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Current selves wield all the power in intertemporal tradeoffs. Although one set of future selves will make similar tradeoffs in the future, another self – who we term the cumulative future self – falls on the receiving end of those dictated decisions. How current selves commune with the cumulative future self determines whether the former heed pleas, from the latter, for patience.

This article examines the labor market payoffs to different types of postsecondary education, including field and institution of study. Instrumental variables (IV) estimation of the payoff to choosing one type of education compared to another is made particularly challenging by individuals choosing between several types of education. Not only does identification require one instrument per alternative, but it is also necessary to deal with the issue that individuals who choose the same education may have different next-best alternatives. We address these difficulties using rich administrative data for Norway’s postsecondary education system. A centralized admission process creates credible instruments from discontinuities that effectively randomize applicants near unpredictable admission cutoffs into different institutions and fields of study. The admission process also provides information on preferred and next-best alternatives from strategy-proof measures of individuals’ ranking of institutions and fields. The results from our IV approach may be summarized with three broad conclusions. First, different fields of study have substantially different labor market payoffs, even after accounting for institution and peer quality. Second, the effect on earnings from attending a more selective institution tends to be relatively small compared to payoffs to field of study. Third, the estimated payoffs to field of study are consistent with individuals choosing fields in which they have a comparative advantage. Comparing our estimates to those obtained from other approaches highlights the importance of using instruments to correct for selection bias and information on individuals’ ranking of institutions and fields to measure their preferred and next-best alternatives.

Individuals must often choose among discrete actions with imperfect information about their payoffs. Before choosing, they have an opportunity to study the payoffs, but doing so is costly. This creates new choices such as the number of and types of questions to ask. We model these situations using the rational inattention approach to information frictions. We find that the decision maker's optimal strategy results in choosing probabilistically in line with a generalized multinomial logit model, which depends both on the actions' true payoffs as well as on prior beliefs.

A good group reputation often facilitates more efficient synergistic teamwork in production activities. Here we translate this simple motivation into a reputation-based synergy and discounting mechanism in the public goods game. Specifically, the reputation type of a group, either good or bad determined by a reputation threshold, modifies the nonlinear payoff structure described by a unified reputation impact factor. Results show that this reputation-based incentive mechanism could effectively promote cooperation compared with linear payoffs, despite the coexistence of synergy and discounting effects. Notably, the complicated interactions between reputation impact and reputation threshold result in a sharp phase transition from full cooperation to full defection. We also find that the presence of a few discounting groups could increase the average payoffs of cooperators, leading to an interesting phenomenon that when the reputation threshold is raised, the gap between the average payoffs of cooperators and defectors increases while the overall payoff decreases. We further extend our framework to heterogeneous situations and show how the variability of individuals affect the evolutionary outcomes. Our work provides important insights into facilitating cooperation in social groups.

As online shopping evolves from being primarily transactional to being more relational, sellers aim to form online relationships. This article investigates online relationship formation, identifies the performance payoffs that result from forming different types of online relationships (unilateral vs. reciprocal), and tests the most effective relationshipbuilding strategies. Study 1, based on a longitudinal buyer-level analysis of an online shopping community, reveals that buyers use community-, seller-, and buyer-generated signals to identify suitable relationship partners and reduce online shopping risk. These signals generally diminish in importance as buyers gain experience but become more important when buyers are forming reciprocal relationships. Study 2 evaluates the dynamic payoffs of online relationship formation (seller-level analysis) on sales; the effect on sales of reciprocal relationships is three times greater and lasts seven times longer than that of seller-initiated, unilateral relationships. Study 3 is a field experiment testing managerially actionable strategies for leveraging relationships to grow online sales. Tenets arising from differences between online and offline relationships, together with the results from the three studies, inform an emerging theory of online relationships.

We present a novel experimental design to measure honesty and lying. Participants receive a die which they roll privately. Since their payoff depends on the reported roll of the die, the subjects have an incentive to be dishonest and report higher numbers to get a higher payoff. This design has three advantages. First, cheating cannot be detected on the individual level, which reduces potential demand effects. Second, the method is very easy to implement. Third, the underlying true distribution of the outcome under full honesty is known, and hence it is possible to test different theoretical predictions. We find that about 20% of inexperienced subjects lie to the fullest extent possible while 39% of subjects are fully honest. In addition, a high share of subjects consists of partial liars; these subjects lie, but do not report the payoff-maximizing draw. We discuss different motives that explain the observed behavioral pattern.

A faster exchange does not necessarily improve liquidity. On the one hand, speed enables a high-frequency market maker (HFM) to update quotes faster on incoming news. This reduces payoff risk and thus lowers the competitive bid-ask spread. On the other hand, HFM price quotes are more likely to meet speculative high-frequency bandits, and thus are less likely to meet liquidity traders. This raises the spread. The net effect of exchange speed depends on a security's news-to-liquidity-trader ratio.

Why do the poor make shortsighted choices in decisions that involve delayed payoffs? Foregoing immediate rewards for larger, later rewards requires that decision makers (i) believe future payoffs will occur and (ii) are not forced to take the immediate reward out of financial need. Low-income individuals may be both less likely to believe future payoffs will occur and less able to forego immediate rewards due to higher financial need; they may thus appear to discount the future more heavily. We propose that trust in one’s community—which, unlike generalized trust, we find does not covary with levels of income—can partially offset the effects of low income on myopic decisions. Specifically, we hypothesize that low-income individuals with higher community trust make less myopic intertemporal decisions because they believe their community will buffer, or cushion, against their financial need. In archival data and laboratory studies, we find that higher levels of community trust among low-income individuals lead to less myopic decisions. We also test our predictions with a 2-y community trust intervention in rural Bangladesh involving 121 union councils (the smallest rural administrative and local government unit) and find that residents in treated union councils show higher levels of community trust and make less myopic intertemporal choices than residents in control union councils. We discuss the implications of these results for the design of domestic and global policy interventions to help the poor make decisions that could alleviate poverty.

Iterated games are a fundamental component of economic and evolutionary game theory. They describe situations where two players interact repeatedly and have the ability to use conditional strategies that depend on the outcome of previous interactions, thus allowing for reciprocation. Recently, a new class of strategies has been proposed, so-called \"zero-determinant\" strategies. These strategies enforce a fixed linear relationship between one's own payoff and that of the other player. A subset of those strategies allows \"extortioners\" to ensure that any increase in one player's own payoff exceeds that of the other player by a fixed percentage. Here, we analyze the evolutionary performance of this new class of strategies. We show that in reasonably large populations, they can act as catalysts for the evolution of cooperation, similar to tit-for-tat, but that they are not the stable outcome of natural selection. In very small populations, however, extortioners hold their ground. Extortion strategies do particularly well in revolutionary arms races between two distinct populations. Significantly, they benefit the population that evolves at the slower rate, an example of the so-called \"Red King\" effect. This may affect the evolution of interactions between host species and their endosymbionts.