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14,878 result(s) for "Philosophy of Perception"
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Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion
The idea of a disjunctive theory of visual experiences first found expression in J. M. Hinton's pioneering 1973 book Experiences. The first monograph in this exciting area since then, this book develops a comprehensive disjunctive theory, incorporating detailed accounts of the three core kinds of visual experience—perception, hallucination, and illusion—and an explanation of how perception and hallucination could be indiscriminable from one another without having anything in common. In the veridical case, it contends that the perception of a particular state of affairs involves the subject's being acquainted with that state of affairs, and that it is the subject's standing in this acquaintance relation that makes the experience possess a phenomenal character. It argues that when we hallucinate, we are having an experience that, while lacking phenomenal character, is mistakenly supposed by the subject to possess it and shows how this approach is compatible with empirical research into the workings of the brain. It concludes by offering a novel treatment of the many different types of illusion that we can be subject to, which accounts for many illusions, not as special cases of either veridical perception or hallucination but rather as mixed cases that involve elements of both.
Phase media : space, time and the politics of smart objects
James Ash theorizes how smart objects, understood as Internet-connected and sensor-enabled devices, are altering users' experience of their environment. Rather than networks connected by lines of transmission, smart objects generate phases, understood as space-times that modulate the spatio-temporal intelligibility of both humans and non-humans. Examining a range of objects and services from the Apple Watch to Nest Cam to Uber, Ash suggests that the modulation of spatio-temporal intelligibility is partly shaped by the commercial logics of the industries that design and manufacture smart objects, but can also exceed them. Drawing upon the work of Martin Heidegger, Gilbert Simondon and Bruno Latour, Ash argues that smart objects have their own phase politics, which offer opportunities for new forms of public to emerge. Phase Media develops a conceptual vocabulary to contend that smart objects do more than just enabling a world of increased corporate control and surveillance, as they also provide the tools to expose and re-order the very logics and procedures that created them.
Perception and its objects
This book presents, motivates, and defends a new solution to a fundamental problem in the philosophy of perception. What is the correct theoretical conception of perceptual experience, and how should we best understand the nature of our basic perceptual relation with the physical objects in the world around us? Most theorists today analyze perception in terms of its representational content, in large part in order to avoid fatal problems attending the early modern conception of perception as a relation with particular mind-dependent direct objects of experience. Having set up the underlying problem and explored the lessons to be learnt from the various difficulties faced by opposing early modern responses to it, it is argued that this contemporary approach has serious problems of its own. Furthermore, the early modern insight that perception is most fundamentally to be construed as a relation of conscious acquaintance with certain direct objects of experience is perfectly consistent with the commonsense identification of such direct objects with persisting mind-independent physical objects themselves. The resultant picture of perception as acquaintance from a given point of view and in certain specific circumstances with particular mind-independent physical objects offers a rich and nuanced account of the various ways such things look in perception that also accommodates illusion and hallucination. This solution is proposed and elaborated as the most satisfactory and defensible vindication of empirical realism.
Becoming animal : an earthly cosmology
This work is an exploration of our human entanglement with the rest of nature. As the climate veers toward catastrophe, the innumerable losses cascading through the biosphere make vividly evident the need for a metamorphosis in our relation to the living land. For too long we have inured ourselves to the wild intelligence of our flesh, taking our primary truths from technologies that hold the living world at a distance. This book subverts that distance, drawing readers ever deeper into their animal senses in order to explore, from within, the elemental kinship between the body and the breathing Earth. The author shows that from the awakened perspective of the human animal, awareness (or mind) is not an exclusive possession of our species but a lucid quality of the biosphere itself, a quality in which we, along with the oaks and the spiders, steadily participate.-- From publisher description.
Seeing Æ, remembering C: Illusions in short-term memory
Perception can be shaped by our expectations, which can lead to perceptual illusions. Similarly, long-term memories can be shaped to fit our expectations, which can generate false memories. However, it is generally assumed that short-term memory for percepts formed just 1 or 2 seconds ago accurately represents the percepts as they were at the time of perception. Here 4 experiments consistently show that within this timeframe, participants go from reliably reporting what was there (perceptual inference accurately reflecting the bottom-up input), to erroneously but with high confidence reporting what they expected to be there (memory report strongly influenced by top-down expectations). Together, these experiments show that expectations can reshape perceptual representations over short time scales, leading to what we refer to as short-term memory (STM) illusions. These illusions appeared when participants saw a memory display which contained real and pseudo-letters (i.e. mirrored letters). Within seconds after the memory display disappeared, high confidence memory errors increased substantially. This increase in errors over time indicates that the high confidence errors do not (purely) result from incorrect perceptual encoding of the memory display. Moreover, high confidence errors occurred mainly for pseudo-to-real letter memories, and much less often for real-to-pseudo-letter memories, indicating that visual similarity is not the primary cause of this memory-bias. Instead 'world knowledge' (e.g., which orientation letters usually have) appear to drive these STM illusions. Our findings support a predictive processing view of the formation and maintenance of memory in which all memory stages, including STM, involve integration of bottom-up memory input with top-down predictions, such that prior expectations can shape memory traces.
Olfactory perception of chemically diverse molecules
Background Understanding the relationship between a stimulus and how it is perceived reveals fundamental principles about the mechanisms of sensory perception. While this stimulus-percept problem is mostly understood for color vision and tone perception, it is not currently possible to predict how a given molecule smells. While there has been some progress in predicting the pleasantness and intensity of an odorant, perceptual data for a larger number of diverse molecules are needed to improve current predictions. Towards this goal, we tested the olfactory perception of 480 structurally and perceptually diverse molecules at two concentrations using a panel of 55 healthy human subjects. Results For each stimulus, we collected data on perceived intensity, pleasantness, and familiarity. In addition, subjects were asked to apply 20 semantic odor quality descriptors to these stimuli, and were offered the option to describe the smell in their own words. Using this dataset, we replicated several previous correlations between molecular features of the stimulus and olfactory perception. The number of sulfur atoms in a molecule was correlated with the odor quality descriptors “garlic,” “fish,” and “decayed,” and large and structurally complex molecules were perceived to be more pleasant. We discovered a number of correlations in intensity perception between molecules. We show that familiarity had a strong effect on the ability of subjects to describe a smell. Many subjects used commercial products to describe familiar odorants, highlighting the role of prior experience in verbal reports of olfactory perception. Nonspecific descriptors like “chemical” were applied frequently to unfamiliar odorants, and unfamiliar odorants were generally rated as neither pleasant nor unpleasant. Conclusions We present a very large psychophysical dataset and use this to correlate molecular features of a stimulus to olfactory percept. Our work reveals robust correlations between molecular features and perceptual qualities, and highlights the dominant role of familiarity and experience in assigning verbal descriptors to odorants.
Exploring GVS as a display modality: signal amplitude and polarity, in various environments, impacts on posture, and with dual-tasking
Galvanic Vestibular Stimulation (GVS) has been proposed as an alternative display modality to relay information without increasing demands on the visual or auditory sensory modalities of the wearer or in environments where those modalities cannot be used (e.g., covert night operations). We further investigated this concept with four experiments designed to test: (1) thresholds at which subjects could distinguish between different GVS current amplitudes and polarities, (2) thresholds at which different bipolar (i.e., sinusoidal waveform with current oscillating between left and right directions) current frequencies were distinguishable among room temperature, hot, cold, and windy environments, (3) effects of unipolar (i.e., sinusoidal waveform with current occurring in only the left or right direction) currents on balance performance, and (4) dual-task performance among frequency and polarity modulated GVS conditions during a concordant visual search task. Subjects reliably distinguished between current amplitudes that varied from a pedestal of ± 0.6 mA by a median of 0.03 mA (range of 0.02–0.32 mA) and between unipolar currents at a median amplitude of 0.55 mA (range of 0.32–0.83 mA). GVS frequency thresholds were robust to the environment conditions tested, with no statistical differences found. Sway and balance errors were increased with unipolar currents. GVS thresholds were not impacted by the dual-task paradigm, but the visual search scores were slightly elevated when congruently performing a polarity thresholding task. Overall findings continue to support GVS use as a display modality, but some limitations are noted, such as the use of unipolar currents under scenarios where postural control is important.
Sartre's Relationalist
In this paper, I argue that Jean-Paul Sartre's theory of the imagination emerges out of a position on perception that is similar to modern naive realism in that he seeks to add elements of what today is called \"relationalism\" to his phenomenological description of perceptual and imaginative experience. The problem is that it is not clear that relationalism can be added to the phenomenologist's intentional theory of consciousness in the way Sartre recommends. This paper takes an analytic approach to understanding Sartre's theory of perception, traces his motivation in arguing that perception and imagination are sui generis mental activity and identifies the ways in which Sartre's attempt to add elements of relationalism to the Husserlian account of perception runs into trouble with hallucinatory experience.