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The only volume on higher education law written specifically for nursing faculty, this volume imparts the basic foundations of the legal, professional, and ethical issues that concern faculty on a daily basis. It clearly defines the legal rights of students, professors, and educational institutions along with the case laws supporting those rights. Each chapter contains a vivid legal scenario, related legal principles and theoretical foundations, and critical thinking questions. Written by an author who is both a nurse educator and attorney, the volume emphasizes sound decision making so that readers can successfully navigate the complex legal issues confronting them in the faculty role. This second edition reflects recent changes in higher education and includes an emphasis on students' rights and safety. Chapters address the general legal rights of students with expanded content on the interplay with social media, rights of faculty regarding freedom of speech, faculty protection against lawsuits, faculty and the employment relationship, faculty relations, the teaching and scholarship roles of faculty, the service and clinical practice role of faculty, and ethical considerations for patients, students, and faculty in education environments. Appendices include information on how to read a legal case and how to research legal topics.

Slip-and-fall accidents are a growing problem. The total cost of these accidents now approaches 80 billion dollars each year, and that number is expected to double within the next decade. In Falls Aren't Funny: America's Multi-Billion Dollar Slip-and-Fall Crisis, author Russell J. Kendzior provides a comprehensive look at one of the most pervasive yet seldom addressed problems facing our world today. The book's three parts explore slips-and-fall accidents themselves, what causes them, and what can be done to prevent them. Kendzior begins by examining the financial costs, the industries hardest hit by slips and falls, and the heightened risk to the elderly population. He then looks at the causes for the numerous slip-and-fall accidents and injuries, from inadequate floor care to improper footwear, and the contributions of the insurance, legal, and manufacturing industries and how they worsen the problem. Finally, he outlines what can be done to prevent slip-and-fall accidents, and how everyone from manufacturers, to property owners, to the general public can help to reverse the trend of this increasingly expensive and dangerous problem. The book is replete with stories of real slip-and-fall accidents and injuries, up-to-date statistics, illustrative charts, and tips for prevention. It is comprehensive, dealing with all aspects of slip-and-fall accidents, their causes, and methods of prevention, while also being accessible and entertaining. It is an informative and much needed book for all managers, safety professionals, attorneys, business and property owners, and anyone else concerned with one of the nation's fastest growing safety crises.

Few microfinance-funded businesses grow beyond subsistence entrepreneurship. This paper considers one possible explanation: that the structure of existing microfinance contracts may discourage risky but high-expected-return investments. To explore this possibility, I develop a theory that unifies models of investment choice, informal risk-sharing, and formal financial contracts. I then test the predictions of this theory using a series of experiments with clients of a large microfinance institution in India. The experiments confirm the theoretical predictions that joint liability creates two potential inefficiencies. First, borrowers free-ride on their partners, making risky investments without compensating partners for this risk. Second, the addition of peer-monitoring overcompensates, leading to sharp reductions in risk-taking and profitability. Equity-like financing, in which partners share both the benefits and risks of more profitable projects, overcomes both of these inefficiencies and merits further testing in the field.

Research on microcredit is now two decades old. There has been enormous progress in understanding both what microcredit does and how. Yet a lot of what we have learned has raised new and often quite fundamental questions about its nature: Is microcredit primarily about investment, consumption, or savings? Why is it that the investments financed by microcredit do not always lead to income growth, and does this have to do with the structure of microlending? What are the roles of social capital, reputation, and group lending? This article attempts to take stock of this significant body of work and tries to identify the most important questions for future research.

The present paper contributes to the understanding of impact of corporate scams and scandals and understanding the reason how these frauds and white-collar crimes impact the investors trust and business environment as a whole. When these scams occur the trust of investors break with each and every turnout. The impact of such corporate scams is not limited to the company where it took place but to each and every business, be it big corporate units or it be some small-scale businesses by directly impacting the stock exchange where the shares are listed. The authors have also tried to focus upon the issues and problems faced by the investors of the company while the company got involved in corporate scams and to figure out the responsible person of the company who will be held accountable in such kind of cases. The present study is limited to the extent of personal liability of a Director and too specifically in the cases of fraud and insolvency. White collar crimes are everywhere these days and that need to be treated as a growing branch of the Criminal law in India. With increase in the Globalization companies are growing and along with it the stakeholders of the company are also growing, any scam done will step back the investors to invest again and more in the company. Thereby with increase in the market share of a company the director of the Company has to establish an internal mechanism to tackle various white -collar crimes nurtured and how these are dealt in the court of law.

Purpose Money laundering (ML) is one of the greatest challenges, the global community faces today. Corporate entities such as financial institutions (FIs) are most susceptible to facilitate and launder money. The paper raises the following question: Who is to bear the burden of liability? Either a corporation or an individual, thus this paper examines liability issues in a corporate setting particularly financial institutions, which arise from regulatory noncompliance or failure to oversight in the context of ML. Design/methodology/approach The study is legal doctrinal mainly based on case laws, legislation and research articles. Findings Firstly, this study provides how the concept of liability in a corporate setting in UK and USA has drifted from its traditional “duty to care” standard to a new “duty to oversight” and “Responsible Corporate Officer” concepts resulting a shift in corporate to individual liability. Secondly, in the context of anti-ML violations in FIs, imposition of corporate or personal liability solely may not effectively deter ML and may create conflicts between management and shareholders. Practical implications The paper can be a source to explore the issue of ML liability for regulatory noncompliance based on UK, USA and Pakistan law. Originality/value This paper demonstrates that the imposition of either corporate or personal liability may create dilemma either for shareholders or management; however, a “combine or collective liability” approach carries potential to retard ML activities in FIs and balancing the harm-penalties incurred upon a corporation while addressing shareholders concerns.

This Article exposes and analyzes the rise of Nevada as an almost liability-free jurisdiction. Without much public attention, Nevada has embarked on a strategy of market segmentation with a differentiated product—a shockingly lax corporate law. Nevada law generally protects directors and officers from liability for breaches of the duties of loyalty, good faith, and care that are widely believed to be staples of U.S. corporate law. Nevada highlights these broad protections as a reason to incorporate there rather than in Delaware, the dominant state in the interstate market for incorporations. Market segmentation with lax law has allowed Nevada to overcome significant barriers to entry. By tailoring its product to a particular subset of the market, Nevada gained market power in a segment that is not served by Delaware. Nevada's clear, no-liability law makes Delaware's competitive advantages less significant and leaves it unable to respond effectively. In offering lax corporate law, Nevada capitalizes on its reputation as a lax regulator. Firms may incorporate in Nevada for a variety of reasons that include extracting private benefits, saving on incorporation taxes, and minimizing litigation costs. The data, however, is consistent with some firms choosing Nevada for the first, less benign reason. Normatively, policymakers should find it worrisome if high agency cost firms, which would benefit the most from legal oversight, disproportionally choose Nevada's lax law. Another reason for concern is that Nevada may create competitive pressures towards the bottom.

Microfinance banks use group-based lending contracts to strengthen borrowers' incentives for diligence, but the contracts are vulnerable to free-riding and collusion. We systematically unpack microfinance mechanisms through ten experimental games played in an experimental economics laboratory in urban Peru. Risk-taking broadly conforms to theoretical predictions, with dynamic incentives strongly reducing risk-taking even without group-based mechanisms. Group lending increases risk-taking, especially for risk-averse borrowers, but this is moderated when borrowers form their own groups. Group contracts benefit borrowers by creating implicit insurance against investment losses, but the costs are borne by other borrowers, especially the most risk averse.

Various commentators have praised the WorldCom and Enron settlements for holding outside directors personally liable, arguing that heightened director liability will induce greater board oversight. This paper shows that the connection between director liability and board behavior is more subtle, because directors have multiple means to respond to an increase in liability exposure: They can increase oversight to prevent accounting manipulation and/or reduce performance-based CEO pay to mitigate the CEO's ex ante incentive to engage in manipulation. These two decisions are interrelated, implying that the effects of director liability on board oversight and CEO incentive pay are ambiguous. In particular, the model predicts that, for firms in which board oversight is difficult and costly (e.g., large firms with complex business operations), a stricter legal environment for directors leads to a lower level of board oversight, lower CEO incentive pay, and lower shareholder value.