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957 result(s) for "Parmenides"
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τὸ ἐξαίφνης and Time in Plato's Parmenides
I argue, through Heidegger, that the notion of τὸ ἐξαίφνης in the Parmenides does not signify eternity, or a trace of eternity in time, but rather implies a primordial conception of time. In deduction two, the relationship between stasis and kinesis becomes problematic due to the notion of τὸ νῦν. This leads Parmenides, in deduction three, to posit the notion of τὸ ἐξαίφνης to solve this problematic relationship, implying a primordial conception of time.
Likeness and likelihood in the Presocratics and Plato
\"The Greek word eoikos can be translated in various ways. It can be used to describe similarity, plausibility or even suitability. This book explores the philosophical exploitation of its multiple meanings by three philosophers, Xenophanes, Parmenides and Plato. It offers new interpretations of the way that each employs the term to describe the status of their philosophy, tracing the development of this philosophical use of eoikos from the fallibilism of Xenophanes through the deceptive cosmology of Parmenides to Plato's Timaeus. The central premise of the book is that, in reflecting on the eoikos status of their accounts, Xenophanes, Parmenides and Plato are manipulating the contexts and connotations of the term as it has been used by their predecessors. By focusing on this continuity in the development of the philosophical use of eoikos, the book serves to enhance our understanding of the epistemology and methodology of Xenophanes, Parmenides and Plato's Timaeus\"-- Provided by publisher.
The Nun in the Parmenides : Not Another Exaiphnês
After some preliminary remarks about Plato’s use of the adverb nun , I explain what the nun is by offering a close textual analysis of the key passage in which it is explicitly addressed ( Parm . 151e3–153b7). Its metaxu nature, between duration and limit, requires one to consider another temporal notion of the second part of the Parmenides that is metaxu , namely the exaiphnês . I explain why the nun does not conceptually overlap with the exaiphnês , arguing moreover that there is no model where both notions fit, but rather a model accounting for a switch and another one accounting for continuous change. Après quelques remarques préliminaires sur l’emploi par Platon de l’adverbe nun , j’explore la nature du nun à travers une lecture approfondie du passage où la notion est spécifiquement examinée ( Parm . 151e3–153b7). Sa nature metaxu , située entre la durée et la limite, conduit à examiner l’autre notion temporelle de la deuxième partie du Parménide qui est metaxu , c’est-à-dire l’ exaiphnês . J’explique pourquoi le nun et l’ exaiphnês doivent être distingués et pourquoi il n’existe pas de modèle où les deux notions s’inscrivent simultanément, mais plutôt un modèle rendant compte d’un saut et un modèle rendant compte d’un changement continu.
The Secret of the Untrembling Heart
Abstract The poem by Parmenides is widely recognized as having a decisive influence on Greek philosophy. The text is also notorious for its interpretative problems owing to its obscure poetic style. Among the discordant quotes from the proem, Simplicius uniquely preserves a verse with the unparalleled genitive εὐκυκλέος (literally 'of [the] well-wheeled'). Contrary to a recent editorial trend in opting for the lectio facilior εὐπειθέος ('of [the] well-persuasive'), I argue in this paper that the lectio difficilior is genuine testimony to a poetic device designed by Parmenides to perform a pivotal role in the proemial structure as a whole, and to redeploy a key concept in archaic verbal art by means of paronomasia: the 'glory' (κλέος) conveyed through the costly medium of song. The proem thus gives characteristic voice to the experimental spirit of inquiry in which Parmenides variously challenged and took his cue from the conceptual framework of encomiastic performance.
Bit, videz in gola navideznost. Od Parmenida k Platonu
Being, Seeming, and Mere Seemingness. From Parmenides Towards Plato The present paper is an attempt to rethink the relationship between being and seeming at the outset of metaphysics as demonstrated in Heidegger’s history of being. Following Heidegger’s interpretation of Parmenides’s poem On Nature, the paper demonstrates the original ancient Greek relationship between being and seeming, when both were understood in terms of the proto-metaphysical phýsis. It illustrates crucial moments in the search for being from Parmenides to Plato, which lead to the abandonment of seeming. It is shown how the movement from cave-like seeming to knowing transformed the notion of seeming and drew it away from being into mere seemingness.
Parmenides' vision
This book intends to establish, against his numerous modern critics, that the ancient philosopher Parmenides was a mystic. Instead of arriving at his conclusions by cold reason, Parmenides found the unity of Being, which he called \"the Truth,\" by turning to a life of meditation.
The Central Role of Incommensurability in Pre-Euclidean Greek Mathematics and Philosophy
In this paper we outline the tremendous impact that the Pythagorean discovery of incommensurability had on pre-Euclidean Greek Mathematics and Philosophy. This will be a consequence of our findings that the Pythagorean method of proof of incommensurability is anthyphairetic, namely depends on Proposition X.2 of the Elements, according to which if the anthyphairesis of two line segments is infinite, then they are incommensurable. Our fundamental finding is that the main entity of Plato's philosophy, the intelligible Being, is a philosophical analogue/imitation of a dyad in periodic anthyphairesis. One byproduct of our deeper and mathematical understanding of Plato's philosophy is that we can next show (a) that Plato's intelligible Beings coincide with the earlier Zeno's true Beings, and (b) that the purpose of Zeno's arguments and most exciting paradoxes is not to deny motion or multiplicity, as usually thought, but to separate the true Beings from the sensible entities of opinion. Although Plato's early/middle work is greatly influenced by the Pythagoreans and Zeno, in his late work he employed via philosophical imitation, the stunning discovery of the great Athenian mathematician Theaetetus, namely the palindromic periodicity theorem for quadratic incommensurabilities (established in modern era by Lagrange and Euler). The study of incommensurability via periodic anthyphairesis produced great Mathematics and great Philosophy; however this approach could only deal with quadratic, and did not extend to solid incommensurabilities. Archytas and Eudoxus marked the beginning of a new, non-anthyphairetic era for incommensurability. In one way or another, the Greek Mathematics (Pythagoreans, Theodorus, Theaetetus, Archytas, Eudoxus) and Philosophy (Pythagoreans, Zeno, Plato) of the pre-Euclidean era were dominated by the Pythagorean discovery of incommensurability.
The \question of Existence\ in the Poem of Parmenides
This paper studies Parmenides' use of the Greek verb 'be' aiming at understanding the way the concept of 'being' was established by the thinkers he influenced. It focuses on the notion of 'existence' aiming to evaluate the correction of our use of the verb 'to exist' to translate the Greek verb 'einai' in Parmenides' Peri physeôs. Based on cognitive considerations, Parmenides presents his thesis on the impossibility of knowing \"what is not\" (B2.5-8a) in order to establish \"what is\" as \"what is there to know\" (B2.2; B8.15-18), consequently allowing the identity of \"thinking\" and \"being\" (B3, B8.34). If, throughout his argument in the Way of Truth, Parmenides reads \"existence\" as a presupposition of \"what is\", but never as a separate predicate, a separated existential reading of the verb 'be' in \"is/is not\", \"what is/what is not\" should be rejected.