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Latin America's leaders
Based on exclusive interviews with over three hundred politicians - former presidents, vice presidents, current party officials and hundreds more - this work exposes what the Pink Tide really thinks of its presidents. Arguing that the political styles of leaders such as Hugo Chávez, Rafael Correa, Álvaro Uribe and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner are far better explained in the context of their respective countries' party systems, the authors examine political stability through the paradoxical relationship between democracy and the concentration of power in charismatic individuals. This is the definitive guide to the world's most left-wing continent.
Book
Post-Communist Mafia State
Having won a two-third majority in Parliament at the 2010 elections, the Hungarian political party Fidesz removed many of the institutional obstacles of exerting power. Just like the party, the state itself was placed under the control of a single individual, who since then has applied the techniques used within his party to enforce submission and obedience onto society as a whole. In a new approach the author characterizes the system as the ‘organized over-world’, the ‘state employing mafia methods’ and the ’adopted political family', applying these categories not as metaphors but elements of a coherent conceptual framework.The actions of the post-communist mafia state model are closely aligned with the interests of power and wealth concentrated in the hands of a small group of insiders. While the traditional mafia channeled wealth and economic players into its spheres of influence by means of direct coercion, the mafia state does the same by means of parliamentary legislation, legal prosecution, tax authority, police forces and secret service. The innovative conceptual framework of the book is important and timely not only for Hungary, but also for other post-communist countries subjected to autocratic rules.
eBook
SELF-ENFORCING DEMOCRACY
If democracy is to have the good effects said to justify it, it must be selfenforcing in that incumbents choose to hold regular, competitive elections and comply with the results. I consider models of electoral accountability that allow rulers a choice of whether to hold elections and citizens whether to rebel. When individuals observe diverse signals of government performance, coordination to pose a credible threat of protest if the ruler \"shirks\" is problematic. The convention of an electoral calendar and known rules can provide a public signal for coordinating rebellion if elections are suspended or blatantly rigged, while the elections themselves aggregate private observations of performance. Two threats to this solution to political moral hazard are considered. First, a ruling faction that controls the army may prefer to fight after losing an election, and ex post transfers may not be credible. A party system in which today's losers may win in the future can restore self-enforcing democracy, though at the cost of weaker electoral control. Second, subtle electoral fraud can undermine the threat of coordinated opposition that maintains elections. I show that when there are organizations in society that can observe and announce a signal of the extent of popular discontent, the incumbent may prefer to commit to fair elections over an \"accountable autocratic\" equilibrium in which public goods are provided but costly rebellions periodically occur.
Journal Article
Bankrupt representation and party system collapse
In recent decades, Bolivia, Colombia, Italy, and Venezuela have all faced the turmoil and democratic crisis of party system collapse. In Bankrupt Representation and Party System Collapse, Jana Morgan analyzes the causes of such collapse. She does so through a detailed examination of Venezuela's traumatic party system decay as well as comparative analysis of seven other countries. Collapse occurs when the party system as a whole is unable to provide adequate linkage between society and the state, failing to furnish programmatic representation, integration of major societal interests, or clientelist exchanges. Linkage decays when party systems face challenges that jeopardize their core strategies at the same time that they are constrained in their ability to adapt and to confront these threats. If this decay is unchecked and linkage of all sorts fails, then the bankrupt party system collapses.
eBook
Democratic quality in Southern Europe : France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain
Fueled by new data from the Varieties of Democracy project, Democratic Quality in Southern Europe takes a close look at the democratic trajectories of France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain over the past fifty years.
Despite similar beginnings, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain have experienced significant variations in the way their democracies have evolved. Covering ground from the protest movements of the late '60s and early '70s to the challenges that resulted from the financial crisis of the Great Recession, editor Tiago Fernandes expertly draws together a collection of essays that look beyond the impact of socioeconomic development in these five countries, exploring innovative and nuanced explanations for their diverging paths.
Democratic Quality in Southern Europe combines new data with classical methodologies to create fresh, convincing hypotheses on the development, quality, and depth of democracy in this critical region.
Contributors: Tiago Fernandes, Rui Branco, João Cancela, Edna Costa, Pedro Diniz de Sousa, Pedro T. Magalhães, Edalina Rodrigues Sanches, José Santana-Pereira, Tiago Tibúrcio
eBook
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
This book develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. Different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Thus democracy is preferred by the majority of citizens, but opposed by elites. Dictatorship nevertheless is not stable when citizens can threaten social disorder and revolution. In response, when the costs of repression are sufficiently high and promises of concessions are not credible, elites may be forced to create democracy. By democratizing, elites credibly transfer political power to the citizens, ensuring social stability. Democracy consolidates when elites do not have strong incentive to overthrow it. These processes depend on (1) the strength of civil society, (2) the structure of political institutions, (3) the nature of political and economic crises, (4) the level of economic inequality, (5) the structure of the economy, and (6) the form and extent of globalization.
eBook
Party system transformation from below: protests by Jobbik and LMP
Recent changes in European politics—such as the rise of so-called movement parties on both the left and the right—call for a rethinking of the links between protest dynamics and party system transformation. In this paper, we contribute to the theoretical and empirical understanding of the mechanisms that unfold in periods of intensified interactions between protest and electoral politics through a case study of the transformation of the Hungarian party system. We ask what mechanisms drive parties' involvement in protests before and after entering parliament. We focus on two competitors: the radical right Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) and the green party Politics Can Be Different (LMP). Using a dataset of protest events compiled from Hungarian news agency reports and official police records, we map the protest network mobilized by the two parties between 2002 and 2022. We analytically distinguish and empirically identify three different mobilization mechanisms: strengthening the party's profile by protesting its own issue, using protest mobilization to build alliances with other parties and actors, or relying on protest to establish a presence at the local level. The empirical results show that Jobbik relies on protest through a combination of different mechanisms, while LMP uses protest to broaden its issue profile and build alliances with other political parties. Over time, both parties increasingly rely on protest to establish a local presence outside of Budapest.
Journal Article
Elite Investments in Party Institutionalization in New Democracies
This article conceptualizes party institutionalization and theorizes the conditions under which party elites invest in institutionalized parties in new democracies. We specify routinization and value infusion as two central dimensions of party institutionalization and theorize conditions relevant for party institutionalization across three central spheres: the party system, the state, and society. Constructing measures for routinization and value infusion based on expert survey data, we test our framework through multivariate regression models across parties in 18 Latin American democracies. As theoretically expected, some conditions (access to executive office, a party’s formative environment, and group ties) significantly relate to both dimensions, while others (party system polarization and fragmentation, permanent state subsidies, and legislative office) relate to one dimension only. This highlights the multidimensionality of party institutionalization as a phenomenon and the complexity of the empirical conditions associated with it.
Journal Article
The Nationalization of Politics
In an in-depth comparative and long-term analysis, first published in 2004, Daniele Caramani studies the macro-historical process of the nationalization of politics. Using a great wealth of data on single constituencies in seventeen West European countries, he reconstructs the territorial structures of electoral support for political parties, as well as their evolution since the mid-nineteenth century from highly fragmented politics in the early stages toward nation-wide alignments. Caramani provides a multi-pronged empirical analysis through time, across countries, and between party families. The inclusion in the analysis of all the most important social and political cleavages - class, state-church, rural-urban, ethno-linguistic and religious - allows him to assess the nationalizing impact of the class cleavage that emerged from national and industrial revolutions, and the resistance of preindustrial cultural factors to national integration. Institutional and socio-economic factors are combined with actor-centered patterns and differences between national types of territorial configurations of the vote.
eBook
The Politics of Service Delivery in Pakistan: Political Parties and the Incentives for Patronage, 1988-1999
This paper examines the impact of the political party structure on the incentives for politicians to focus on patronage versus service delivery improvements in Pakistan. By analysing inter-provincial variations in the quality of service delivery in Pakistan, the paper argues that the more fragmented, factionalised, and polarised the party systems, the greater are the incentives for patronage, weakening service delivery improvements. Fragmentation and factionalism both exacerbate the information problems that voters have in assigning credit (blame) for service delivery improvements (deterioration), thereby creating the incentives for politicians to focus on targeted benefits. Polarisation, particularly ethnic polarisation, reduces the ability of groups to agree on the provision of public goods, again causing politicians to favour the delivery of targeted benefits.
Journal Article