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El presente artículo trata de ser un comentario a la introducción general de Schleiermacher a los diálogos platónicos que antecede el presente volumen. De este modo, trataremos de descubrir la novedad de la interpretación schleiermacheriana de Platón, tanto desde su propia comprensión de la hermenéutica como desde el diálogo con la tradición interpretativa que le antecede y es coetánea suya. Schleiermacher ve la historia de las interpretaciones como un malentendido constante. En este sentido, central es el debate con Wilhelm Tennemann, cuya obra sobre Platón esperamos publicar en una parte representativa. Por ello no podemos entender ni la introducción general ni el actual comentario como algo aislado.

Rapp begins with a question posed by the poet Theodore Roethke: \"Should we say that the self, once perceived, becomes a soul?\" Through her examination of Plato's Phaedrus and her insights about the place of forgetting in a life, Rapp answers Roethke's query with a resounding Yes. In so doing, Rapp reimagines the Phaedrus, interprets anew Plato's relevance to contemporary life, and offers an innovative account of forgetting as a fertile fragility constitutive of humanity. Drawing upon poetry and comparisons with other ancient Greek and Daoist texts, Rapp brings to light overlooked features of the Phaedrus, disrupts longstanding interpretations of Plato as the facile champion of memory, and offers new lines of sight onto (and from) his corpus. Her attention to the Phaedrus and her meditative apprehension of the permeable character of human life leave our understanding of both Plato and forgetting inescapably altered. Unsettle everything you think you know about Plato, suspend the twentieth-century entreaty to \"Never forget,\" and behold here a new mode of critical reflection in which textual study and humanistic inquiry commingle to expansive effect.

Abstract Plato's Phaedrus is a dialogue in which rhetoric is not only discussed, but also displayed. The first half of the plot depicts a rhetorical contest in which Socrates himself offers two opposite speeches on love, a kind of dissoi logoi. The current paper tries to explain that the second half of the dialogue offers the necessary keys to understand that for Plato true rhetoric is nothing but dialectic and that beyond the apparent antilogic exercise carried out by Socrates there can be found philosopher's dialectical practice itself. Last but not least, the article defends that dialectic does not necessarily deal with Forms.

There have been many attempts to give a precise definition of beauty. In this article, I join a tradition of trinitarian reflection on beauty and attempt to add further clarity to a trinitarian definition of beauty. Beauty, in my construal, is the gravitas amoris of the triune being of love—it is, in other words, the objective attractional “force” or “weightiness” exerted by triune love on the soul by which one, if she yields to triune love, experiences the bliss and delight of triune love and is thereby drawn into deifying union. This article will proceed as follows: First, I will survey the relationship between beauty and love found in the classic philosophical tradition represented by Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus. Then, I will survey this beauty–love relation in Christian thought from Augustine, Aquinas, Ficino, Edwards, and von Hildebrand. These figures will provide supporting evidence for my construal of beauty. I then turn to the constructive task. I argue that there is an abductive fit between the features of beauty and the nature of the Trinity. In light of this fit and the sources of traditional thought above, beauty is best thought of as the gravitas amoris—the weighty impression of God’s triune love in created things that draws one into the triune life and is experienced as delight when perceived. I conclude by answering objections and reflecting on how this account reframes the transcendentals and coordinates the experience of beauty with Christian love.

This article weaves together three main strands: first, the ambiguities of mirror metaphors in relation to concepts of artistic representation and expression; secondly, the double-sided and sometimes paradoxical influence of Plato in this area of aesthetics; thirdly, the need to interpret long-lasting metaphors in the history of ideas not as static figures of speech but as dynamic tropes which shift in sense and implications with changes of context. In constructing and exploring this thematic configuration of mirrors, metaphors, and Plato, the chief concern is to draw out—via a small selection of texts, including passages from Schopenhauer and Nietzsche—some underappreciated complexity in the various classical traditions that have contributed to aesthetics and philosophy of art.

This article revisits the mainstream scholarly view that the Greek Hestia is the least anthropomorphic deity among the Olympians, an idea that owes much to a short reference to her in Plato’s Phaedrus. The analysis is based on textual and visual sources from the Archaic period: I first review two references to Hestia in early hexameter poetry, in Hesiod’s Theogony and in the Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite, before turning to the depiction of her in two early Attic black-figure vases, the Sophilos dinos at the British Museum and the François vase, which have been neglected in discussing Hestia’s anthropomorphic nature in early Greek thought. While the study of individual Greek gods has returned to the fore in the field of Greek religion in the last 20 years, it seems that not enough has changed in the current conceptualization of Hestia.

In Phaedrus, Plato invokes a mythic exemplum concerning the Egyptian deity Thoth. Though often interpreted as an overt critique of writing, this argument posits Thoth is offered analogically to contrast Plato's rhetorical epistemology with that of the ancient Egyptians. To do so, this argument addresses why a mythic Egyptian figure might be so significant to Plato in the 4th Century B.C. Greece, whose culture already had multiple gods and cultural heroes to whom the invention of writing is attributed, when the episode in Phaedrus is axiomatically described as a critique of writing. Because Plato may have had some degree of firsthand knowledge of Egyptian traditions it explores those traditions personified in the figure of Thoth, which should be examined as an analogical device advised by Egyptian rhetorical epistemology. A closer examination of the comparative rhetorical epistemological perspective not only illuminates Thoth's appearance in Phaedrus but also the Egyptian rhetorical-epistemic tradition. Thoth's role as epistemic mediator between humans and truth, in the broadest terms, was to act as psychopomp who moves both between humanity and the arrival at knowledge that prefigures rhetorical action.

This paper discusses Aristotle's references to a ζῷον in his Poetics (1450b34–51a4 and 1459a20) and evaluates their implications. The usual interpretation, ‘living creature’ or ‘animal’, is one-sided, because the word ζῷον is Aristotle's paradigm of homonymy, applying as it does to both the human being and the drawing (Cat. 1a1–6). After an examination of the two passages containing such references and their contexts, other passages by Aristotle and earlier writers (Plato, Alcidamas and Gorgias) that may shed light on the issue are analysed. The conclusion reflects on the relevance of the interpretation as ‘figure’ for the premises and purpose of the Poetics.