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State failure is a central challenge to international peace and security in the post-Cold War era. Yet theorizing on the causes of state failure remains surprisingly limited. InState Erosion, Lawrence P. Markowitz draws on his extensive fieldwork in two Central Asian republics-Tajikistan, where state institutions fragmented into a five-year civil war from 1992 through 1997, and Uzbekistan, which constructed one of the largest state security apparatuses in post-Soviet Eurasia-to advance a theory of state failure focused on unlootable resources, rent seeking, and unruly elites. In Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and other countries with low capital mobility-where resources cannot be extracted, concealed, or transported to market without state intervention-local elites may control resources, but they depend on patrons to convert their resources into rents. Markowitz argues that different rent-seeking opportunities either promote the cooptation of local elites to the regime or incite competition over rents, which in turn lead to either cohesion or fragmentation. Markowitz distinguishes between weak states and failed states, challenges the assumption that state failure in a country begins at the center and radiates outward, and expands the \"resource curse\" argument to include cash crop economies, where mechanisms of state failure differ from those involved in fossil fuels and minerals. Broadening his argument to weak states in the Middle East (Syria and Lebanon) and Africa (Zimbabwe and Somalia), Markowitz shows how the distinct patterns of state failure in weak states with immobile capital can inform our understanding of regime change, ethnic violence, and security sector reform.

Conducting quantitative research (e.g., surveys, a large number of interviews, experiments) with the participation of political elites is typically challenging. Given that a population of political elites is typically small by definition, a particular challenge is obtaining a sufficiently high number of observations and, thus, a certain response rate. This paper focuses on two questions related to this challenge: (1) What are best practices for designing the study? And (2) what are best practices for soliciting the participation of political elites? To arrive at these best practices, we (a) examine which factors explain the variation in response rates across surveys within and between large-scale, multi-wave survey projects by statistically analyzing a newly compiled dataset of 342 political elite surveys from eight projects, spanning 30 years and 58 countries, (b) integrate the typically scattered findings from the existing literature and (c) discuss results from an original expert survey among researchers with experience with such research (n = 23). By compiling a comprehensive list of best practices, systematically testing some widely held believes about response rates and by providing benchmarks for response rates depending on country, survey mode and elite type, we aim to facilitate future studies where participation of political elites is required. This will contribute to our knowledge and understanding of political elites’ opinions, information processing and decision making and thereby of the functioning of representative democracies.

In the mid-2000s, Uganda's authoritarian National Resistance Movement (NRM) regime set out to extend state control over Karamoja, a long-neglected region in the northeast of the country. This effort has involved large-scale deployment of security personnel, investment in an expansive administrative system used to subdue the local population, and construction of physical infrastructure that connects Karamoja with the rest of Uganda and facilitates the exploitation of the region's natural resources by members of the political elite. Government bodies in Karamoja capably perform functions that benefit the NRM elite and regime; other government responsibilities, notably for public service provision, have been assumed by non-state organisations. This article shows that the unevenness of state capacity in the region is the result of a coherent strategy that the regime has implemented across Uganda; developments in Karamoja illuminate this strategy and, thereby, help to account for the apparent incongruity of the country's political system.

According to elite and mass surveys, the late-Soviet sociopolitical and economic order was largely perceived as the only viable alternative to domestic political and economic status quo in Russia before 2022. Political elites invested significant efforts and funds into deliberative promotion of a complex of ideational legacies through different tools (including cinematography). This complex, labeled a “Good Soviet Union,” is an imagined sociopolitical and economic order, which somehow resembles that of the late-Soviet past, while lacking its inherent flaws. Elements of the Soviet legacy were selectively chosen for the sake of preservation of the politico-economic status quo. They include the hierarchical mechanism of governance, low circulation of elites and their privileged status, state control over media, and repressions toward organized dissent. Meanwhile, other elements of the late-Soviet past, such as relatively low inequality and certain state social guarantees, have been discarded. A “Good Soviet Union” model includes not only market economy and no shortages of goods and services, but also a lack of institutional constraints on rent-seeking and legalization of wealth and status of elites. In this article, we consider a “Good Soviet Union” as a socially constructed legacy of the past and focus on mechanisms of translation of this legacy into Russia’s current agenda through the use of modern Russian cinematography and analysis of policy preferences on the part of political elites. We further consider its effects on politics and policy-making, as well as its limitations and constraints. Some implications of the social construction of Soviet legacies are discussed in the conclusion.

We investigated the attitudes of the 11,410 candidates in the Finnish 2017 municipal elections who had responded to a Voting Advice Application. Women candidates were, both in terms of economic and social attitudes, more progressive than men. Building on the gender diagnosticity approach, we used responses to the attitude items to construct a dimensional measure of political genderedness; i.e., a measure of the femininity–masculinity of the individual’s political attitudes. We used this measure to investigate the magnitude of sex differences across parties and the determinants of these differences. Sex differences were larger in parties with more economically right-oriented, socially conservative, well-off, and male candidates. Moreover, these differences were caused by men in these parties being different from other candidates. A similar methodology, in which a continuous measure of genderedness is used to assess sex differences, could be used in other domains of research on political behavior.

How are political elites embedded in both civil and political domains? I studied 246 Chinese political elites who also served on nonprofit foundations’ boards from 2011 to 2015 and conceptualized a framework to understand the state-nonprofit relationship before 2015. The political elites can build horizontal connections with foundations, helping the party-state reach nonprofit actors. They can also build vertical connections with political groups, helping foundations access political resources. The dual-role elites’ connectedness with foundations and in the polity varies by their primary positions in the political system. Effective communication between the state and nonprofit actors requires elites to have strong connections in both the civil and political domains, but the situation in China is far from ideal—those embedded in foundations are disconnected from the polity, and those connected in the polity are marginalized in foundations.

This paper aims to shed light into Turkey's political and diplomatic history by focusing on its efforts to join the United Nations (UN). The search for a new political system in Turkey coincided with the global quest for a new world order, initiated by the UN's four founding members during the Second World War. After a brief discussion on the making of the UN and its predecessors, the paper delves into Turkey's position during the war, followed by an analysis of the ruling elites' perceptions as reflected in parliamentary debates and the contemporary national press coverage. Furthermore, the paper evaluates the influence of UN membership on the emergence of a multi-party system in Turkey and discusses how and why the change of the global political climate contributed to the transformation of the Turkish political system.

Attempts at consolidating their political power during and after independence in Nigeria motivated nationalists to embark on politics of regionalism and ethnicity. The divide and rule tactics of the elite originated from the Richards (1946) and Macpherson (1951) constitutions when the three, later four, regions were created to cater for their peculiarities and maintain unity in diversity. These constitutions, initially designed to allow each of the regions to develop at its own pace and with its own available human and material resources, eventually paved way for politics of regionalism and ethnicity as the political elite sought to tighten their political support base in their respective regions. Using historical research design, this study examined the chronology of events that spurred the evolution of ethnicity and regionalism in Nigeria’s First Republic which continues to define political relations in contemporary Nigeria by integrating the accounts of the relationship among ethnic groups and the political elite. The study noted that, instead for the balkanisation of the country into regions to integrate and bring development through healthy rivalry, a dividend of federalism, it perpetuated the modernisation of political and socio-economic instability. The prebendal politics that accompanied this decision concretised political topsy-turvy with zero-sum-game of intra and inter party politics. The study concluded that it is pertinent that the ruling elite in a plural state, such as Nigeria, should take cognisance of the fears and grievances of minority ethnic groups in the quest to ensure equity and justice, which are the fundamentals of nation-building.

In this fascinating study, Carol Hakim presents a new and original narrative on the origins of the Lebanese national idea. Hakim's study reconsiders conventional accounts that locate the origins of Lebanese nationalism in a distant legendary past and then trace its evolution in a linear and gradual manner. She argues that while some of the ideas and historical myths at the core of Lebanese nationalism appeared by the mid-nineteenth century, a coherent popular nationalist ideology and movement emerged only with the establishment of the Lebanese state in 1920. Hakim reconstructs the complex process that led to the appearance of fluid national ideals among members of the clerical and secular Lebanese elite, and follows the fluctuations and variations of these ideals up until the establishment of a Lebanese state. The book is an essential read for anyone interested in the evolution of nationalism in the Middle East and beyond.

This study examines the role of elite politics in the emergence of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. It argues that the struggle between political elites of northern and southern extractions over the control of state power has intensified national conflicts and insurgency in the country. Political elites are no longer divided by ideology but by economics of state power. Elite politics of who gets what, when, and how and the struggle for state power led to the formation of the sect and fuels the incessant attacks and insecurity in Nigeria. The study adopts a methodology involving re-description of history based on documentary research. It establishes that elite politics accounts for the emergence and escalation of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. Accordingly, the study recommends that good and inclusive governance be employed as a panacea for harmonizing the fractured Nigerian state and overcoming insurgency in Nigeria.