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Anthropogenic emissions increase the concentration of greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide, which necessitates the promotion of environmental protection as one of the most urgent tasks of European environmental policy. The reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and the development of clean technologies in production also depends on the impact of environmental taxation; in this regard, a methodology for analyzing its impact and assessment on the development of eco-friendly technologies is proposed. An analysis of environmental tax revenues to the budgets of the EU countries revealed the insufficiency of environmental revenues to cover the costs of environmental protection from the damage caused by greenhouse gas emissions, which requires the transformation of the system of fiscal mechanisms. The total receipts of all environmental taxes in the EU budget for the period 2000–2020 increased by 53%, and the receipts from taxes on greenhouse gas emissions into the atmosphere increased by 71% in the EU budget, with a tax rate increase of 1.5-fold over this period. The application of the proposed methodology made it possible to determine, on the basis of the correlation coefficient, a high connection strength of +0.971 for the period 2000–2020 between the receipts of the environmental tax for greenhouse gas emissions into the atmosphere and the total values of all environmental taxes, as well as a fairly strong feedback of +0.913 from the receipts of the environmental tax to the EU budget with gross domestic product. Therefore, it is proposed to use differentiated environmental tax rates for different stages of the development of clean technologies.

Contract law treats consumer attention as ifit were unlimited. We instead view consumer attention as a scarce resource that must be conserved. We argue that consumer contracts generate negative externalities by overwhelming consumers with information that depletes their attention and prevents competition on contract terms. We propose a novel solution to this market failure: To force sellers to internalize the attention externalities that their contracts generate. This will be accomplished through a Pigouvian tax on the presentation of a consumer contract, proportionate to the attention costs that reading and comprehending the contract would impose on consumers.

Blockchain and cryptocurrency are a hot topic in today’s digital world. In this paper, we create a game theoretic model in continuous time. We consider a dynamic game model of the bitcoin market, where miners or players use mining systems to mine bitcoin by investing electricity into the mining system. Although this work is motivated by BTC, the work presented can be applicable to other mining systems similar to BTC. We propose three concepts of dynamic game theoretic solutions to the model: Social optimum , Nash equilibrium and myopic Nash equilibrium . Using the model that a player represents a single “miner” or a “mining pool”, we develop novel and interesting results for the cryptocurrency world.

Many economists and psychologists have studied the impact of nudges on households’ pro-environmental behaviors. Interestingly, “private nudges” can be imagined for companies. Yet, studies focusing on nudging employees’ energy use are rare. The objective of our paper is to explore this issue with the help of a field experiment conducted at 47 French companies’ sites. Using a difference-in-difference methodology, the effects of three nudges on employees’ energy conservation are tested. The first nudge, “moral appeal”, stresses the responsible use of energy. The second one, “social comparison”, informs employees on the energy consumption of other firms participating in the experiment. Finally, the third nudge, “stickers”, alerts employees about good energy conservation practices. Our results stress the complementarity of these nudges. When implemented alone, the three nudges have no significant effects on energy consumption. However, when the moral appeal and social comparison nudges are combined with the stickers nudge, they become effective.

Most economists believe that the government should impose Pigouvian taxes on firms that produce negative externalities like pollution, yet regulatory agencies hardly ever use their authority to create Pigouvian taxes. Instead, they issue command-and-control regulations. Our major point is that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, regulators typically have legal authority to create Pigouvian taxes—they just do not use it. While regulators may hesitate to impose Pigouvian taxes for a range of political and symbolic reasons, we argue that these reasons do not justify this massive failure of regulatory efficiency. It is time for the regulatory state to take a Pigouvian turn.

In the aftermath of the financial crisis, several European countries have introduced levies on bank liabilities. The aim is to compensate taxpayers for the provision of bailouts and guarantees and to internalize the fiscal costs of future banking crises. This paper studies the tax incidence: Building on the Monti–Klein model, we predict that banks shift the tax mainly to borrowers by raising lending rates and that deposit rates may increase because deposits are partly exempt. Bank-level evidence from 23 EU countries (2007–2013) shows that the levy indeed increases the lending and the deposit rate as well as the net interest margin. Banks adjust differently to this tax depending on the composition of their balance sheets: In line with theory, especially those banks with a high loan-to-deposit ratio raise the interest rates. Market concentration and the capital structure influence the magnitude of the pass-through, which is stronger in concentrated markets and weaker in case of banks with a high regulatory capital ratio.

Marijuana legalization creates a host of complex legal problems, not the least of which is how to best tax the emerging legal market. This Essay attempts to bridge the gap between tax theory and marijuana policy to make some modest claims. First, it roots the discussion of state-level marijuana taxation in the theoretical distinction between ordinary revenue-raising taxes and \"Pigouvian \" or regulatory taxes. It makes the somewhat controversial claim that the best taxing strategy for states is to attempt to capture as much of the marijuana legalization premium as possible without driving consumers into the illegal market and that other Pigouvian policy concerns are likely to be less important. Second, it roots the discussion of federal taxes in the many factors that will change if federal prohibition ends, again recognizing the importance ofpossible additional legalization surplus if marijuana is legalized at the federal level. It concludes that the most pronounced difficulty at both levels of taxation is ensuring that excessive taxes do not stymie efforts to move consumers out of the existing illegal market and into the newly regulated legal market while keeping taxes high enough to capture the majority of the legalization surplus.

The Theory of Taxation and Public Economicspresents a unified conceptual framework for analyzing taxation--the first to be systematically developed in several decades. An original treatment of the subject rather than a textbook synthesis, the book contains new analysis that generates novel results, including some that overturn long-standing conventional wisdom. This fresh approach should change thinking, research, and teaching for decades to come. Building on the work of James Mirrlees, Anthony Atkinson and Joseph Stiglitz, and subsequent researchers, and in the spirit of classics by A. C. Pigou, William Vickrey, and Richard Musgrave, this book steps back from particular lines of inquiry to consider the field as a whole, including the relationships among different fiscal instruments. Louis Kaplow puts forward a framework that makes it possible to rigorously examine both distributive and distortionary effects of particular policies despite their complex interactions with others. To do so, various reforms--ranging from commodity or estate and gift taxation to regulation and public goods provision--are combined with a distributively offsetting adjustment to the income tax. The resulting distribution-neutral reform package holds much constant while leaving in play the distinctive effects of the policy instrument under consideration. By applying this common methodology to disparate subjects,The Theory of Taxation and Public Economicsproduces significant cross-fertilization and yields solutions to previously intractable problems.

We consider optimal anonymous consumption taxes in situations where the magnitude of an externality varies with individuals who cause it. For instance, urban fuel consumers generate greater pollution damages compared to rural consumers, but both groups are subjected to the same fuel tax. We provide a condition for the validity of the targeting principle, where external concerns are only addressed through the tax imposed on the commodity responsible for the externality. When this condition holds, one can separate the equity/efficiency and environmental components of this tax. An illustration suggests that Pigovian considerations explain most of the fuel tax in France.

Pigovian taxes have been proposed or enacted on dozens of harmful products and activities: carbon, gasoline, fat, sugar, guns, cigarettes, alcohol, traffic, zoning, executive pay, and financial transactions, among others. Academics of all political stripes are mystified by the public's inability to see the merits of using Pigovian taxes more frequently to address serious social harms, some even calling for the creation of a \"Pigovian state.\" A Pigovian tax is easy to design if one assumes that each individual causes the same amount of harm with each incremental increase in activity on the margin. This assumption of uniform marginal social cost pairs well with the limited information and enforcement capacity of government institutions. Broadly speaking, Pigovian taxes are likely to be the optimal regulatory instrument only when the harm is global pollution, and where the harm does not vary significantly based on the source, or the variation in marginal social cost is easily observed and categorized, as with traffic congestion charges.