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\"Although 'populism' has become something of a buzzword in discussions about politics, it tends to be studied by country or region. This is the first book to offer a genuine cross-regional perspective on populism and its impact on democracy. By analyzing current experiences of populism in Europe and the Americas, this edited volume convincingly demonstrates that populism can be both a threat and a corrective to democracy. The contributors also demonstrate the interesting similarities between right-wing and left-wing populism: both types of populism are prone to defend a political model that is not against democracy per se, but rather at odds with liberal democracy. Populism in Europe and the Americas offers new insights into the current state of democracy from both a theoretical and an empirical point of view\"-- Provided by publisher.

Although 'populism' has become something of a buzzword in discussions about politics, it tends to be studied by country or region. This is the first book to offer a genuine cross-regional perspective on populism and its impact on democracy. By analyzing current experiences of populism in Europe and the Americas, this edited volume convincingly demonstrates that populism can be both a threat and a corrective to democracy. The contributors also demonstrate the interesting similarities between right-wing and left-wing populism: both types of populism are prone to defend a political model that is not against democracy per se, but rather at odds with liberal democracy. Populism in Europe and the Americas offers new insights into the current state of democracy from both a theoretical and an empirical point of view.

Various macro-shocks arguably affect the demand for populism. However, there is no evidence beyond a few case studies. I expand electoral data on left- and right-wing populism and link them with per capita income, inflation, unemployment, government expenditures, income inequality, migration, trade and financial openness, and natural resource rents. Negative shocks in some of those consistently predict a surge in populist votes, even in the presence of inherent populist cycles. Shocks also affect election outcomes of left-wing and right-wing populists differently. Finally, European and Latin American voters are still different, yet converging, in their post-crisis preferences for populism.

How do governments address complex, cross-sectoral problems, like the COVID-19 pandemic? Why were some Latin American countries more successful at containing the pandemic's most devastating health outcomes? We argue that national governments that were more collaborative in their response to COVID-19 were more successful in reducing death rates. Our original dataset offers a novel attempt to operationalise collaborative governance (CG). We undertake simple statistical tests to measure the relationship between CG and COVID-19-related mortality rates in Latin America. We then choose three case studies to assess whether collaboration was meaningful in practice. Initial evidence suggests governments that pursued CG were more effective at containing mortality rates early on in the pandemic. The collaboration helped to foster cooperation over resources; buy time to prepare for a potential case surge; and produce a unified message regarding what citizens should do to prevent viral spread.

This article examines the positioning of political parties on the issue of transnational data governance, with a special focus on sovereignist parties, through the case study of Italy. With digital policy being increasingly high on Italy’s political agenda, the country finds itself in a delicate balancing act between guarding itself from external interference, and opening up to global key players in data governance, including international corporate actors. While the literature on Italy’s domestic data governance is relatively well developed, party-specific stances on its external dimension are understudied. Given their sovereignist ideology, it is expected that populist radical right parties prioritise sovereignty-focused stances, with concerns around data security and state control over digital policy. However, the populist radical right government’s flirtation with radical right tech entrepreneur Elon Musk poses a significant research puzzle. Through a qualitative analysis of Italy’s parliamentary debates covering the 12 months prior to the approval of the Space Law in June 2025, this article investigates how the incumbent sovereignist populist radical right positioned itself on digital sovereignty in the context of cross-border data governance, compared to opposition parties occupying different dimensions on the political spectrum. This case study will especially focus on the most prominent topic in current parliamentary debates on external data governance: Italy’s proposed deal with Musk’s SpaceX for the acquisition of Starlink technology.

This article examines the personalist leadership style of Fabio Vásquez, a founding member of the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), the Colombian guerrilla group. Personalism, as a theoretical framework for understanding Latin American leaders, has primarily focused on traditional political practices, emphasizing the tensions and conflicts among formal institutions, political parties, and personalist politicians. While these studies provide valuable insights, they overlook leaders who operate outside conventional political structures who also rely on personalist strategies to attract and retain followers. This article seeks to bridge this gap by presenting a case study of Vásquez’s leadership style. In an era marked by the resurgence of populism and renewed interest in the effects of personalism on conventional politics, this article argues that examining personalist leadership within revolutionary insurgent groups that reject conventional party politics is necessary for a thorough understanding of the phenomenon. In particular, it offers a comprehensive overview of how Vásquez’s personalist strategies shaped the ELN’s early insurgency, ultimately revealing the strengths and vulnerabilities of such leadership within revolutionary movements.

Between 1898 and 1918, voters in 20 American states adopted constitutional amendments granting citizens the power of the initiative. The embrace of direct democracy by voters invites inquiry into why some state legislatures opted to delegate to citizens the power of the initiative, while others did not. Drawing on an original data set, this article uses Event History Analysis hazard models to explain the puzzle of why legislatures might devolve institutional power to citizens. Our longitudinal, macrolevel analysis of socioeconomic and political forces reveals that political considerations—interparty legislative competition, party organizational strength, and third parties—are the most powerful predictors of a legislature's decision to refer the initiative to the ballot. Although several of our findings comport with the conventional wisdom explaining the adoption of the initiative during the Progressive Era, others are surprising, offering us new theoretical insights into why and when legislative bodies might be willing to divest themselves of their institutional power.

In the age of growing global populism, the continued popularity and relevance of a populist government is anchored on the ability of its populist leader to convince the voters that the primary objective of his foreign policies is to secure the interests of the state and its citizens. However, without an adequate level of state power, pursuing realist foreign policies to improve the state’s relative gains and position in the international system can pose significant risks even for the most influential populist leader. Hence, the question is, how do populist leaders acquire an adequate level of state power to implement realist foreign policies, without ultimately losing their political capital and institutional legitimacy in the process? To answer this question, I develop a model that illustrates the three-way linkage between populism, securitization, and realism. I use this model to explain the rationale behind President Donald Trump’s ‘America First’ doctrine, as well as its implications for U.S. foreign policy making. I argue that “populist securitization” is a conduit through which populist leaders formulate, execute, and justify their realist foreign policies. Using Trump’s securitization of the U.S. economy as a case study, I reveal how a populist securitization act can trigger the illiberal tendencies and nativist sentiments of the nationalistic voters, which, in turn, allow populist leaders to maintain their popularity and legitimacy among these voters while they experiment with realist foreign policies. En una era de creciente populismo global, la continua popularidad y relevancia de un gobierno populista esta anclada en la habilidad de su líder de convencer a los electores qué el principal objetivo de su política exterior es asegurar los intereses del estado y de sus ciudadanos. No obstante, sin un adecuado nivel de poder de estado, seguir políticas exteriores realistas para mejorar las ganancias y posición relativas del estado en el sistema internacional, puede presentar riesgos significativos aun para el líder populista. Por tanto la cuestión es ¿cómo adquieren los lideres populistas un adecuado nivel de poder de estado para implementar políticas exteriores realistas sin perder en el proceso su capital político y la legitimidad institucional? Para contestar esta pregunta, desarrollo un modelo para explicar la racionalidad subyacente de la doctrina de ‘Primero América’ del Presidente Donald Trump, así como sus implicaciones para la hechura de la política exterior de los Estados Unidos. Argumento que la ‘securitización populista’ es un conducto a través del cual los lideres populistas formulan, ejecutan, y justifican sus políticas exteriores realistas. Utilizo la securitización de la economía estadounidense de Trump como un caso de estudio, revelo cómo un acto de securitización populista puede desatar tendencias iliberales y sentimientos nativistas de los electores nacionalistas, que a su ves permiten a los lideres populistas mantener su popularidad y legitimidad entre dichos electores al tiempo que los lideres experimentan con políticas exteriores realistas. 在全球民粹主义不断发展的时代, 民粹主义政府的受欢迎度和相关性持续增加的条件在于, 政府领袖有能力说服选民相信其外交政策的主要目的是保护国家和公民的利益。然而, 假如没有足够的国家权力就去追寻现实主义外交政策, 意图提高国家在国际系统中的相对收益和位置, 则可能会带来显著风险, 甚至对最具影响力的民粹主义领袖也是如此。因此，问题在于, 民粹主义领袖如何获得充足的国家权力, 实施现实主义外交政策, 同时在此过程中不会最终失去其政治资本和制度正当性？为回答此问题, 作者提出一种模型, 用于阐明民粹主义、安全化和现实主义之间的三边关系。作者用该模型解释了美国总统唐纳德·特朗普提出的”美国第一”信条背后的根本原因，以及它对于美国外交政策制定的意义。作者主张, ”民粹主义安全化”（populist securitization）是一个导管, 民粹主义领袖通过此导管来制定、实施和辩护其现实主义外交政策。作者将特朗普对美国经济的安全化作为案例研究, 揭示了民粹主义安全化的行为如何能触发民族主义选民的不自由倾向和本土主义情绪, 这些则会反过来允许民粹主义领袖在尝试实行现实主义外交政策的同时, 维持其在上述选民中的受欢迎度和正当性。

In the era of Brexit and President Trump, it is clear that we need to talk about populism. Populist political campaigns feature ever more widely, suggesting the phenomenon of a 'populist wave'. But do populist sentiments shape vote choice? Using data from Ireland and the United States, incorporating CSES Module 5 questions that focused on populist sentiments and vote choice in 2016, we show that populist sentiments did motivate voters in both countries. We also demonstrate, however, that the old reliables - economic perceptions, partisanship, and left-right ideology - mattered more. Thus, an exclusive focus on populism for the success of Donald Trump in the US or Sinn Féin/AAA in Ireland is unwarranted. Further, populist sentiments motivating vote choice differed between the two countries, raising fresh questions about whether populism can be regarded as an ideology and whether even the \"chameleon\" metaphor overclaims coherence for the term.

Recent political changes across Latin America that challenge mainstream conceptions of liberal democracy have led to speculation about some kind of post-liberal democracy possibly emerging in the region. Up to now, however, there has been no systematic assessment of this proposition or any explicit conception of post-liberal democracy. This article fills this research gap by proposing a conceptual framework for analysing political change in the direction of post-liberal democracy, in Latin America and beyond, and probes the plausibility of this framework in a case study of Bolivia. It shows that the concept of post-liberal democracy helps us make sense of the contemporary transformation of Bolivian democracy and that it has comparative advantages over alternative conceptual frameworks such as radical populism and defective – that is, illiberal or delegative – democracy. Los recientes cambios políticos a lo largo de América Latina que desafían las concepciones dominantes de la democracia liberal han llevado a especular sobre la posibilidad de que alguna forma de democracia postliberal esté emergiendo en la región. Hasta ahora, sin embargo, no ha habido una evaluación sistemática de tal propuesta o una concepción explícita de democracia postliberal. Este artículo llena este vacío al proporcionar un marco para analizar el cambio político en la dirección de la democracia postliberal, en Latinoamérica y otras partes, y pone a prueba la posibilidad de tal marco de referencia en un caso de estudio en Bolivia. Éste muestra que el concepto de democracia postliberal nos ayuda a entender las transformaciones contemporáneas de la democracia boliviana y que tiene ventajas comparativas sobre marcos conceptuales alternativos tales como el populismo radical y la democracia defectuosa, es decir iliberal o delegativa. Recentes mudanças políticas na América Latina que desafiam conceitos estabelecidos de liberalismo democrático tem gerado especulações sobre a possibilidade de algum tipo de democracia pós-liberal surgir na região. Até o momento, no entanto, não houveram avaliações sistemáticas sobre essa previsão, tampouco uma definição clara de democracia pós-liberal. Este artigo preenche essa lacuna de pesquisa ao propor um modelo conceitual para a análise das mudanças em direção à democracia pós-liberal, na América Latina e além dela, testando a viabilidade desse modelo de análise utilizando o caso da Bolívia. O modelo mostra que o conceito de democracia pós-liberal nos ajuda a compreender as transformações atuais na democracia boliviana e apresenta vantagens quando comparado à outros modelos conceituais, como o populismo radical e a democracia deficiente, ou seja, não liberal ou delegatória.