crimes tribunals, combining analysis with investigative reporting and a broad historical perspective. The Nuremberg trials powerfully demonstrated how effective war crimes tribunals can be. But there have been many other important tribunals that have not been as successful, and which have been largely left out of today's debates about international justice. This timely book brings them in, using primary documents to examine the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, World War I, the Armenian genocide, World War II, and the recent wars in the former Yugoslavia. Bass explains that bringing war criminals to justice can be a military ordeal, a source of endless legal frustration, as well as a diplomatic nightmare. The book takes readers behind the scenes to see vividly how leaders like David Lloyd George, Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt, and Bill Clinton have wrestled with these agonizing moral dilemmas. The book asks how law and international politics interact, and how power can be made to serve the cause of justice. Bass brings new archival research to bear on such events as the prosecution of the Armenian genocide, presenting surprising episodes that add to the historical record. His sections on the former Yugoslavia tell--with important new discoveries--the secret story of the politicking behind the prosecution of war crimes in Bosnia, drawing on interviews with senior White House officials, key diplomats, and chief prosecutors at the war crimes tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Bass concludes that despite the obstacles, legalistic justice for war criminals is nonetheless worth pursuing. His arguments will interest anyone concerned about human rights and the pursuit of idealism in international politics.

Prior studies in the United States argue that the discretionary decisions of federal prosecutors regarding which issues to prioritize are shaped by the politicians who appoint them, while studies on state prosecutors emphasize the role of press coverage and public opinion. However, these studies leave untheorized whether prosecutors’ discretionary decisions are also affected by how their peers frame issues within and beyond prosecution offices. Building on the scholarship of collective action frames, this study develops a framework to explain how prosecutors’ framing work affects their colleagues’ decisions about which issues to focus on. I draw on the case of Brazil, where federal prosecutors focused on crime-fighting and human rights, but in the mid-2010s switched focus to corruption following a large-scale investigation called Lava Jato . I compare Lava Jato with two similarly large investigations that failed to transform corruption into the dominant issue within the Public Prosecutor’s Office. Drawing on 131 original interviews, I show how federal prosecutors’ framing work can persuade their colleagues to focus on the same issue through two stages: (1) conceptualization of versatile frames that speak to problems a variety of issues prosecutors care about and (2) diffusion of frames through professional meetings – providing roadmaps for how other prosecutors can implement the new frame – and to the press, increasing public attention.

Fulton County District Attorney Fani T. Willis told The Washington Post on Nov. 14 that she was “not happy” that recorded video statements tied to plea deals in the case against former president Donald Trump were leaked.