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This article offers a review of the recent empirical literature on lobbying within political economy. In surveying extant research, we emphasize quid pro quo and informational issues in special interest politics and highlight crucial open questions in both. The two main unresolved methodological issues remain ( a ) how to account for the impact of lobbying on which equilibrium policies are chosen and advanced and ( b ) how distorted those equilibrium policies are relative to the social optimum. Of the principal open questions within political economy, a comprehensive, quantitative assessment of the welfare effects of lobbying remains one of the most elusive.

Research summary: Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission and subsequent developments created a covert channel for firms to allocate resources from corporate treasuries to political activity. Through the use of a financial market event study of an accidental disclosure of firms' contributions to a Republican nonprofit organization, I examine investors' reactions to covert investment in independent political expenditures. I find that, on average, contributing firms experienced positive abnormal returns around the disclosure event and that these abnormal returns were more positive for firms in heavily regulated industries as well as those previously making campaign contributions to candidates. However, firms that recently faced a shareholder resolution on political spending disclosure experienced negative abnormal returns, suggesting that the controversial nature of covert activity moderated investors' reactions. Managerial summary: The purpose of this study is to examine how investors reacted to an accidental disclosure of firms' investments in udark money,\" a new form of corporate political activity allowed by the U.S. Supreme Court in its Citizens United decision. I find that, on average, investors reacted positively toward firms identified as making these new political investments, especially if the firms previously engaged in electoral politics or operate in heavily regulated industries. However, this reaction turned negative if the firm recently faced a shareholder resolution asking that it voluntarily disclose all of its political investments. An implication for managers is that they should consider their firms' legal and information environments as fully as possible before committing resources to new and potentially controversial political tactics.

We conducted a field experiment to study social influences on partisan political participation. We sent letters to 92,000 contributors during the 2012 presidential election campaign. We randomized features of the letters and measured the effects of these variations on the recipients’ subsequent contributions. We find that making an individual’s contributions more visible to her neighbors increases the contributions of supporters of the local majority party and decreases those of supporters of the minority party. Individuals contribute more when they perceive higher average contributions from own-party supporters in their area and contribute less if there is a higher share of own-party contributors.

This paper investigates the value of firm political connections using a regression discontinuity design in a sample of close, off-cycle U.S. congressional elections. I compare firms donating to winning candidates and firms donating to losing candidates and find that postelection abnormal equity returns are 3% higher for firms donating to winning candidates. Connections to politicians serving on powerful congressional committees, such as appropriations and taxation, are especially valuable and impact contributing firms sales. Firms' campaign contributions are correlated with other political activities such as lobbying and hiring former government employees, suggesting that firms take coordinated actions to build political networks.

Political campaigns are among the most sophisticated marketing exercises in the United States. As part of their marketing communication strategy, an increasing number of politicians adopt social media to inform their constituencies. This study documents the returns from adopting a new technology, namely Twitter, for politicians running for Congress by focusing on the change in campaign contributions received. We compare weekly donations received just before and just after a politician opens a Twitter account in regions with high and low levels of Twitter penetration, controlling for politician-month fixed effects. Specifically, over the course of a political campaign, we estimate that the differential effect of opening a Twitter account in regions with high versus low levels of Twitter penetration amounts to an increase of 0.7%–2% in donations for all politicians and 1%–3.1% for new politicians who were never elected to Congress before. In contrast, the effect of joining Twitter for experienced politicians remains negligibly small. We find some evidence consistent with the explanation that the effect is driven by new information about the candidates; for example, the effect is primarily driven by new donors rather than past donors, by candidates without Facebook accounts, and by tweeting more informatively. Overall, our findings imply that social media can intensify political competition by lowering the costs of disseminating information for new entrants to their constituents and thus may reduce the barriers to enter politics. This paper was accepted by Eric Anderson, marketing.

This paper studies whether firms trade political contributions for public procurement contracts. Combining data on Lithuanian government tenders, corporate donors, and firm characteristics, I examine how a ban on corporate contributions affects the awarding of procurement contracts to companies that donated in the past. Consistent with political favoritism, donors’ probability of winning falls by five percentage points as compared to that of nondonor firms after the ban. Evidence on bidding and victory margins suggests that corporate donors may receive auction-relevant information affecting procurement outcomes in their favor.

We develop a new and comprehensive database of firm-level contributions to U.S. political campaigns from 1979 to 2004. We construct variables that measure the extent of firm support for candidates. We find that these measures are positively and significantly correlated with the cross-section of future returns. The effect is strongest for firms that support a greater number of candidates that hold office in the same state that the firm is based. In addition, there are stronger effects for firms whose contributions are slanted toward House candidates and Democrats.

This paper studies how interest groups allocate campaign contributions when congressmen are connected by social ties. We establish conditions for the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for the contribution game and characterize the associated allocation of the interest groups’ moneys. While the allocations are generally complex functions of the environment (the voting function, the legislators’ preferences, and the social network topology), they are simple, monotonically increasing functions of the respective legislators’ Katz-Bonacich centralities. Using data on the 109th–113th Congresses and on congressmen’s alumni connections, we estimate themodel and find evidence supporting its predictions.

We study the relation between CEO and employee campaign contributions and find that CEO-supported political candidates receive 3 times more money from employees than candidates not supported by the CEO. This relation holds around CEO departures, including plausibly exogenous departures due to retirement or death. Equity returns are significantly higher when CEO-supported candidates win elections than when employee-supported candidates win, suggesting that CEOs’ campaign contributions are more aligned with the interests of shareholders than are employee contributions. Finally, employees whose donations are misaligned with their CEOs’ political preferences are more likely to leave their employer.

Purpose Despite the importance and prevalence of corporate political activities in modern organizations, there remains limited insight on the potential relationship between political contributions and companies’ risk-taking activities. This study aims to examine the relationship between monetary political contributions of firms and corporate risk-taking activities in the context of unstable political and economic environments. Design/methodology/approach The authors use a two-step system GMM estimation to investigate the subject using a cross-country sample of 307 firms from 22 countries covered over 2002–2017. In line with previous studies, the authors control for various corporate governance mechanisms, firm-level factors and country-level characteristics. Findings The findings demonstrate that firms that make monetary political contributions exhibit lower levels of risk as measured by different proxies for risks, namely, systematic, idiosyncratic and total risk. Practical implications The results suggest that political contributions can be a useful mechanism to mitigate risk exposure. Also, the use of different risk measures and other factors for robustness fosters a better understanding of political connectedness in a more contextualized and dynamic manner. Originality/value This study seeks to contribute to the debate surrounding corporate strategy, political connectedness and corporate risk-taking by using actual monetary political contributions as an explicit measure of political connection. This study furthers scholarly understanding on the dynamics of corporate political activities using political contributions in monetary terms as a measure of political connectedness and its impact on risk-taking. Furthermore, the authors explore this topic using insights from nonmarket strategy literature and studies on political contributions.