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A core question in research on compensation and motivation is whether individual variable pay for performance (IVPFP) can undermine intrinsic motivation in the workplace. We investigated the mediating role of a controlling effect on the relationship between the amount of IVPFP received and intrinsic motivation. In a three-wave study of 304 employees from eight European countries, we found that a controlling effect mediated the negative association between IVPFP and intrinsic motivation. These findings support the proposition from self-determination theory that financial rewards can have a controlling effect that decreases intrinsic motivation. Theoretical and practical implications for compensation and motivation in the workplace are discussed.

This study investigated relations between pay-for-performance incentives designed to vary in instrumentality (annual pay-for-performance, quarterly pay-for-performance, and base pay level) and employee outcomes (self-reported work effort and turnover intention) in a longitudinal study spanning more than 2 years. After controlling for perceived instrumentality, merit pay increase, and the initial values of the dependent variables, the amount of base pay was positively related to work effort and negatively related to turnover intention, where both relationships were mediated by autonomous motivation. The amounts of quarterly and annual pay-for-performance were both positively related to controlled motivation, but were differently related to the dependent variables due to different relations with autonomous motivation.

Purpose Enhancing the innovative behaviour of knowledge workers is a main task in knowledge management. The pay-for-performance policy is one of the management practices for innovative behaviour enhancement and has been gaining popularity in the knowledge-intensive context. However, it is still uncertain whether such practice really enhances the innovative behaviour of knowledge workers. To address this issue, this paper aims to propose and verify a conceptual framework incorporating kernel notions of social exchange, psychological empowerment and work engagement rooted in the social cognition paradigm. Design/methodology/approach The current study conducts a survey on 608 knowledge workers and their supervisors, validating the model structure and causal path pattern of the proposed framework. The causality is delineated from social exchange attributes of financial incentive, psychological empowerment and work engagement to innovative behaviour of knowledge workers. Findings Perceived organisational support and perceived pay equity are primary antecedents of symbolic incentive meaning reflected in the financial incentive of the pay-for-performance policy. Symbolic incentive meaning comprising dimensions of relative position, control and personal importance relates positively to innovative behaviour of knowledge workers. Psychological empowerment and work engagement are partial mediators of the positive relationship. Originality/value The current study explicates why and how social exchange attributes of the financial incentive provided by the pay-for-performance policy may enhance innovative behaviour of knowledge workers. Implications are supplied to knowledge management scholars and practitioners to optimise the pay-for-performance policy for innovative behaviour enhancement.

We investigated the effect of financial incentives on performance in a professional organization. Whereas agency theory treats tangible rewards such as money as a potentially powerful motivator for improving performance, the professional control perspective posits that the motivational effects of financial incentives will depend on the intended recipients attitudes toward the incentives relative to their professional values. The study setting was a large network of physician practices that adopted a financial incentive program to improve physician performance in the management of diabetic patients. Consistent with agency theory, performance did improve following the introduction of the incentive. However, consistent with the professional control perspective, physicians' psychologically based attitudes toward the incentive program regarding its impact on their own work autonomy and the importance of the performance goals moderated the effect of the incentive on performance. Study findings indicate that agency theory and professional control are complementary theoretical perspectives for understanding how professionals will respond to the imposition of performance-related financial incentives. In terms of practice, pay-for-performance programs aimed at professional organizations should be designed to take into account the values and goals of an organization's professionals to maximize the effect of financial incentives on performance.

PurposeNew Public Management-informed pay-for-performance policies are common in public sectors internationally but can be controversial with delivery agents. More attention is needed on contingent forms of bottom-up implementation of challenging policies, in emerging market economies, for professionals who face tensions between policies and their codes of practice. Street-level bureaucrats (SLBs) mediate policy implementation through discretionary practices; health professionals have enhanced space for discretion based on autonomy derived from professional status. The authors explore policy implementation, adaptation and resistance by physicians, focusing on payments for health workers in Turkey.Design/methodology/approachThe researchers conducted semi-structured qualitative interviews with 12 physicians in Turkish hospitals and thematic analysis of interview transcripts, using a blended (deductive and inductive) approach.FindingsThe policy fostered discretionary behaviours such as cherry-picking (high volume, low risk procedures) and pro-social rule-breaking (e.g. “upcoding”), highlighting clinical autonomy to navigate within policy restrictions. Respondents described damage to relationships with patients and colleagues, and dissonance between professional practice and perverse policy incentives, sometimes leading to disengagement from clinical work. Policymakers were perceived to be detached from the realities experienced by SLBs. Tensions between the policy and professional values risked alienating physicians.Research limitations/implicationsThis study utilises participant self-reported perceptions of discretionary behaviours. Further work may adopt alternative methods to explore the relationship between self-reporting and observed practice.Originality/valueThe authors contribute to research on differentiated, contingent roles of groups with high scope for discretion in bottom-up implementation, pointing to the potential for policy-professional role conflicts between top-down P4P policies, and the values and codes of practice of professional SLBs.

PurposeThe study compares how distinct mechanisms that connect pre-established policy objectives to professionals' practices, and the health policy implementation context influenced different approaches to frontline staff participation. The authors analysed 26 teams in six cities from two Brazilian states, during the last cycle of the National Program for Improving Access and Quality of Primary Care (PMAQ).Design/methodology/approachAbout 172 in-depth interviews were conducted with frontliners – community health workers (78), nurses (37), doctors (30) – and managers (27). Interview guides were based on key issues identified in the implementation and pay-for-performance (P4P) literature. Drawing on thematic analysis and synthesis of the literature, three types of participation mechanisms were identified: relational, motivational and incremental learning. They were analysed considering distinct contexts at the local level to understand how they influenced different forms of participation: mere adherence, result-oriented and transformative.FindingsAdministrations with stronger institutional organizational structures were able to control work processes and reduce professional discretion. However, sustained participation was more likely where there was greater integration between management and frontline health care teams. Motivation based only on financial incentives could not bring about transformative participation. This depended on the degree of professional's ideational motivation towards primary care. Finally, contexts with unfavourable working conditions tend to demotivate professionals, but incremental learning helps teams cope with these obstacles.Originality/valueThe study overcomes gaps in the literature in relation to PMAQ's implementation process. Overall, the study delves into which/how mechanisms alter frontliners participation in performance-oriented health programs.

Empirical research investigating the association between teacher pay incentives and student test scores has grown rapidly over the past decade. To integrate the findings from these studies and help inform the debate over teacher merit pay, this meta-analysis synthesizes effect sizes across 37 primary studies, 26 of which were conducted in the United States. Among the U.S. base studies, the results suggest that the effect of teacher ment pay on student tes scores is positive and statistically significant (0.043 standard deviation). This summary effect varies by program design and study context, suggesting that teacher merit pay has the potential to improve student test scores in som contexts but researchers and policymakers should pay close attention to program design and implementation.

This study reports how 3 design features (size of incentive, who is responsible, and target goal) affect clinical staff perceptions of pay-for-performance (P4P) for HPV vaccination. We conducted a national survey of clinical staff in 2022 (N = 2527; response rate = 57%). Respondents worked in pediatrics, family medicine, or general medicine specialties in the United States and had a role in HPV vaccination for children ages 9 through 12 years. Respondents were randomized to 1 of 8 P4P scenarios representing 3 design features with 2 levels each. We used ordered logistic regression to model respondents’ agreement with each of 11 statements about the P4P scenario. Statements represented domains of the Theory of Planned Behavior (attitudes, perceived behavioral control, and norms) plus 2 equity items. Relative to a $1000 incentive, a $5000 incentive was associated with favorable perceptions in 8/11 items: 5/5 attitude items and 1/2 items for each of control, norms, and equity. Incentives based on an individual provider’s patients, rather than the entire clinic’s patients, were associated with more agreement for 1 attitude item and 1 perceived behavioral control item. Relative to an absolute goal of 80%, a goal of 5% relative increase in HPV vaccination rates was associated with favorable perceptions for 3/5 attitude items and 1 equity item. Clinical staff perceptions of P4P for HPV vaccination were more favorable the larger the size of the incentive, when it was focused on a provider’s own patients, and when the goal was a relative, rather than absolute, target.

We test for three-way complementarities among information technology (IT), performance pay, and human resource (HR) analytics practices. We develop a principal-agent model examining how these practices work together as an incentive system that produces a larger productivity premium when the practices are implemented in concert rather than separately. We assess our model by combining fine-grained data on human capital management (HCM) software adoption over 11 years with detailed survey data on incentive systems and HR analytics practices for 189 firms. We find that the adoption of HCM software is greatest in firms that have also adopted performance pay and HR analytics practices. Furthermore, HCM adoption is associated with a large productivity premium when it is implemented as a system of organizational incentives, but has less benefit when adopted in isolation. The system of three-way complements produces disproportionately greater benefits than pairwise interactions, highlighting the importance of including all three complements. Productivity increases significantly when the HCM systems \"go live\" but not when they are purchased, which can be years earlier. This helps rule out reverse causality as an explanation for our findings. This paper was accepted by Sandra Slaughter, information systems.

Organizations should constantly improve their business processes to increase performance while keeping employees satisfied. Therefore, human actors are considered a success factor in business process management (BPM) projects. This fact amplifies the impact of employees’ satisfaction on business process performance. Although several reward approaches exist, it remains unclear how they affect job satisfaction specifically in combination with certain process characteristics. To address this gap, we conducted a statistical analysis of survey data based on a representative European working conditions dataset. We applied two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) and analysis of covariance (ANCOVA, i.e., controlled for organization size and sector) to explore the interaction effects. By looking at all possible combinations, we uncover how the presence or absence of specific pay modes and process-related aspects influence job satisfaction. Additionally, we reveal and discuss the joint effect of process characteristics and pay-for-performance types on job satisfaction. The results argue for a differentiated approach in pay-for-performance to obtain optimal reward solutions. Moreover, we advise for better strategic planning and facilitating successful BPM implementation.