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Are institutions a deep cause of economic growth? This paper tries to answer this question in a novel manner by focusing on within-country variation, over long periods of time, using a new hand-collected data set on institutions and the power-ARCH econometric framework. Focusing on the case of Brazil since 1870, our results suggest (a) that both changes in formal political institutions and informal political instability affect economic growth negatively, (b) there are important differences in terms of their short- versus long-run behaviour, and (c) not all but just a few selected institutions affect economic growth in the long-run.

In the years 1922-1930 Brazil's political and cultural arenas were bestirred by distinct movements of protest and demand for change, forcing a great shift in the manner Brazilians perceived themselves and their country, and shaping a national climate of opinion which led to a revolution and substantial reforms.

Autos and Progress analyzes autos as both tools for and cultural symbols of Brazil's status as a modern nation. This book details attempts to remake the nation physically and economically, through road building, the establishment of a domestic auto industry, and the founding of Brasília, as well as culturally and politically with the transformation of segments of the poor into a democratic and assertive working class.

This paper analyses the role played by US economic assistance during the administrations of Jânio Quadros and João Goulart in Brazil (1961–4). It focuses on the negotiation and implementation of financial agreements associated with the Alliance for Progress, President Kennedy's aid programme for Latin America. It demonstrates that the Alliance had a positive impact during Quadros' administration, providing substantial resources to the country and placing economic growth ahead of economic stabilisation as the principal criterion for aid. Circumstances changed, however, when João Goulart became president, resulting in serious funding constraints. The paper suggests that the main reason for this was political, specifically regarding Washington's perception of Goulart's links with communist groups. Este artículo analiza el papel jugado por la asistencia económica estadounidense durante los gobiernos de Jânio Quadros y João Goulart en Brasil (1961–4). Se centra en la negociación e implementación de acuerdos financieros asociados con la Alianza para el Progreso, el programa de ayuda para Latinoamérica del presidente Kennedy. Demuestra que dicha Alianza tuvo un impacto positivo durante la administración de Quadros, al proveer de recursos sustanciales al país y al priorizar al crecimiento económico sobre la estabilización económica como el criterio principal de la ayuda. Las circunstancias cambiaron, sin embargo, cuando João Goulart se hizo presidente, lo que desembocó en serias limitaciones financieras. El artículo sugiere que la razón principal para lo anterior fue política, específicamente en relación a la percepción de Washington sobre los vínculos de Goulart con los grupos comunistas. Este artigo analisa o papel desempenhado pelo programa estadunidense de assistência financeira durante os governos dos presidentes Jânio Quadros e João Goulart no Brasil (1961–4). Foca-se na negociação e implementação dos acordos financeiros associados com a Aliança para o Progresso, programa do governo Kennedy de assistência econômica para a América Latina. Demonstra-se que a Aliança teve um impacto positivo durante a administração de Jânio Quadros, fornecendo recursos substanciais para o país e colocando crescimento econômico antes da estabilização econômica como critério principal para a assistência. No entanto, este quadro muda quando João Goulart assume a presidência, resultando em sérias limitações de recursos. O artigo sugere que a principal razão para tal mudança foi política, particularmente no tangente à percepção por parte de Washington das ligações de Goulart com grupos comunistas.

This country program evaluation (CPE) evaluates World Bank Group (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), or the Bank, International Finance Corporation (IFC), and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) operations in Brazil from FY2004 through FY2011. It seeks to answer two questions: to what extent was the Bank Group program relevant to Brazil's development needs?, and how effective were Bank Group operations in helping to accelerate economic growth and making growth more inclusive and environmentally sustainable? The period reviewed was covered by two country strategies, one for FY2004-07 and the other for FY2008-11. The evaluation comments on aspects of the country partnership strategy (CPS) FY2012-15 with particular reference to its relevance and design. The report aims to extract lessons relevant to future Bank Group operations in Brazil. The study also examines the synergies between lending and knowledge services and the effectiveness of collaboration within the Bank Group and with external development partners. This report has five chapters. Chapter one gives purpose and country context. Chapter two summarizes the Bank Group operations and examines trends and patterns during the evaluation period. Chapters three and four assess the relevance and contributions of these operations to the objectives stated in the country strategies. The concluding chapter draws lessons and recommendations for the Bank Group's future engagement in Brazil.

Brazilian industrial entrepreneurs have shown a high degree of mobilization and political activity in defense of their specific interests since the beginning of Brazilian industrial capitalist development. They have been characterized by pragmatism, support of different governments and political regimes (dictatorships or democracies), and adaptation to the political instability typical of the country from the proclamation of the Republic until the mid-1980s. For almost half a century they have played a prominent role in sustaining the different phases of national developmentalism by joining diverse political coalitions that upheld the industrial order. The past 10 years have been marked by an important reversal of this pattern that is essentially political: the socialization of entrepreneurs in democratic values, rules, and practices. A thread of continuity is represented by an ideological pragmatism characterized by successive adaptations to positions more or less aligned with a more active role for the state.

Today's global economy, with most developed nations experiencing very low inflation, seems a world apart from the \"Great Inflation\" that spanned the late 1960s to early 1980s. Yet, in this book, Brigitte Granville makes the case that monetary economists and policymakers need to keep the lessons learned during that period very much in mind, lest we return to them by making the same mistakes we made in the past. Granville details the advances in macroeconomic thinking that gave rise to the \"Great Moderation\"--a period of stable inflation and economic growth, which lasted from the mid-1980s through the most recent financial crisis. She makes the case that the central banks' management of monetary policy--hinging on expectations and credibility--brought about this period of stability, and traces the roots of this success back to the eighteenth-century foundations of modern monetary thought. Tackling fundamental questions such as the causes of inflation and its relation to unemployment and growth, the natural rate of inflation hypothesis, the fiscal theory of the price level, and the proper goals of central banks, the book aims above all to demonstrate the dangers of forgetting the role of credibility in establishing sound monetary policy. With the lessons of the past firmly in mind, Granville presents stimulating ideas and proposals about inflation-targeting principles, which provide tools for present-day monetary authorities dealing with the forces of globalization, mercantilism, and reserve accumulation.

The London House of Rothschild depended on Brazil to maintain its reputation. This became a problem in the 1890s, when the Brazilian government almost defaulted on its sovereign debt after a change of regime had made politics unstable and economic policy unorthodox. This article shows how the relationship between the bank and the state developed to the point that Rothschilds was forced to rescue its client. Exposure enabled Brazil to implement policies designed to defend the regime at the expense of payment capacity without defaulting. The debt crisis ended only after the political situation stabilized toward the close of the century, when the bank pressured the government to tighten economic policy.

For Keynes, convention is a device used to circumvent uncertainty. For French conventionalists (FCs), convention coordinates behavior in \"complex market situations.\" Brazilian economist Fabio Erber contributed to this debate by formulating a concept of development convention (DC) and thus making this subject particularly interesting to economists and policymakers in developing countries. Because development refers to long-term structural changes, DCs are identified over the long term. Further, multiple DCs can coexist in a given society; however, only one can be hegemonic or dominant at any particular point in time. DCs can be revealed by examining the historical evidence pertaining to that society. Accordingly, this paper analyzes the Brazilian development experience during the latter half of the twentieth century. There has been a struggle for hegemony between two types of DCs in Brazil: the pro-growth state-led DC and the pro-stability free-market DC. From World War II until the 1970s, the former DC was hegemonic, but it has since been replaced by the pro-stability free-market DC. The conservative conduct of monetary policy in Brazil since the 1990s has been built on the hegemony of the stability convention. This perspective has created space for a research program based on political economy and devoted to the study of Brazilian contemporary monetary policy, which helps explain why Brazil has consistently maintained the world's highest interest rates for so long.