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Observers can store thousands of object images in visual long-term memory with high fidelity, but the fidelity of scene representations in long-term memory is not known. Here, we probed scene-representation fidelity by varying the number of studied exemplars in different scene categories and testing memory using exemplar-level foils. Observers viewed thousands of scenes over 5.5 hr and then completed a series of forced-choice tests. Memory performance was high, even with up to 64 scenes from the same category in memory. Moreover, there was only a 2% decrease in accuracy for each doubling of the number of studied scene exemplars. Surprisingly, this degree of categorical interference was similar to the degree previously demonstrated for object memory. Thus, although scenes have often been defined as a superset of objects, our results suggest that scenes and objects may be entities at a similar level of abstraction in visual long-term memory.

Visual thinking is a systematic way to produce knowledge in design by means of mental imagery, spatial reasoning, and the use of an array of visual representations. Pictorial representations such as sketches are crucial for the activity of designing at the early stage of the creative process. Designers see more information in sketches than was actually drawn. The ability to see more information than is sketched out can be seen as an enhanced visual capacity of human agency. Enhanced agency is the prosthetic incorporation of artifacts to improve the original agentive capacities. The incorporation of artifacts to draw raises some fundamental questions: Is the pencil an extension of the mind? Can we think with our hands? What agentive capacities are increased with the use of the pencil? What is the representational status of sketching? The chapter is structured around these key questions to suggest some answers inspired by the work of Göran Sonesson. Using the notion of enhanced agency and the layered model of agency, I explore the way in which the pencil improves the visual thinking of design. In doing so I found that it is important to maintain the principle of asymmetry in cognitive systems to reconsider relational ontology in favor of ecological relationships.

Different theoretical views about Bayesian reasoning (ecological rationality and nested sets views) both claim support from results showing that natural sampling, whole numbers, and pictorial representations help with reasoning performance, although they differ in explaining how those results occur. Three studies (total N = 653) use minimally different numerical presentation formats—varying the singular or plural tense of the context story topic—and presence or absence of an additional icon array picture, to better understand the mechanisms driving these reasoning performance results. Plural wording, indicating a conceptual aggregation (i.e., frequencies) rather than just numerical whole numbers, consistently boosted performance. Icon arrays, in contrast, were helpful only when alongside single-tense information. These results fit more consistently with an ecological rationality view which has long argued that the mind is adapted to work best with frequentist information.

Research conducted primarily during the 1970s and 1980s supported the assertion that carefully constructed text illustrations generally enhance learners' performance on a variety of text-dependent cognitive outcomes. Research conducted throughout the 1990s still strongly supports that assertion. The more recent research has extended pictures-in-text conclusions to alternative media and technological formats and has begun to explore more systematically the \"whys,\" \"whens,\" and \"for whoms\" of picture facilitation, in addition to the \"whethers\" and \"how muchs.\" Consideration is given here to both more and less conventional types of textbook illustration, with several \"tenets for teachers\" provided in relation to each type.

Consumers often imagine themselves in a scene and engage in such self-imagery while processing information. The goals that they have when they engage in such imagery (e.g., a goal to construct a story of the experience vs. a goal to acquire information) can influence how the mental images they generate affect judgments. When pictures from very different perspectives are provided, those trying to imagine themselves in the scene in order to create a story of the experience have to shift visual perspectives in order to imagine the entire experience. This shift in visual perspective can increase processing difficulty and decrease evaluations of the product or service being described. When individuals are simply imagining themselves acquiring information about the product or service, however, presenting information from different perspectives has a positive impact on evaluations. Four experiments confirmed these effects and the assumptions underlying their conceptualization.

Presents a paper from the symposium `Wollheim on pictorial representation'. The author outlines the minimal requirement of a theory of representation, and argues that semiotic theories of representation fail to meet his basic requirement because they exclude perception as a factor at a fundamental point in the process of assigning representational meaning to pictures. In the light of this failure, he amplifies his minimalist requirement, then applies it to resemblance theories, which rely on understandings of how resemblance is experienced; resemblance theories require the appropriate experience, and thus they also fail to meet the amplified requirement. The author describes his theory of representation, developed over a number of years, which is predicated on a special skill, which he terms `seeing-in', which accounts for the phenomenology of experience and allows him to argue that the scope of seeing-in and the scope of representation can be identical. He tests this theory against the questions posed by other theories concerning the nature of pictorial representation and argues that it answers the problems they raise.

Understanding the role of emotion in forming preferences is critical in helping firms choose effective marketing strategies and consumers make appropriate consumption decisions. In five experiments, participants made a set of binary product choices under conditions designed to induce different degrees of emotional decision processing. The results consistently indicate that greater reliance on emotional reactions during decision making is associated with greater preference consistency and less cognitive noise. Additionally, the results of a meta‐analytical study based on data from all five experiments further show that products that elicit a stronger emotional response are more likely to yield consistent preferences.

I argue for an intentional conception of representation in science that requires bringing scientific agents and their intentions into the picture. So the formula is: Agents (1) intend; (2) to use model, M; (3) to represent a part of the world, W; (4) for some purpose, P. This conception legitimates using similarity as the basic relationship between models and the world. Moreover, since just about anything can be used to represent anything else, there can be no unified ontology of models. This whole approach is further supported by a brief exposition of some recent work in cognitive, or usage-based, linguistics. Finally, with all the above as background, I criticize the recently much discussed idea that claims involving scientific models are really fictions.

We introduce a τ\\tau-dependent Wigner representation, Wigτ\\operatorname {Wig}_\\tau, τ∈[0,1]\\tau \\in [0,1], which permits us to define a general theory connecting time-frequency representations on one side and pseudo-differential operators on the other. The scheme includes various types of time-frequency representations, among the others the classical Wigner and Rihaczek representations and the most common classes of pseudo-differential operators. We show further that the integral over τ\\tau of Wigτ\\operatorname {Wig}_\\tau yields a new representation QQ possessing features in signal analysis which considerably improve those of the Wigner representation, especially for what concerns the so-called “ghost frequencies”. The relations of all these representations with respect to the generalized spectrogram and the Cohen class are then studied. Furthermore, a characterization of the LpL^p-boundedness of both τ\\tau-pseudo-differential operators and τ\\tau-Wigner representations are obtained.

Recognition of a particular individual occurs when we reactivate links between current perceptual inputs and the previously formed representation of that person. This recognition can be achieved by identifying, separately or simultaneously, distinct elements such as the face, silhouette, or voice as belonging to one individual. In humans, those different cues are linked into one complex conceptual representation of individual identity. Here we tested whether rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) also have a cognitive representation of identity by evaluating whether they exhibit cross-modal individual recognition. Further, we assessed individual recognition of familiar conspecifics and familiar humans. In a free preferential looking time paradigm, we found that, for both species, monkeys spontaneously matched the faces of known individuals to their voices. This finding demonstrates that rhesus macaques possess a cross-modal cognitive representation of individuals that extends from conspecifics to humans, revealing the adaptive potential of identity recognition for individuals of socioecological relevance.