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Newly developed historical time series on public debt, along with data on external debts, allow a deeper analysis of the debt cycles underlying serial debt and banking crises. We test three related hypotheses at both \"world\" aggregate levels and on an individual country basis. First, external debt surges are an antecedent to banking crises. Second, banking crises (domestic and those in financial centers) often precede or accompany sovereign debt crises; we find they help predict them. Third, public borrowing surges ahead of external sovereign default, as governments have \"hidden domestic debts\" that exceed the better documented levels of external debt.

States of Creditprovides the first comprehensive look at the joint development of representative assemblies and public borrowing in Europe during the medieval and early modern eras. In this pioneering book, David Stasavage argues that unique advances in political representation allowed certain European states to gain early and advantageous access to credit, but the emergence of an active form of political representation itself depended on two underlying factors: compact geography and a strong mercantile presence. Stasavage shows that active representative assemblies were more likely to be sustained in geographically small polities. These assemblies, dominated by mercantile groups that lent to governments, were in turn more likely to preserve access to credit. Given these conditions, smaller European city-states, such as Genoa and Cologne, had an advantage over larger territorial states, including France and Castile, because mercantile elites structured political institutions in order to effectively monitor public credit. While creditor oversight of public funds became an asset for city-states in need of finance, Stasavage suggests that the long-run implications were more ambiguous. City-states with the best access to credit often had the most closed and oligarchic systems of representation, hindering their ability to accept new economic innovations. This eventually transformed certain city-states from economic dynamos into rentier republics. Exploring the links between representation and debt in medieval and early modern Europe,States of Creditcontributes to broad debates about state formation and Europe's economic rise.

This article has examined the impact of public expenditure on economic growth and viability of fiscal policy when the deficit in budget is financed by public borrowing. A number of alternative criteria have been used as indicators of solvency in fiscal balance. The study is based on the theoretical framework and supported by the results of time series analysis in the Indian context. It is found that the share of revenue expenditure (RE) of the government has significantly increased over time and many of the components of RE are non-developmental in nature. The article argues that if growth suffers, it will put adverse impact on fiscal balance. The ratio of gross fiscal deficit (GFD) to net national product (NNP) and growth of NNP are co-integrated, and the ratio is found to increase with increase in NNP indicating deterioration in fiscal balance. The increase in total expenditure of the government has caused rise of the ratio of revenue deficit to total spending. Interest payment on public debt has led to the increase of the ratio of GFD to income. These results are indicators of non-viability of fiscal policy in India at least in the short run.

There is a conventional wisdom in economics that public debt can serve as a substitute for private credit if private borrowing is limited. The purpose of this paper is to show that, while a government could in principle use such a policy to fully relax borrowing limits, this is not generally optimal. In our economy, agents invest in a short-term asset, a long-term asset, and government bonds. Agents are subject to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks prior to the maturity of the long-term asset. We show that a high public debt policy fully relaxes private borrowing limits and is suboptimal. This is because agents expecting such a policy respond by investing less than is socially optimal in the short asset which can protect them in the event of a liquidity shock. The optimal policy is more constrained and it induces a wedge between the technological rate of return on the long asset and the rate of return on bonds. In such a regime, agents subject to liquidity shocks are also borrowing constrained, and this expectation of being borrowing constrained induces them to invest the optimal level in the short asset.

This article investigates the politics of sovereign borrowing in Europe over the very long run. I consider three alternative hypotheses regarding the sources of borrower credibility. According to the first, European states with constitutional checks on executive authority found it easier to obtain credit at low interest rates than did states that lacked such constraints. My second hypothesis focuses on state type (city-state versus territorial state) and the way in which this may have influenced the balance of political power between owners of land and owners of capital in a society. This hypothesis suggests that after controlling for other factors, one should observe that city-states in Europe found it easier to borrow than did larger territorial states, and that these city-states paid lower interest rates on their debt. Finally, my third hypothesis suggests that borrower credibility depended on the simultaneous presence of both constitutional checks and balances and a city-state. When one considers a broad sample of cases over a long time span there is strong support for the proposition involving city-states and merchant power, but less support for the argument that constitutional checks influenced credibility regardless of state type (city-state or territorial state). There is, however, some empirical evidence of an interaction effect whereby constitutional constraints on rulers made city-states particularly credible as borrowers. My results are robust to a number of controls for alternative determinants, for sample selection bias, and for the endogeneity of city-state development.I would like to thank Robert Fannion, Jeff Frieden, Peter Gourevitch, Lisa Martin, Adam Przeworski, Ronald Rogowski, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Ken Scheve, Mike Tomz, Nikki Velasco, two anonymous referees, and seminar participants at Stanford and UCLA for comments on a previous draft. This research was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council (UK).

This article studies a flat tax reform and capital tax reform in an economy with occupational choice and borrowing constraints. Building on previous models with heterogeneous agents and the flat tax reform within the representative firm framework, we introduce entrepreneurs as an occupation. We model endogenous entry and exit of firms whose size, number and production decisions are affected by the tax system. We compare steady state allocations in the benchmark economy with a progressive tax schedule to steady states with a flat tax at different exemption levels with or without a capital tax reform. We find that for low exemption levels the flat tax reform is efficient as well as welfare improving for both occupations.

The National policy on public-private partnerships (PPP) recently approved by the Government of Ghana (GoG) sets out the government's intention to use PPPs to improve the quality, cost-effectiveness, and timely provision of public infrastructure in Ghana. The PPP policy highlights the role of the government's financial support to PPPs, as well as the importance of putting in place a system to manage the associated fiscal commitments (FCs). As noted in the policy, the government's contribution to a PPP may include remuneration to the private party from government budgets, which may be fixed or partially fixed, periodic payments (annuities) and contingent. This report proposes an operational framework for managing fiscal obligations arising from PPPs in Ghana. This framework aims to ensure that PPP FCs are consistently identified and assessed during PPP project preparation, and that these assessments are fed into project approval. The report outlines roles and responsibilities, concepts, and processes for managing PPP FCs, drawing on international standards and practices, bearing in mind existing institutions and capacities in Ghana. The report also suggests legislative additions and capacity building needed to establish this framework in practice. This report focuses primarily on managing long-term FCs to PPPs, including regular payments or contingent liabilities (CL) that typically last throughout a project's lifetime. This report is structured as follows: chapter 1 is introduction; chapter; 2 introduces the concept of FCs from PPPs: how and why PPPs create FCs, why managing them is important, and an overview of what it entails; chapter 3 presents institutional roles and responsibilities; chapter 4 describes how FC management should be incorporated in the PPP development and approval process; chapter 5 describes how FCs can be managed during PPP implementation by monitoring, reporting, and budgeting adequately; and chapter 6 sets out the steps needed to begin to implement this PPP framework-to build its core requirements into the forthcoming PPP Law, and to build capacity in the relevant entities to carry out those requirements in practice.

The author came to Australia in August 2012 to present the annual Ted Wheelwright memorial lecture at the University of Sydney. The article is an abridged version of her full address. A video of the full speech, with an introduction by Meredith Burgmann, can be seen on the JAPE website at http://australianpe.wix.com/japehome#!wheelwright/ciqv.

This book is intended to explain the factors underlying the stellar growth record that has led to Armenia's emergence as the Caucasian Tiger and to provide policy advice to the Armenian authorities to ensure the continuation of this growth. The book is presented in two parts, with Part I containing analysis and policy advice and Part II containing detailed background papers.