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Background: Global trade and travel are key factors affecting the initial introduction of vectors and VBDs (vector-borne diseases) in a country. Vectors know no borders; it is essential to establish systems for the surveillance of vectors and vector-borne diseases (VBDs). This study was conducted to investigate the strengths and weaknesses of a newly established entomological surveillance system for Aedes mosquitoes at points of entry (PoE) in West Azerbaijan Prov­ince. Methods: The Aedes surveillance system was implemented in West Azerbaijan Province from 2019 to 2023. Following national guidelines, Aedes eggs and larvae were surveyed at eight international PoEs using ovitraps and by collecting larvae from natural or artificial habitats. A specific checklist designed for this study was employed to evaluate the pro­gram. Results: Over 9008 ovitraps were deployed, while 552 had eggs, including species from the families Phasmatidae and Psychodidae, as well as species from the genus Culex and Aedes caspius. Additionally, 506 larvae were collected during the surveillance period. The program had several key strengths, including a well-structured reporting system, robust technical support, knowledgeable personnel, designated health staff spaces at PoE, standardized surveillance tools, initi­atives for environmental enhancement, the establishment of an entomology laboratory, cross-border collaborations, and public health education campaigns. Identified weaknesses comprised staff and entomologist shortages, the absence of a functional insectary, limited engagement of volunteer groups, and inadequate availability of insecticides and tools for emergency vector control.  Conclusions: The study outcomes shed light on the challenges and suggest operational and practical solutions to ad­dress the identified shortcomings.

A scoping search and a systematic literature review were conducted to give an insight on entry and exit screening referring to travelers at points of entry, by analyzing published evidence on practices, guidelines, and experiences in the past 15 years worldwide. Grey literature, PubMed. and Scopus were searched using specific terms. Most of the available data identified through the systematic literature review concerned entry screening measures at airports. Little evidence is available about entry and exit screening measure implementation and effectiveness at ports and ground crossings. Exit screening was part of the World Health Organisation’s (WHO) temporary recommendations for implementation in certain points of entry, for specific time periods. Exit screening measures for Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) in the three most affected West African countries did not identify any cases and showed zero sensitivity and very low specificity. The percentages of confirmed cases identified out of the total numbers of travelers that passed through entry screening measures in various countries worldwide for Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) and EVD in West Africa were zero or extremely low. Entry screening measures for Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) did not detect any confirmed SARS cases in Australia, Canada, and Singapore. Despite the ineffectiveness of entry and exit screening measures, authors reported several important concomitant positive effects that their impact is difficult to assess, including discouraging travel of ill persons, raising awareness, and educating the traveling public and maintaining operation of flights from/to the affected areas. Exit screening measures in affected areas are important and should be applied jointly with other measures including information strategies, epidemiological investigation, contact tracing, vaccination, and quarantine to achieve a comprehensive outbreak management response. Based on review results, an algorithm about decision-making for entry/exit screening was developed.

COVID-19 remains a communicable disease with the capacity to cause substantial damage to health and health systems. Enhanced health screening at points of entry (POEs) is a public health measure implemented to support early detection, prevention and response to communicable diseases, such as COVID-19. The purpose of this study was to review the available evidence on the effectiveness of POE health screening in the detection and containment of the COVID-19 pandemic. This study was registered under PROSPERO and followed PRISMA guidelines in which the literature between 2019 and 2022 was retrieved from Scopus, PubMed, Web of Science, Global Health, CINAHL, Embase, Google Scholar and international organizations. A total of 33,744 articles were screened for eligibility, from which 43 met the inclusion criteria. The modeling studies predicted POE screening able to detect COVID-19 in a range of 8.8% to 99.6%, while observational studies indicated a detection rate of 2% to 77.9%, including variants of concern depending on the screening method employed. The literature also indicated these measures can delay onset of the epidemic by 7 to 32 days. Based on our review findings, if POE screening measures are implemented in combination with other public health interventions such as rapid tests, they may help detect and reduce the spread of COVID-19.

Indonesia has articulated ambitious green economy objectives through frameworks such as the Low Carbon Development Initiative (LCDI). Despite this ambition, a critical research gap exists. The weak ‘green political capabilities’ of policymakers—defined as their ability to navigate political processes, build coalitions, and translate technical knowledge into viable policy—hinder effective agenda-setting and implementation. This study addresses this deficit by identifying strategic points of entry for enhancing these capabilities to strengthen a more sustainable economic transition. Employing a mixed-methods approach guided by the UNDP Capacity Assessment Framework, this research gathered data from 170 stakeholders via workshops, focus group discussions, and surveys. The analysis identifies four principal entry points: (1) internal institutional development, (2) accreditation processes, (3) bureaucratic reform, and (4) external partnerships. Critically, ordinal regression reveals which actors most significantly influence capacity development priorities. Governmental/legislative institutions (Estimate = 1.855, p < 0.010) and the private sector (Estimate = 3.173, p < 0.020) exert a significant positive influence on advancing the green economy agenda. Conversely, competencies such as policy strengthening exhibit a significant negative correlation (Estimate = −3.467, p < 0.000), which indicates a concentration of need among institutions with substantial capacity gaps. The study’s key contribution is a framework for systematically integrating green competencies into national accreditation standards and bureaucratic reforms, providing a clear pathway to transform entry points into effective levers for enhancing the state’s green political capabilities.

Background Points of Entry (POEs) are at the frontline for prevention, detection and response to international spread of diseases. The objective of this assessment was to ascertain the current level of existing International Health Regulations (IHR) core capacities of designated airports, ports and ground crossings in Cameroon and identify critical gaps for capacity building for prevention, early warning and response to public health threats including COVID-19. Methods Data were collected from April to May 2020 in 5 designated POEs: Yaounde Nsimalen International Airport (YIA), Douala international Airport (DIA), Douala Autonomous Port (DAP), Garoua-Boulai ground crossing, Kye-Ossi ground crossing which were all selected for their high volume of passenger and goods traffic. The World Health Organization (WHO) assessment tool for core capacity requirements at designated airports, ports and ground crossings was used to collect data on three technical capacities: (i) communication and coordination, (ii) Capacities at all times and (iii) capacities to respond to Public Health Emergencies of International Concern (PHEIC). Results All the investigated POEs scored below 50% of capacities in place. YIA recorded the highest percentage for all groups of capacities, coordination and communication and for core capacity at all times with a percentage of 42%, 58% and 32% respectively. For core capacity to respond to PHEIC, all the POEs recorded below 50%. The DAP and all ground crossings lacked trained personnel for inspection of conveyances. Only DIA had a public health emergency plan. There is no isolation/quarantine and transport capacity at the POEs. Conclusion All POEs assessed did not meet IHR standards and need significant improvement to fulfill the IHR requirements. Unstructured communication channels between stakeholders make the implementation of IHR challenging. A coordination mechanism, with clear functions and structure, is necessary for well-coordinated response efforts to health emergencies at POEs. This assessment will serve as a baseline to inform planning and IHR implementation at designated POEs in Cameroon.

Background The implementation of core capacities as stated in the International Health Regulations (IHR) is far from complete, and, as the COVID-19 pandemic shows, the spreading of infectious diseases through points of entry (POEs) is a serious problem. To guide training and exercises, we performed a training needs assessment on infectious disease management among professionals at European POE. Methods We disseminated a digital questionnaire to representatives of designated airports, ports, and ground-crossings in Europe. Topics were derived from the IHR core capacities for POEs. Based on the importance (4-point Likert scale) and training needs (4-point Likert scale), we identified the topics with the highest priority for training. These results were put in further perspective using prior experience (training < 3 year, exercise < 5 years, events < 5 years). Also, preferences for training methodologies were assessed. Results Fifty questionnaires were included in the analyses, representing 50 POEs from 19 European countries. Importance is high for 26/30 topics, although scores widely vary among respondents. Topics with a high training need (16/30) are amongst others the handling of ill travelers; using and composing the public health emergency contingency plan, and public health measures. Respondents from ports and airports attribute equal importance to most topics, but respondents from ports showed higher training needs on 75% of the topics. POEs are unevenly and generally little experienced. The most preferred training methods were presentations. Simulation is the preferred methodology for training the handling of ill or exposed travelers. Conclusions The European workforce at designated ports, airports and ground-crossings has a different level of experience and perceives varying importance of the topics assessed in our study. We identified the topics on which training is required. We call for European collaboration between POEs to agree upon the importance of infectious disease management, and to jointly build a trained and prepared workforce that is ready to face the next crisis.

Background The dynamic nature of zoonotic emergence, spillover and spread necessitates multisectoral coordination beyond national borders to encompass cross-boundary and regional cooperation. Designated points of entry (POEs), specifically ground crossings, serve as critical locales for establishing and maintaining robust prevention, detection, notification, coordination, and response mechanisms to transboundary emerging and re-emerging disease threats. In order to better assess One Health capacities for transboundary zoonotic diseases (TZD) prevention, detection and response we adapted an existing tool, One Health Systems Assessment for Priority Zoonoses (OHSAPZ), for a cross-border, POE setting in North Africa. Methods The One Health Transboundary Assessment for Priority Zoonoses (OHTAPZ) tool was used to support prioritization of transboundary zoonoses and analyze operational capacities between national and subnational-level human and animal health stakeholders from Libya and Tunisia. Country partners jointly identified and prioritized five TZDs of concern. Case study scenarios for each priority pathogen were used to elicit current disease operations, as well as multisectoral and bilateral engagement networks. Finally, a gap analysis was performed to determine bilateral strengths and weaknesses to TZDs. Results The five priority TZDs jointly confirmed to undergo One Health assessment were avian influenza (low and high pathogenic strains); brucellosis; Rift Valley fever; Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever; and rabies. Using the qualitative information collected, a transboundary systems map schematic was developed outlining the movement of human patients, animals, diagnostic samples, and routes of communication and coordination both within and between countries for zoonotic diseases. Conclusions Analysis of current operations (prevention, detection, surveillance, laboratory capacity, quarantine/isolation, and response) and the resulting transboundary systems map schematic helped identify existing capacity strengths for certain priority pathogens, as well as challenges to timely information-sharing and coordination. We developed targeted recommendations to address these limitations for joint action planning between Libya and Tunisia.

Implementing and monitoring infection prevention and control (IPC) measures at immigration points of entry (PoEs) is key to preventing infections, reducing excessive use of antimicrobials, and tackling antimicrobial resistance (AMR). Sierra Leone has been implementing IPC measures at four PoEs (Queen Elizabeth II Quay port, Lungi International Airport, and the Jendema and Gbalamuya ground crossings) since the last Ebola outbreak in 2014–2015. We adapted the World Health Organization IPC Assessment Framework tool to assess these measures and identify any gaps in their components at each PoE through a cross-sectional study in May 2021. IPC measures were Inadequate (0–25%) at Queen Elizabeth II Quay port (21%; 11/53) and Jendema (25%; 13/53) and Basic (26–50%) at Lungi International Airport (40%; 21/53) and Gbalamuya (49%; 26/53). IPC components with the highest scores were: having a referral system (85%; 17/20), cleaning and sanitation (63%; 15/24), and having a screening station (59%; 19/32). The lowest scores (0% each) were reported for the availability of IPC guidelines and monitoring of IPC practices. This was the first study in Sierra Leone highlighting significant gaps in the implementation of IPC measures at PoEs. We call on the AMR multisectoral coordinating committee to enhance IPC measures at all PoEs.

BackgroundThe One Health Systems Transboundary Assessment for Priority Zoonoses (OHTAPZ) tool was developed to address the need for a multisectoral approach in assessing transboundary zoonotic disease threats within and across shared land borders. This study sought to implement recommendations from the tool’s initial pilot and revise it for further application.MethodsThis revised methodology included an expanded stakeholder identification process in Phase 1, an interactive tabletop exercise for assessment in Phase 2, and a partner-led strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats analysis in Phase 3. We implemented the revised tool in Jordan and Iraq, focusing our assessment and analysis at the Karameh-Turaibil formal land border crossing.ResultsImplementation of the revised methodology resulted in expanded identification and engagement of nontraditional One Health partners and highlighted mechanisms by which partners communicate and coordinate across levels, sectors at the national level, within and between points of entry (POEs), and bilaterally when preventing, detecting, and responding to priority transboundary zoonotic diseases. Both countries have core One Health capacities available at Karameh and Turaibil POEs and can leverage existing, effective mechanisms for communication and coordination when facing transboundary threats. However, reporting systems, budget and workforce constraints, and geographical/ conflict-related limitations are challenges.ConclusionsThe OHTAPZ tool provides a methodology for countries to conduct national and bilateral assessments to understand, integrate, and improve One Health systems and to reassess and refine strategies for the prevention, detection, and response to emerging and evolving transboundary threats. These findings can help countries understand and improve their One Health capacities, especially at POEs.

WHO recommends surveillance for COVID-19 among travelers at Points of Entry (POE) to countries. At 13 selected POE at the Nepal-India border, between March 2021 and July 2021, we describe the screening, testing, diagnosis and isolation practices of COVID-19 amongst travelers. Those who stayed in India or elsewhere for > one day and those who did not have a negative RT-PCR result within the last 72 h of travel were tested for COVID-19 with rapid antigen diagnostic tests. Daily surveillance reports maintained at POE were used for analysis. Of 337,338 travelers screened, 69,886 (21%) were tested and 3907 (6%) were diagnosed with COVID-19. The proportions tested averaged 15% during April-May when screened numbers were high and increased to 35% in July when screened numbers had decreased. The proportions diagnosed positive peaked at 10% in April-May, but decreased to below 1% in June and July. Testing coverage varied from 0–99% in the different POE. Most COVID-19 cases were Nepalese, male, <60 years of age, migrant workers and presented with fever. Of COVID-19 cases, 32% had home-based isolation, 64% underwent community-based isolation and the remainder either went to hospital or returned to India. In conclusion, about one fifth of travelers overall were tested, with coverage varying considerably over time and among different POE. Strengthening surveillance processes at POE is needed.