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Dear Editor,In many high-income countries, the growing influence of politics and public administration over health system governce is fueling public discontent...

Using time series data of Pakistan from 1990 to 2019, this study explores the asymmetric effects of political instability on clean energy consumption and CO 2 emissions. The results from the traditional ARDL model show that political stability lessens environmental damage by reducing CO 2 emissions in the long run. However, when we used the nonlinear ARDL approach, we found that political instability not only reduces the consumption of clean energy but also leads to damage environmental quality in the long run in Pakistan,while political stability not only increases the consumption of clean energy but also helps improve environmental quality in the short run in Pakistan. Thus, macroeconomic policies to promote expansion in clean energy consumption will directly stimulate green economic growth and environmental quality.

China’s increased trade with, and investment in, Africa have boosted the continent’s economic growth but have also generated considerable controversy. The aggregate data on China’s overseas direct investment (ODI) in African countries reveal that China’s share of the stock of foreign investment is small, though growing rapidly. China’s attraction to resource-rich countries is no different from Western investment. China’s overall ODI is uncorrelated with a measure of rule of law, whereas Western investment favors the better governance environments. As a result, Chinese investment in strong and weak governance environments is about the same, but its share of foreign investment is higher in the weak governance states. Micro data from MOFCOM’s database on registered Chinese firms investing in Africa between 1998 and 2012 provide a different perspective. Key words in project descriptions are used to code the investments into 25 sectors. This database captures the small and medium private firms investing in Africa. Contrary to common perceptions, there are few projects in natural resource sectors. Most projects are in services, with a significant number in manufacturing as well. Country-sector-level regressions based on firms’ transaction-level data find that Chinese ODI, both horizontal and vertical, is profit-driven, like investment from other countries. In particular, regressions show that Chinese ODI is relatively more concentrated in skill-intensive sectors in skill-abundant countries but in capital-intensive sectors in capital-scarce countries. These patterns are mostly observed in politically unstable countries, suggesting stronger incentives to seek profits in tougher environments.

Research on civil war termination typically classifies conflict outcomes into homogeneous categories. Civil wars are conventionally described as ending in ‘victory’ for one side, ‘negotiated settlement’, or ‘stalemate’. However, each of these common categories conceals a significant degree of unexplored variation. Not all peace processes are the same, nor should we assume equivalence between all ‘victory’ outcomes. Ignoring the variability in outcomes obscures our understanding of how civil wars actually end and can undermine efforts to examine how this may influence the sustainability of the ensuing peace. This article focuses on the concept of rebel victory and argues that it has been used to describe a wide range of civil war outcomes that share some features but that also differ along three dimensions: (i) the residual threat posed by the defeated regime; (ii) the role of external actors in enabling victory; and (iii) rebel fragmentation . The article describes these dimensions and the influence that they can exert on the likelihood of continued political instability in the aftermath of rebel victories. The examples of rebel victories in the Central African Republic (2003 and 2012) are used to demonstrate the analytical utility of this novel conceptualisation of rebel victory.

Previous research by Goldstone et al. (2010) generated a highly accurate predictive model of state-level political instability. Notably, this model identifies political institutions – and partial democracy with factionalism, specifically – as the most compelling factors explaining when and where instability events are likely to occur. This article reassesses the model’s explanatory power and makes three related points: (1) the model’s predictive power varies substantially over time; (2) its predictive power peaked in the period used for out-of-sample validation (1995–2004) in the original study and (3) the model performs relatively poorly in the more recent period. The authors find that this decline is not simply due to the Arab Uprisings, instability events that occurred in autocracies. Similar issues are found with attempts to predict nonviolent uprisings (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017) and armed conflict onset and continuation (Hegre et al. 2013). These results inform two conclusions: (1) the drivers of instability are not constant over time and (2) care must be exercised in interpreting prediction exercises as evidence in favor or dispositive of theoretical mechanisms.

Al-Shabaab remains one of the most resilient and dangerous extremist groups in Somalia and the broader Horn of Africa. The group exploits weak governance, socio-economic disparities, and regional instability to sustain its operations. Despite ongoing military interventions, the group continues to adapt through financial networks, strategic propaganda, and alliances with global jihadist movements. This study employs a qualitative analysis of secondary data sources, including academic literature, policy reports, and government documents, to examine Al-Shabaab’s operational tactics, governance structures, and counterterrorism challenges. The findings reveal that military strategies alone are insufficient in dismantling Al-Shabaab’s influence. A comprehensive approach that includes governance reforms, economic development, community engagement, and regional cooperation is essential for sustainable counterterrorism efforts. Strengthening state institutions, reducing corruption, and addressing socioeconomic grievances will be key to mitigating Al-Shabaab’s appeal and ensuring long-term security in Somalia and beyond.

This article offers a unified approach for studying political violence whether it emerges as repression or civil war. We formulate a model where an incumbent or opposition can use violence to maintain or acquire power to study which political and economic factors drive one-sided or two-sided violence (repression or civil war). The model predicts a hierarchy of violence states from peace via repression to civil war; and suggests a natural empirical approach. Exploiting only within-country variation in the data, we show that violence is associated with shocks that can affect wages and aid. As in the theory, these effects are only present where political institutions are noncohesive.

Using two unusual surveys, this study analyzes participation in the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine, comparing participants with revolution supporters, opponents, counter-revolutionaries, and the apathetic/inactive. As the analysis shows, most revolutionaries were weakly committed to the revolution's democratic master narrative, and the revolution's spectacular mobilizational success was largely due to its mobilization of cultural cleavages and symbolic capital to construct a negative coalition across diverse policy groupings. A contrast is drawn between urban civic revolutions like the Orange Revolution and protracted peasant revolutions. The strategies associated with these revolutionary models affect the roles of revolutionary organization and selective incentives and the character of revolutionary coalitions. As the comparison suggests, postrevolutionary instability may be built into urban civic revolutions due to their reliance on a rapidly convened negative coalition of hundreds of thousands, distinguished by fractured elites, lack of consensus over fundamental policy issues, and weak commitment to democratic ends.

Purpose This research aims to explore the moderating role of alms tax (zakat) knowledge in the relationship between extrinsic and intrinsic motivations (i.e. political instability, trust in institutions and service quality) and zakat compliance among businessmen in a Muslim developing country. Design/methodology/approach A final sample of 315 Algerian entrepreneurs randomly collected through a self-administered survey was analysed. Drawing on the social cognitive theory, estimation and analysis were done using structural equation modelling (Smart PLS). Findings The results indicate that all the hypothesised direct relationships are supported. Particularly, the knowledge-moderated interaction of political instability’s effect on entrepreneurs’ zakat compliance intention was significant, while its interactions with service quality and trust were not. Practical implications Findings that emerged from this study may serve as a reminder to zakat agencies and policymakers that varying degrees of knowledge about zakat can have a significant impact on shaping intentions to comply with zakat rules, particularly in an unstable political environment. Additionally, this work sheds light on the critical role of service quality delivered by zakat institutions and businessmen’s trust in such entities in shaping their zakat compliance intentions. Finally, it demonstrates how critical it is to strengthen the business sector’s social responsibility to support the zakat’s noble socioeconomic objectives. Originality/value This present work augments the scanty literature on zakat compliance because it validates a research model drawing on social cognitive perspectives. Additionally, the model blends the moderating role of knowledge into social cognitive perspectives of zakat compliance among businessmen.

This article analyses the effects of political instability on migrant remittances in 35 Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries over the period 2006–2023, examining the role of financial development. A finite mixture model (FMM) estimated using instrumental variables (IVs) is adopted to account for country heterogeneity and correct for endogeneity. The results reveal that the effects of political instability on migrant remittances differ between two distinct groups of countries. Political instability has no significant effect on migrant remittances in the first group, whereas in the second group, it increases remittances. The first group comprises countries in which migrant remittances are not affected by political instability. The second group consists of countries where political instability leads to a significant increase in these transfers. Furthermore, countries with a high level of financial development are more likely to belong to the group where political instability increases migrant remittances. Therefore, the results suggest that SSA countries should develop their financial sectors to encourage large-scale migrant remittances in contexts of political instability.