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"Political corruption Argentina."
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Hybrid regimes within democracies : fiscal federalism and subnational rentier states
\"From the racially segregated 'Jim Crow' US South to the many electoral but hardly democratic local regimes in Argentina and other federal democracies, the political rights of citizens around the world are often curtailed by powerful subnational rulers. Hybrid Regimes within Democracies presents the first comprehensive study of democracy and authoritarianism in all the subnational units of a federation. The book focuses on Argentina, but also contains a comparative chapter that considers seven other federations including Germany, Mexico, and the USA. The in-depth and multidimensional description of subnational regimes in all Argentine provinces is complemented with an innovative explanation for the large differences between those that are democratic and those that are 'hybrid', complex combinations of democratic and authoritarian elements. Putting forward and testing an original theory of subnational democracy, Gervasoni extends the rentier-state explanatory logic from resource rents to a more general concept, such as 'fiscal federalism rents', and from the national to the subnational level\"-- Provided by publisher.
Book
Argentines Mark 30 Years Since Dirty War
\"Thousands of Argentines swayed to protest songs...at an early morning vigil marking the 30th anniversary of a military coup that ushered in the country's Dirty War. 'Thirty Years of Life Defeating Death!' and 'Not One Step Back!' read large banners strung alongside black-and-white photographs of hundreds of 'desaparecidos'--Spanish for the 'Missing' victims of the seven-year dictatorship and its bloody crackdown on dissent.\" (Wyoming Tribune-Eagle) Learn about the coup that overthrew Argentina's constitutional government in 1974 and how the new national holiday marks the anniversary of Argentina's return to democratic government.
Newspaper Article
Witch Hunts? Electoral Cycles and Corruption Lawsuits in Argentina
Courts prosecuting corruption serve a critical horizontal accountability function, but they can also play a role in moments of vertical accountability when voters can sanction corrupt candidates. This article documents the strategic use of corruption lawsuits, demonstrating the presence of an electoral cycle in filing new corruption accusations against politicians. Using an original dataset of daily corruption complaints filed in federal courts against members of Argentina's main political coalitions between 2013 and 2021, we document increased corruption accusations against and by politicians in the periods immediately preceding an election. A second dataset of daily media coverage of corruption accusations in two leading newspapers suggests that corruption is more salient before elections, offering politicians a temporal focal point to prepare and launch especially impactful lawsuits. Our findings shed new light on using courts for accountability and debates about the so-called ‘lawfare’ in Latin America.
Journal Article
Government Advertising and Media Coverage of Corruption Scandals
We construct measures of the extent to which the four main newspapers in Argentina report government corruption on their front page during the period 1998-2007 and correlate them with government advertising. The correlation is negative. The size is considerable—a one standard deviation increase in monthly government advertising is associated with a reduction in the coverage of the government's corruption scandals of 0.23 of a front page per month, or 18 percent of a standard deviation in coverage. The results are robust to the inclusion of newspaper, month, newspaper × president and individualcorruption scandal fixed effects, as well as newspaper × president specific time trends.
Journal Article
When Do Voters Sanction Corrupt Politicians?
A growing body of research explores the factors that affect when corrupt politicians are held accountable by voters. Most studies, however, focus on one or few factors in isolation, leaving incomplete our understanding of whether they condition each other. To address this, we embedded rich conjoint candidate choice experiments into surveys in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. We test the importance of two contextual factors thought to mitigate voters’ punishment of corrupt politicians: how widespread corruption is and whether it brings side benefits. Like other scholars, we find that corruption decreases candidate support substantially. But, we also find that information that corruption is widespread does not lessen the sanction applied against corruption, whereas information about the side benefits from corruption does, and does so to a similar degree as the mitigating role of permissible attitudes toward bribery. Moreover, those who stand to gain from these side benefits are less likely to sanction corruption.
Journal Article
Libertarian Populism? Making Sense of Javier Milei’s Political Discourse
This study seeks to understand the political discourse of Javier Milei and to determine which concept of populism best captures his approach. Although perceived by many as a populist, Milei is unusual in that he sees himself as a liberal libertarian and defender of the West against collectivist policies. To this end, this study analyzes selected speeches by Milei from three different periods during and after the 2024 presidential election campaign and applies a deductive coding scheme designed to identify ideational populism, populist discursive framing, populism as strategy, and populism as crisis performance. The analysis confirms that Milei is at best a partial populist, as he fails to define the core populist concept of “the people”. It concludes that the concept of crisis performance emerges as the most apt theoretical framework to classify Milei’s type of populism. By rhetorically transforming the crisis not only into an existential economic issue but also into a moral tale of corruption and failure at the highest levels, he can appeal for radical change and offer himself as the national political savior. Milei’s discourse also illustrates that, unlike ideological populism or discursive populist framing, in the performative turn, the victims of the crisis, the people, often remain a vague signifier defined by their suffering at the hands of elites.
Journal Article
Explaining presidential instability in Latin America: Evidence from Brazil, Argentina and Ecuador
Purpose - This study attempts to figure out the factors that contributed to deposing certain elected presidents before the end of their constitutional terms, alongside tracing the new political context that prevailed in Latin America since 1978 and its impact on direct political participation and military behavior during presidential crises. Design/methodology/approach - The paper uses the comparative method to investigate the causes of presidential instability in three case studies. Findings - The likelihood of presidential instability increases when a president enacts austerity economic policies that marginalize large sectors of the citizenry, becomes implicated in acts of corruption and develops a hostile relationship with members of the ruling coalition. Originality/value - This study integrates the social movement theory with analytical perspectives from parliamentary behavior to explain presidential instability. It attempts to investigate the dynamics of interaction between the acts of furious citizens and disloyal legislators through the in-depth analysis of three case studies.
Journal Article
ACCOUNTABILITY AND CORRUPTION IN ARGENTINA DURING THE KIRCHNERS' ERA
This article highlights an important paradox: in Argentina between 2003 and 2013 the center-left Peronist government's approach to governance mirrors that of the center-right Peronist administration of the 1990s. While the latter centralized authority to pursue neoliberal reforms, the former have centralized authority in the name of expanding government intervention in the economy. In both cases, corruption has tended to go unchecked due to insufficient government accountability. Therefore, although economic policies and political rhetoric have changed dramatically, government corruption remains a constant of the Argentine political system due to the executive branch's ability to emasculate constitutional checks and balances. Este artículo pone de relieve una paradoja importante: en la Argentina entre 2003 y 2013 los gobiernos peronistas de centro-izquierda reflejan los de la administración peronista de centro-derecha de la década de 1990. Mientras en los años noventa la concentración del poder presidencial se usó para promover reformas neoliberales, en los 2000 la autoridad centralizada se persiguió en nombre de la expansión de la intervención gubernamental en la economía. En ambos casos, la corrupción ha tendido a pasar inadvertida debido a la insuficiencia de la rendición de cuentas del gobierno. Por lo tanto, aunque las políticas económicas y la retórica política han cambiado drásticamente, la corrupción gubernamental sigue siendo una constante del sistema político argentino, gracias a la capacidad del Poder Ejecutivo para nulificar a los controles y equilibrios constitucionales.
Journal Article
Concessions of infrastructure in Latin America: Government-led renegotiation
This paper analyzes government-led renegotiations in infrastructure concession contracts in Latin America, based on the same sample used in Guasch, Laffont and Straub (2003) to examine firm-led renegotiations. After extending the theoretical framework to a multiple-period context in which both Pareto-improving and rent-shifting renegotiations at the initiative of the government can occur, we develop an original instrumental variable strategy to address the issue of contract endogeneity and derive empirical results. While some of the main insights concerning the importance of having a regulator in place when awarding concessions and the fragility of price cap regulatory schemes are unchanged, significant differences arise with respect to the effect of investment and financing, as well as the corruption variables. We provide evidence that a good regulatory framework is especially important in contexts with weak governance and political opportunism.
Journal Article
Vote Buying in Argentina
We analyze vote buying in Argentina--the payment by political parties of minor benefits (food, clothing, cash) to citizens in exchange for their votes. How widespread is vote buying in Argentina, and what is the profile of the typical vote \"seller\"? Did the shift toward a neoliberal economic model in the 1990s increase or reduce vote buying? Why do parties attempt to buy votes when the ballot is secret and people could simply accept campaign handouts and then vote as they wish? We analyze responses to surveys we conducted in Argentina in 2002 and offer answers to these questions. Our findings suggest that vote buying is an effective strategy for mobilizing electoral support among low-income people when parties are able to monitor voters' actions, make reasonably accurate inferences about how individuals voted, and credibly threaten to punish voters who defect from the implicit clientelist bargain. Our results point toward ballot reform as one way to reduce vote buying in Argentina.
Journal Article