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"Persian Gulf States Foreign relations 20th century."
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The foreign policy of smaller Gulf states : size, power, and regime stability in the Middle East
\"This book studies how smaller Gulf states managed to increase their influence in the Middle East, often times capitalising on their smallness as a foreign policy tool. By establishing a novel theoretical framework (the complex model of size), this study identifies specific ways in which material and perceptual smallness affect power, identity, regime stability and leverage in international politics. The small states of the Gulf (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates) managed to build up considerable influence in regional politics in the last decade, although their size is still considered an essential, irresolvable weakness, which makes them secondary actors to great powers like Saudi Arabia or Iran. Breaking down explicit and implicit biases towards largeness, the book examines specific case studies related to foreign and security policy behaviour, including the Gulf wars, the Arab Uprisings, the Gulf rift, and the Abraham Accords. Analysing the often neglected small Gulf states, the volume is an important contribution to international relations theory making it a key resource for students and academics interested in small state studies, Gulf studies and political science of the Middle East\"-- Provided by publisher.
Book
The Discourse of Propaganda
In the early 1990s, false reports of Iraqi soldiers in Kuwait
allowing premature infants to die by removing them from their
incubators helped to justify the Persian Gulf War, just as spurious
reports of weapons of mass destruction later undergirded support
for the Iraq War in 2003. In The Discourse of Propaganda ,
John Oddo examines these and other such cases to show how
successful wartime propaganda functions as a discursive
process.
Oddo argues that propaganda is more than just misleading
rhetoric generated by one person or group; it is an elaborate
process that relies on recontextualization, ideally on a massive
scale, to keep it alive and effective. In a series of case studies,
he analyzes both textual and visual rhetoric as well as the social
and material conditions that allow them to circulate, tracing how
instances of propaganda are constructed, performed, and repeated in
diverse contexts, such as speeches, news reports, and popular,
everyday discourse.
By revealing the agents, (inter)texts, and cultural practices
involved in propaganda campaigns, The Discourse of
Propaganda shines much-needed light on the topic and
challenges its readers to consider the complicated processes that
allow propaganda to flourish. This book will appeal not only to
scholars of rhetoric and propaganda but also to those interested in
unfolding the machinations motivating America's recent military
interventions.
eBook
Paying the human costs of war
From the Korean War to the current conflict in Iraq, Paying the Human Costs of War examines the ways in which the American public decides whether to support the use of military force. Contrary to the conventional view, the authors demonstrate that the public does not respond reflexively and solely to the number of casualties in a conflict. Instead, the book argues that the public makes reasoned and reasonable cost-benefit calculations for their continued support of a war based on the justifications for it and the likelihood it will succeed, along with the costs that have been suffered in casualties. Of these factors, the book finds that the most important consideration for the public is the expectation of success. If the public believes that a mission will succeed, the public will support it even if the costs are high. When the public does not expect the mission to succeed, even small costs will cause the withdrawal of support. Providing a wealth of new evidence about American attitudes toward military conflict, Paying the Human Costs of War offers insights into a controversial, timely, and ongoing national discussion.
eBook
US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation
US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation examines how the US Army rebuilt itself after the Vietnam War and how this has affected US intervention policy, from the victory of the Gulf War to the failure of Somalia, the Bosnian and Kosovo interventions and the use of force post 9/11.
Richard Lock-Pullan analyzes the changes in US military intervention strategy by examining two separate issues: the nature of the US Army as it rebuilt itself after the Vietnam War, and the attempts by the US to establish criteria for future military interventions. He first argues that US strategy traditionally relied upon national mobilization to co-ordinate political aims and military means; he subsequently analyzes how this changed to a formula of establishing militarily achievable political objectives prior to the use of force. Drawing on a vast body of material and on strategic culture and military innovation literature, Lock-Pullan demonstrates that the strategic lessons were a product of the rebuilding of the Army's identity as it became a professional all-volunteer force and that the Army's new doctrine developed a new 'way of war' for the nation, embodied in the AirLand Battle doctrine, which changed the approach to strategy.
This book finally gives a practical analysis of how the interventions in Panama and the Gulf War vindicated this approach and brought a revived confidence in the use of force while more recent campaigns in Somalia, Kosovo and Bosnia exposed its weaknesses and the limiting nature of the Army's thinking. The legacy of the Army's innovation is examined in the new strategic environment post 9/11 with the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Introduction 1. The US Army and American Strategic Culture 2. The Vietnam War and the US Army 3. The All-Volunteer Army 4. Innovation in US Army Doctrine 5. The Influence of Army Thinking 6. Interventions: Panama, The Gulf, Somalia 7. Back to the Gulf Conclusion
eBook
Inside the danger zone : the U.S. Military in the Persian Gulf, 1987-1988
From the Iraqi attack on the USS Stark to Iranian mine fields to Revolutionary Guard gunboats, the 1987-88 Persian Gulf was a place of shadowy danger for U.S. Navy ships assigned to protect oil tankers during the Iran-Iraq War. A low-profile escort mission quickly became an international test of wills between the United States and Iran. The conflict escalated to involve secret missions and special operations until finally the United States and Iran engaged in open combat, most notably during Operation Praying Mantis in April 1988, the world's largest sea-air battle since World War II. It was the largest deployment of American forces between the Vietnam War and Desert Storm and one with dramatic implications for subsequent events. Yet, the story remained mostly untold and misunderstood for almost two decades. This is the first book to focus on this period, that saw an unprecedented series of American military action in this volatile region.Based on declassified documents and extensive interviews with veterans and government officials, Inside the Danger Zone is a fast moving narrative that tells the story of this quasi-war with Iran from the White House to the front lines.
eBook
Making war, thinking history : Munich, Vietnam, and presidential uses of force from Korea to Kosovo
In examining the influence of historical analogies on decisions to use--or not use--force, military strategist Jeffrey Record assesses every major application of U.S. force from the Korean War to the NATO war on Serbia. Specifically, he looks at the influence of two analogies: the democracies? appeasement of Hitler at Munich and America's defeat in the Vietnam War. His book judges the utility of these two analogies on presidential decision-making and finds considerable misuse of them in situations where force was optional. He points to the Johnson administration's application of the Munich analogy to the circumstances of Southeast Asia in 1965 as the most egregious example of their misuse, but also cites the faulty reasoning by historical analogy that prevailed among critics of Reagan's policy in Central America and in Clinton's use of force in Haiti and the former Yugoslavia. The author's findings show generational experience to be a key influence on presidential decision-making: Munich persuaded mid-twentieth-century presidents that force should be used early and decisively while Vietnam cautioned later presidents against using force at all. Both analogies were at work for the Gulf War, with Munich urging a decision for war and Vietnam warning against a graduated and highly restricted use of force. Record also reminds us of the times when presidents have used analogies to mobilize public support for action they have already decided to take. Addressing both the process of presidential decision-making and the wisdom of decisions made, this well-reasoned book offers timely lessons to a broad audience that includes political scientists, military historians, defense analysts, and policy makers, as well as those simply curious about history's influence.
eBook
Unintended consequences
\"The United States does not do nation building, \" claimed Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld three years ago. Yet what are we to make of the American military bases in Korea? Why do American warships patrol the Somali coastline? And perhaps most significantly, why are fourteen \"enduring bases\" being built in Iraq? In every major foreign war fought by United States in the last century, the repercussions of the American presence have been felt long after the last Marine has left. Kenneth J. Hagan and Ian J. Bickerton argue here that, despite adamant protests from the military and government alike, nation building and occupation are indeed hallmarks—and unintended consequences—of American warmaking.
In this timely, groundbreaking study, the authors examine ten major wars fought by the United States, from the Revolutionary War to the ongoing Iraq War, and analyze the conflicts' unintended consequences. These unexpected outcomes, Unintended Consequences persuasively demonstrates, stemmed from ill-informed decisions made at critical junctures and the surprisingly similar crises that emerged at the end of formal fighting. As a result, war did not end with treaties or withdrawn troops. Instead, time after time, the United States became inextricably involved in the issues of the defeated country, committing itself to the chaotic aftermath that often completely subverted the intended purposes of war.
Stunningly, Unintended Consequences contends that the vast majority of wars launched by the United States were unnecessary, avoidable, and catastrophically unpredictable. In a stark challenge to accepted scholarship, the authors show that the wars' unintended consequences far outweighed the initial calculated goals, and thus forced cataclysmic shifts in American domestic and foreign policy.
A must-read for anyone concerned with the past, present, or future of American defense, Unintended Consequences offers a provocative perspective on the current predicament in Iraq and the conflicts sure to loom ahead of us.
eBook
Justifying America's Wars
This book examines the justifications for, and practice of, war by the US since 1990, and examines four case studies: the Gulf War, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq.
The author undertakes an examination of presidential speeches and public documents from this period to determine the focal points on which the respective presidents based their rhetoric for war. The work then examines the practice of war in the light of these justifications to determine whether changes in justifications correlate with changes in practice. In particular, the justificatory discourse finds four key themes that emerge in the presidential discourses, which are tracked across the case studies and point to the fundamental driving force in US motivations for going to war. The four key themes which emerge from the data are: international law or norms; human rights; national interest; and egoist morality (similar too, but wider than, 'exceptionalism'). This analysis shows that 9/11 resulted in a radical shift away from an international law and human rights-focused justificatory discourse, to one which was overwhelmingly dominated by egoist-morality justifications and national interest.
This book will be of much interest to students of US foreign policy, humanitarian intervention, Security Studies, and IR theory.
1. Introduction 2. Setting the Context: Intervention and Norms in International Society 3. The Gulf War 4. The Kosovo Intervention 5. The Intervention in Afghanistan 6. The Iraq War 7. Conclusion
Nicholas Kerton-Johnson is Chief Executive Officer of The Ephesus Initiative.
eBook
