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Objective. This study examines the effects of government performance and corruption on political trust in three East Asian democracies—Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—using the empirical implications of theoretical models (EITM) framework. Methods. I argue that political trust is a function of evaluation of government performance, perception of corruption, and their interaction, and provide an empirical test using the data from the Asian Barometer. Results. Empirically, I find that assessment of government performance is positively associated with political trust, whereas perception of corruption is negatively related to political trust. Furthermore, evaluation of government performance interacts with perception of corruption to negatively influence political trust. Conclusions. The findings demonstrate that the effects of evaluation of government performance and perception of corruption on political trust depend on the level of each other. Specifically, corruption can exacerbate the positive effect of government performance on political trust, but government performance cannot ameliorate the negative association between corruption and political trust. This study implies that in a democracy, the public expects its government to be not only competent but also ethical, and put more weight on ethics than on competence.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to identify the five mistakes made by political leaders in Asian countries in combating corruption. These mistakes constitute the cycle of failure which must be broken for Asian countries to succeed in fighting corruption.Design/methodology/approachThis paper is based on the comparative evaluation of the effectiveness of the anti-corruption measures adopted by various Asian countries.FindingsThe cycle of failure in combating corruption in Asian countries arises from their governments’ reliance on corrupt political leaders and the police, and multiple anti-corruption agencies as attack dogs or paper tigers.Originality/valueThis paper would be of interest to those policymakers, anti-corruption practitioners, and scholars, who are concerned with enhancing the effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies in their countries by breaking the cycle of failure.

Does local democracy induce better service to citizens? While elected officials can be punished at the ballot box if they fail to address citizens’ needs, appointed bureaucrats may have policy knowledge that enables them to better serve citizens. Employing a multimethod design, this paper uses variation in local political institutions in Taiwan to assess the relative merits of direct election and bureaucratic appointment for local government responsiveness. While democratic institutions are often thought to induce responsiveness, I find that in Taiwan, with its historically strong bureaucracy and relatively new democratic institutions, the picture is somewhat more complicated. Elected and appointed officials face different incentives that motivate the latter to respond more quickly and effectively to online requests for help.

Chinese cross-border investments are often assumed to be state driven and a tool of Beijing's economic statecraft. However, corresponding evidence remains inconclusive. This article examines mainland Chinese direct investments in Taiwan and finds that they are not particularly effective tools of economic statecraft. Their excessive politicization and the sheer possibility that investments could be used for Beijing's economic statecraft resulted in a considerable pushback by Taiwan's government, bureaucrats and civil society against large and sensitive investments. The agency enjoyed by Taiwan hindered Beijing from deploying cross-Strait direct investments for political purposes, and Beijing has not openly promoted or supported such investments in Taiwan. Moreover, cross-border direct investments are by nature less exploitable for political purposes because they involve company-level commercial and entrepreneurial decisions. This sets them apart from other forms of economic statecraft, such as sanctions or trade restrictions, where the state has greater influence. Mainland Chinese companies have had limited commercial interests in Taiwan, and the investments that have been made there do not appear to have triggered significant political or security externalities. These findings suggest more generally that foreign direct investment might not be particularly effective as a tool of economic statecraft.

Using panel data on Taiwan district court verdicts from 2000 through 2015, this study examines the impact of resource inequality on corruption litigation to determine whether court decisions are politically biased. Contrary to expectations, it appears that superior resources give defendants only a limited advantage in corruption trials in Taiwan.

The 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in October 2022 secured Xi Jinping's third term as General Secretary and secured a team of supporters amid socioeconomic woes and increasingly hostile global circumstances. While leadership matters in all political systems, it matters much more in totalitarian and authoritarian ones. Political leaders in democracies are constrained by electoral cycles, term limits, and approval ratings, but the leaders of the PRC's single-party system that emphasizes discipline, hierarchy, and democratic centralism operate relatively unchecked by bureaucracy, opposition forces, or public opinion. Its leaders possess the ultimate decision-making authority in national security and strategic policies (Zhao, 2022, p. 5). The consolidation of Xi's power has far-reaching implications for China's foreign policy. As a feared, sycophantically revered, and ruthless emperor confident in his country's military power and economic clout, Xi feels equipped to accomplish his mission of making China great again. He has also inherited a pervasive insecurity of pushback from Western powers that threatens his authoritarian rule. He has therefore upheld the security of the regime beyond Deng Xiaoping and his decades of prioritizing growth. Proactively stifling any opposition to his rule and cracking down on any hint of a ＂color revolution＂ at home in connection with foreign forces, Xi has strengthened the military and reorganized the economy in preparation for a possible showdown with the United States. He has required Chinese diplomats to act as ＂wolf warriors＂ in diplomatic battles and fight criticisms of the regime even at the cost of escalating international tensions. While his team of supporters has maximized his power to implement his policies, this has also prevented his colleagues from counseling against any mistakes they may anticipate or discover. Intentionally or not, he has minimized opportunities to correct his mistakes and increased the stakes and the risks they present, raising the potential for his country to become embroiled in a foreign adventure of no return.

Purpose>This article analyzes the implementation of anti-corruption reforms in Taiwan by two former presidents, Chen Shui-bian (2000-2008) and Ma Ying-jeou (2008-2016).Design/methodology/approach>A three-tier research approach, including in-depth interviews, questionnaire survey, and descriptive and inferential analysis, is adopted. In addition to Chen and Ma, 11 senior anti-corruption officials who served under both presidents were interviewed by the author. The survey questions cover 12 factors which are later grouped into the five dimensions of ethical leadership, considerate leadership, delegating leadership, participatory leadership, and performance to illustrate the causal relationship between these dimensions and performance.Findings>Ma’s personal ethics are distinct from Chen’s in kind but Ma’s overall leadership and performance outshine Chen’s in degree rather than in kind. While the gap of ethical leadership between two Taiwan presidents is significantly wider than other dimensions of leadership, the outcome of the national integrity is not proportionate to the ethical leadership gap. In other words, personal ethics are not automatically transformed into political will for enhancing anti-corruption effectiveness. Three popular forms of corruption, red envelopes (bribing), influence-peddling, and vote-buying are analyzed in the context of changing political culture through national leadership. Unfortunately, both Chen and Ma produce insignificant contributions based on public surveys.Originality/Value>Policy-makers and scholars can use these research findings to further explore how ethical leadership can enhance a country’s anti-corruption performance.

Despite intensified governmental and public efforts at corruption control in recent years, official transgression continues to surface in various ways of abusing the unique power and trust that a government holds. Preventing Corruption in Asia addresses a number of crucial questions: What institutional arrangements are necessary to ensure a clean and honest government? What self-regulatory capabilities must government institutions develop in order to maintain integrity? How should a sense of ethical responsibility be instilled in the civil services? Do special anti-corruption agencies help keep government clean? How will a regulatory framework of official conduct work properly? How useful are anti-corruption campaigns in containing corruption? Focusing on a number of carefully selected countries in the Asia and Pacific region, the book sets as its focal point the choice of institutional design in preventing corruption, rather than treating corruption as a practical or technical problem to be corrected by strong political will and good anti-corruption policy measures. While focusing on institutional designs and policy choices, the book also examines other aspects of clean government such as the social environment, legal and regulatory framework, role of the public, and the impact of culture.

This study aims to explore if local responsiveness pressure and subsidiary resources influence green management adoption of overseas subsidiaries, and to investigate the relationships between the level of green management adoption and performance. The 101 effective samples were collected from 583 Taiwanese firms, which are listed in the top 1000 manufactory firms and have invested in China. Though structural equation model (SEM) analysis' empirical results indicate that local responsiveness pressure and subsidiary resources both have positive effects on the level of green management adoption of the subsidiary. This study also suggests that the level of green management adoption is positively related to the subsidiary's performance.

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become increasingly popular in advanced economies in the West. In contrast, CSR awareness in Asia is rather low, both on the corporate and state level. However, recent events have shown that the CSR is receiving more attention by corporations in Asia. Recent development in CSR in Taiwan is one example of such a trend. A 2005 survey on the 700 publicly listed companies in Taiwan on␣CSR has highlighted the current CSR situation. Concurrently, the numbers of corporate scandals and corruption have dramatically increased over the past 6 years. Corporate CSR activities co-existing with pervasive corporate scandals create a phenomenon of contradictions. This article aims to report via the survey findings the current development of business ethics in corporate Taiwan; and to interpret the findings in context of Taiwan’s business ethos, especially its Confucian familism and crony capitalism.