Explore the vast range of titles available.

Dominant political parties rule for prolonged periods of time by winning successive multiparty elections. However, the term \"dominant party\" encompasses an extremely diverse set of parties, ranging from ones winning unremarkable vote shares in established democracies to those garnering massive popular majorities in free but unfair elections. To grapple with such heterogeneity, this article proposes a three-part typology based on the foundations of a party's electoral dominance-whether extremely high votes shares, steadfast support from legislative allies, or a favorable translation of votes into seats or office. These three types are internally homogenous but distinct from one another in ways predicted by the typology. The puzzles posed by each dominant-party type and the kinds of answers required to address those puzzles differ markedly.

Existing research on terrorism as a strategy has largely neglected the apparent differences in what groups target. Whereas some organizations primarily target undefended civilians, others attack mainly official and hard targets. I develop an explanation of terrorist groups’ relative target preferences based on how a group’s ties to its constituency and specific government repressive strategies either constrain or incentivize terrorist attacks against soft civilian vs. hard/official targets. Specific sources of support and the degree of out-group antagonism in their constituency shape terrorist groups’ primary targeting strategy. While groups with transnational support are generally more likely to target primarily undefended civilians, not all groups with local support are restrained. Groups with low out-group antagonism and local civilian support incur high political costs for targeting civilians and focus primarily on official targets. Instead, groups with domestic support but high out-group antagonism have mixed incentives. When facing indiscriminate government repression these groups become more likely to target primarily undefended civilians, because they can justify such a response to their audience, direct attacks against out-group civilians, and radicalize local constituents. Indiscriminate repression, however, does not change the targeting strategy of groups who face high political costs for attacking civilians. I examine the observable implications of the theory in a comparative analysis of terrorist organizations (1995–2007) as well as an over-time analysis of repression and targeting in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict (1987–2004), and find strong support for the theoretical argument.

United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions are complex social organizations, with soldiers coming from several countries. In this environment, effective communication and interactions with local populations are often difficult, and establishing essential local support can be jeopardized when soldiers are culturally distant from local communities. At the same time, however, when local populations perceive peacekeepers as sufficiently distant or unbiased, the promotion of cooperation is enhanced. We explore whether cultural distance—in terms of geography, language, and religion—and social distance—in terms of economy and institutions—between the peacekeepers and the local population improve the operational capabilities of a mission. We use monthly information on UN peacekeeping missions’ composition from 1990 to 2015. We find that higher geographic and cultural distances correspond to higher levels of violence against civilians and higher battle deaths, whereas institutional and economic differences have the opposite effects, although these are less robust.

Dominant political parties rule for prolonged periods of time by winning successive multiparty elections. However, the term “dominant party” encompasses an extremely diverse set of parties, ranging from ones winning unremarkable vote shares in established democracies to those garnering massive popular majorities in free but unfair elections. To grapple with such heterogeneity, this article proposes a three-part typology based on the foundations of a party’s electoral dominance—whether extremely high votes shares, steadfast support from legislative allies, or a favorable translation of votes into seats or office. These three types are internally homogenous but distinct from one another in ways predicted by the typology. The puzzles posed by each dominant-party type and the kinds of answers required to address those puzzles differ markedly.

During the past few decades, Latin American governments’ recurrent attacks against journalists have contributed to the erosion of press freedom in the region and, relatedly, of the quality of democracy. Yet what pushes governments to harass journalists? We argue that governments are more likely to harass journalists when popular support for them drops. Due to the ability of journalists to influence public opinion, governments could perceive the harassment of journalists as a means to punish and silence those individuals who are seen as contributing to their decline in public support or as obstacles to regaining popularity. We test our argument on a sample of Latin American countries observed from 1990 to 2019. We find that declines in governments’ popular support lead to more harassment of journalists. Our research contributes to the debate on the determinants of press freedom and sheds further light on the current decline of democratic quality in Latin America.

The study uses proxies of political polarization, popular support of the government, and government cohesion, to examine its role in explaining internal conflict and the specific types of political violence and civil disorder. The study uses panel data from 135 countries from 1990 to 2021. The research uses two econometric models, Quantile via Moments, to examine the effects of popular support and government cohesion across the distribution of internal conflict, and two-way fixed effects with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors. The two models account for heteroscedasticity, cross-sectional dependence, and autocorrelation. The study finds popular support of the government and its cohesion robustly explain internal conflict and its specific forms of political violence and civil disorder. The research also finds political polarization that reduces popular support and government cohesion influences internal conflict regardless of regime type. The variables are significant from autocratic to democratic, suggesting political polarization that reduces popular support and government cohesion can negatively affect internal conflict levels irrespective of regime.  Finally, the study finds the internet has a minor mitigating impact on internal conflict, while its interaction with popular support and government cohesion slightly exacerbates internal conflict.

Contrary to many negative predictions, the euro, as a currency, is a remarkable success in terms of credibility and stability. The euro, as a currency, and the euro area, as a single market with a single currency, proved a remarkable resilience in the worst global financial crisis since World War II. The euro area was quick, imaginative and flexible to learn lessons from the global financial crisis. The euro and the euro area were and are benefiting from a large popular support, which explains largely their resilience in the crisis. The euro area is a success in terms of real growth measured during the period starting from its inception until today.

This article compares the 1967 riots in Hong Kong and the 1959–1960 anti-security treaty movement in Japan in terms of six different dimensions—(1) the organization of the leftist groups that participated in the two movements, (2) the extent of support from external communist powers, especially China and the Soviet Union, (3) the leftists’ focus and goals, (4) the tactics employed by the leftist forces, (5) the colonial and Japanese governments’ response to the disturbances, and (6) the influence of several key events on public opinion. In so doing, it provides several unique findings and insights. Most importantly, several key events influenced public opinion in opposite directions—negatively in Hong Kong and more positively in Japan. This was probably the most important determinant of the differing degrees of the leftists’ success in their respective revolutionary movements. The two cases therefore prove at least partially the important principle in any revolutionary movement that the attainment of legitimacy and the mobilization of popular support are the key to success. The people, after all, are the center of gravity in revolutionary warfare.

This article analyses critically the applicability of current theories of welfare state retrenchment to the 2004 public pension reform in Mexico, with the 1995 reform acting as a complementary case. In particular, this article contributes to the literature by analysing the reasons for which a potentially unpopular reform was successfully enacted. Available evidence suggests that – contrary to the existing literature's assertions – Mexican politicians responsible for the 2004 reform sought credit for these changes, rather than to avoid blame. Also, by presenting the reform as necessary to enhance socioeconomic equality, politicians were able to gather substantial popular support and defeat labour unions opposing this pension restructuring process. Hence, we propose that by framing the public debate as a matter of social justice, promoters of pension reform increased significantly popular support for the retrenchment of important benefits from a core group of civil servants, and successfully pressured Congress to promulgate this reform. We suggest that this created a reform path that will facilitate future efforts at reforming the remaining public pension schemes in Mexico.

This report evaluates the outcomes of World Bank Group support to Liberia from its post-war reengagement in 2003 through 2011. The country has moved from total disarray to a solid foundation for inclusive development. Although development has not moved forward as quickly as hoped, substantial progress has been made. Public finance and key institutions have been rebuilt; crucial transport facilities have been restored; and hospitals, schools, and universities are operating. The debilitating burden of massive external debt has been eliminated. Although the government deserves most of the credit, this success would not have been possible without external development and security partners, including the World Bank Group. Regarding outcomes, the rebuilding of public institutions has seen substantial progress, with important achievements in restoring public finances and reforming the civil service. Regarding the rehabilitation of infrastructure, the World Bank Group has helped improve the conditions of roads, ports, power supply, and water and sanitation. However, World Bank Group financial support has been relatively modest with regard to facilitating growth, but it has helped with policy advice and in filling gaps left by other partners. With regard to the three cross-cutting themes of Bank Group strategy, some effective programs were carried out, including capacity development at several core public finance-related agencies. However, the integration of these themes across World Bank Group interventions, which was the underlying intent, still needs a vision and better articulated strategy. Finally, the Bank and the International Monetary Fund led efforts to reduce Liberia's inherited external debt burden under the enhanced Highly-Indebted Poor Country Initiative and the Multi-lateral Debt Relief Initiative mechanisms.