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Ethnic insurgents sometimes defect to join forces with the state during civil wars. Ethnic defection can have important effects on conflict outcomes, but its causes have been understudied. Using Sunni defection in Iraq as a theory-developing case, this article offers a theory of \"fratricidal flipping\" that identifies lethal competition between insurgent factions as an important cause of defection. It examines the power of the fratricidal-flipping mechanism against competing theories in the cases of Kashmir and Sri Lanka. These wars involve within-conflict variation in defection across groups and over time. A detailed study of the empirical record, including significant fieldwork, suggests that fratricide was the dominant trigger for defection, while government policy played a secondary role in facilitating pro-state paramilitarism. Deep ideological disagreements were surprisingly unimportant in driving defection. The argument is probed in other wars in Asia. The complex internal politics of insurgent movements deserve careful attention.

Many states in Latin America, Africa, and Asia lack the monopoly of violence, even though this was identified by Max Weber as the foundation of the state, and thus the capacity to govern effectively. In this paper we develop a new perspective on the establishment of the monopoly of violence. We build a model to explain the incentive of central states to eliminate nonstate armed actors (paramilitaries) in a democracy. The model is premised on the idea that paramilitaries may choose to and can influence elections. Since paramilitaries have preferences over policies, this reduces the incentives of the politicians they favor to eliminate them. We then investigate these ideas using data from Colombia between 1991 and 2006. We first present regression and case study evidence supporting our postulate that paramilitary groups can have significant effects on elections for the legislature and the executive. Next, we show that the evidence is also broadly consistent with the implication of the model that paramilitaries tend to persist to the extent that they deliver votes to candidates for the executive whose preferences are close to theirs and that this effect is larger in areas where the presidential candidate would have otherwise not done as well. Finally, we use roll-call votes to illustrate a possible \"quid pro quo\" between the executive and paramilitaries in Colombia.

In an era when the global community is confronted with challenges posed by violent nonstate organizations--from FARC in Colombia to the Taliban in Afghanistan--our understanding of the nature and emergence of these groups takes on heightened importance. Julie Mazzei's timely study offers a comprehensive analysis of the dynamics that facilitate the organization and mobilization of one of the most virulent types of these organizations, paramilitary groups (PMGs).Mazzei reconstructs in rich historical context the organization of PMGs in Colombia, El Salvador, and Mexico, identifying the variables that together create a triad of factors enabling paramilitary emergence: ambivalent state officials, powerful military personnel, and privileged members of the economic elite. Nations embroiled in domestic conflicts often find themselves stuck between a rock and a hard place when global demands for human rights contradict internal expectations and demands for political stability. Mazzei elucidates the importance of such circumstances in the emergence of PMGs, exploring the roles played by interests and policies at both the domestic and international levels. By offering an explanatory model of paramilitary emergence, Mazzei provides a framework to facilitate more effective policy making aimed at mitigating and undermining the political potency of these dangerous forces.

The Lord's Resistance Army is Africa's most extraordinarily persistent and notorious 'terrorist' group. From the issue of child soldiers to the response of the Ugandan government, this book looks at the various aspects of this most brutal of conflicts.

Gerwarth offers a new perspective on paramilitary violence that differs from previous investigations in two ways. He conceptualizes post-war Central Europe as a transnational theater of paramilitary ultra-violence in which a new type of warrior, born out of Central Europe's 'culture of defeat' and unrestrained by conventional military discipline and moral reservations, staged bloody rituals of retribution against real and imagined enemies. He engages closely with the cultural, social and psychological preconditions and group dynamics that shaped the activists' response to defeat and revolution. He also investigates the social origins and composition of ultra-violent paramilitary movements in Central Europe, it therefore places particular emphasis on the human agency of individuals.

This article discusses the political success of the far-right Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik). Jobbik is usually depicted as owing its success to anti-Roma and anti-establishment sentiment, mobilized with the help of a paramilitary organization, the Hungarian Guard. With the examples of the party programs, the speeches of Jobbik leaders during marches of the Hungarian Guard, and the press releases of the party between 2008 and 2010, this article shows how Jobbik not only attempts to mobilize anti-Roma sentiment, but also tries to present itself as a party taking considerable interest in the economic issues of poverty and inequality triggered by capitalism. It also suggests that the party's success might in fact also be due to this focus on the economy, as well as due to increasing efforts on behalf of the party leadership to differentiate their positions from those of the main center-right party, Fidesz. This could explain how even though authorities banned the Hungarian Guard in July 2009, Jobbik nevertheless doubled its number of voters in the parliamentary elections of April 2010 (and achieved a further increase in absolute vote numbers in 2014) as compared to its electoral outcome in the European Parliament elections of June 2009.

Over the years, paramilitary groups and the Colombian state have jointly policed marginal neighborhoods of the city of Medellin. Using evidence from events that have marked the history of this Colombian city, I argue that the murky pact between paramilitary and state forces reveal the nature of the state, as a force of capture, and of its sovereignty. Building on the analysis of the Italian word intreccio (intertwining) that Jane and Peter Schneider use to analyze the Sicilian Mafia and its link to the Italian state, and using Deleuze and Guattari's concept of the \"war machine\" acquired by the state for reterritorialization, I suggest that the intertwinement between the state and organized crime is a manifestation of the presence of the state, not of its absence at the margins. I conclude that this intertwinement is not a sign of the state's weakness but of its power; a proof of the state's effectiveness, not of its failure.

\"Paramilitary violence\" means military or quasi-military organizations and practices that either expanded or replaced the activities of conventional military formations. Sometimes this violence occurred in the vacuum left by collapsing states; on other occasions it served as an adjunct to state power; in yet others it was deployed against the state. It included revolutionary and counterrevolutionary violence committed in the name of secular ideologies as well as ethnic violence linked to the founding of new nation-states or to minority groups that resisted this process. It shared the stage with other violence, such as social protest, insurrection, terrorism, police repression, criminality, and conventional armed combat. Here, Gerwarth and Horne explore the origins, manifestations, and legacies of paramilitarism as it emerged between 1917 and 1923.

The decision to respect the law – or not – is far from automatic, regardless of whether it is taken by an armed group or a state. Respect for international humanitarian law (IHL) can only be encouraged, and hence improved, if the reasons used by armed groups to justify respect or lack of it are understood and if the arguments in favour of respect take those reasons into account. Among the reasons for respecting the law, two considerations weigh particularly heavily for armed groups: their self-image and the military advantage. Among the reasons for non-respect, three are uppermost: the group's objective, the military advantage, and what IHL represents according to the group.

A distinctive feature of the conflict in Northern Ireland over the past forty years has been the way Catholic and Protestant paramilitaries have policed their own communities. This has mainly involved the violent punishment of petty criminals involved in joyriding and other types of antisocial behavior. Between 1973 and 2007, more than 5,000 nonmilitary shootings and assaults were attributed to paramilitaries punishing their own people. But despite the risk of severe punishment, young petty offenders--known locally as \"hoods\"--continue to offend, creating a puzzle for the rational theory of criminal deterrence. Why do hoods behave in ways that invite violent punishment? InThe Hoods, Heather Hamill explains why this informal system of policing and punishment developed and endured and why such harsh punishments as beatings, \"kneecappings,\" and exile have not stopped hoods from offending. Drawing on a variety of sources, including interviews with perpetrators and victims of this violence, the book argues that the hoods' risky offending may amount to a game in which hoods gain prestige by displaying hard-to-fake signals of toughness to each other. Violent physical punishment feeds into this signaling game, increasing the hoods' status by proving that they have committed serious offenses and can \"manfully\" take punishment yet remained undeterred. A rare combination of frontline research and pioneering ideas,The Hoodshas important implications for our fundamental understanding of crime and punishment.