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This article examines the debate surrounding the right to vaccination in the context of increasing vaccine hesitancy. The study posits that children’s right to vaccination results from their fundamental right to life. The first section explores the normative expansion of human rights and the implications of recognizing children’s vaccination as a right. The second section assesses the potential consequences of the recognition of the child’s right to be vaccinated as being derived from the right to life. The final section analyses Polish legislation on mandatory vaccinations for children, evaluating its effectiveness in protecting the right. The paper concludes that the recognition of children’s right to be vaccinated requires legal protections comparable to those for the right to life, highlighting vaccination’s critical role in safeguarding individual and public health, and that Polish law needs to be more effective in protecting the child’s right to be vaccinated.

The concept of human dignity receives considerable scholarly attention in international law. More often, however, such studies primarily focus on the genesis, definition, and functions of human dignity across various domains of international law, particularly within the ambit of international human rights law. This research seeks to inquire into a less-explored connection between human dignity and . Such an attempt is made to elucidate the foundational character of human dignity for peremptory norms through the examination of of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, relevant treaties, as well as international and domestic jurisprudence. The overarching aim of this study is twofold: firstly, to enrich the discourse on human dignity by examining it as a general legal principle underpinning , while illuminating its operational role within the international legal order; secondly, to provide further insights into the legal category of by delineating the rationale for its existence and the foundations that support it.

Systems of law usually establish a hierarchy of norms based on the particular source from which the norms derive. In national legal systems, it is commonplace for the fundamental values of society to be given constitutional status and afforded precedence in the event of a conflict with norms enacted by legislation or adopted by administrative regulation; administrative rules themselves must conform to legislative mandates, while written law usually takes precedence over unwritten law and legal norms prevail over nonlegal (political or moral) rules. Norms of equal status must be balanced and reconciled to the extent possible. The mode of legal reasoning applied in practice is thus naturally hierarchical, establishing relationships and order between normative statements and levels of authority.

State immunity from jurisdiction -grave violations of human rights - peremptory norms - compensation proceedings - Brazilian Supreme Court.

The International Law Commission's 2019 Draft Conclusions on Peremptory Norms of International Law assert that States have an obligation to cooperate to end serious breaches of peremptory norms. International law provides scarce guidance, however, regarding how States are expected to fulfil that obligation. This article seeks to elaborate: first, whether the prohibition of crimes against humanity and the ‘basic rules’ of international humanitarian law are peremptory norms; second, what States are required to do to fulfil their obligation to cooperate; and third, how States might utilise the General Assembly as a forum through which to fulfil that obligation.

Constitutionalism is a deeply contested but indispensable symbolic and normative frame for thinking about the problems of viable and legitimate regulation of the complexily overlapping political communities of a post-Westphalian world.1

This article argues that if there is a jus cogens norm in the jus ad bellum, it must be the customary norm which prohibits non-consensual uses of force that are neither validly authorised under the UN Charter nor lawful exercises of self-defence. In doing so this article will clarify the method by which jus cogens norms should be identified, based on a correct understanding and application of what it means for a norm to be ‘accepted and recognized as a norm from which no derogation is permitted’. It is argued that all existing jus cogens norms must be norms of customary law, and that the uncertainty regarding the scope of the jus cogens norm prohibiting force results from uncertainty as to the structure of the underlying customary and treaty law norms in the jus ad bellum.

Italian Supreme Court of Cassation decision on enforcement of U.S. judgment rendered under the state-sponsored terrorism exception to sovereign immunity

In its 2015 \"Interpretative Notice on indication of origin of goods from the territories occupied by Israel since June 1967\", the European Commission linked the indication of origin of prod-ucts from Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories to the duty of non-recognition under international law, i.e., a duty not to recognize illegal situations. In its Psagot judgment (judgment of 12 November 2019, case C-363/18 [GC]), however, the CJEU did not engage with this duty, but limits itself to interpreting EU consumer law. It is argued that disputes over the application and interpretation of consumer law indeed do not lend themselves well to the application of the duty of non-recognition. The question remains, however, whether conducting trade relations as regards settlement products amounts to an implicit recognition of Israeli settlement policy in the occupied territories.

This article illuminates the normative basis for international law's regulation of public emergencies by arguing that human rights are best conceived as norms arising from a fiduciary relationship between states (or state-like actors) and persons subject to their power. States bear a fiduciary duty to guarantee subjects' secure and equal freedom, a duty that flows from their institutional assumption of sovereign powers. The fiduciary theory disarms Carl Schmitt's critique of constitutionalism by explaining how emergency powers can be reconciled with the rule of law.