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Pictorial free perception reports are sequences in comics or film of one unit that depicts an agent who is looking, and a following unit that depicts what they see. This paper proposes an analysis in possible worlds semantics and event semantics of such sequences. Free perception sequences are implicitly anaphoric, since the interpretation of the second unit refers to the agent depicted in the first. They are argued to be possibly non-extensional, because they can depict hallucination or mis-perception. The semantics proposed here employs an account of anaphora using discourse referents, a formalized possible worlds semantics for pictorial narratives, and, to model the epistemic consequences of perceptual events, the event alternative construction from dynamic epistemic logic. In intensional examples, the second unit depicting what is seen is analyzed as embedded. It is argued that a semantics for embedding where the attitudinal state of the depicted agent is required to entail the semantic content of the picture attributes too much information to the agent. This is addressed with a model of normal looking, and a semantics for the embedding construction that uses existential quantification over alternatives, rather than universal quantification.

In this paper, I argue that David Lewis’s possible world semantics for counterfactual discourse and for fictional discourse are apparently inconsistent and in need of revision. The problem emerges for Lewis’s account once one considers how to evaluate ambifictional counterfactuals. Since this is likely not a concept familiar to most, and since it does not appear that the problem has been previously recognized in the critical literature, I will begin by rehearsing Lewis’s possible worlds semantics for counterfactuals and fiction. Then I will explicate the distinction between intrafictional, extrafictional, interfictional, and ambifictional propositions. Next, I will state what an ambifictional counterfactual proposition is, and explain why this kind of discourse confounds Lewis’s system. I will conclude, finally, with a brief discussion of how the Lewisian would be best advised to resolve the paradox.

This article sheds some light on ethical issues in Arthur Miller’s A View from the Bridge from the cognitive poetic perspective, especially Marie-Laure Ryan’s theoretical framework of the Possible Worlds Theory. It is argued that Miller’s play could be considered as cognitive ethical narrative as it highlights ethical considerations (centrally, issues of right and wrong, value and choice) in relation to the cognitive valences of the characters as well as those of the readers (who are steered to imaginatively apprehend the possibility that narrative actions and values may occur in the real world). As such, viewing the play through the lens of cognitive poetics can illustrate its ethical affordances, particularly with respect to the issue of choices, which ultimately endow human life with meaning. Adding some reflections on the philosophical implications of Sartre and Levinas, it is proposed that the protagonist’s act of betrayal is circumstantially complex. The conflict of values it involves could be illuminated through the consideration of the conflicting anguished W-world/Social O-world of the protagonist and the Communal O-world/hospitable W-world of the community in which he lives.

“The Craft of Formal Logic” is Arthur Prior’s unpublished textbook, written in 1950–51, in which he developed a theory of modality as quantification over possible worlds-like objects. This theory predates most of the prominent pioneering texts in possible worlds semantics and anticipates the significance of its basic concept in modal logic. Prior explicitly defines modal operators as quantifiers of ‘entities’ with modal character. Although he talks about these ‘entities’ only informally, and hesitates how to name them, using alternately the phrases ‘possible states of affairs’, ‘chances’, ‘cases’ or ‘peculiar objects’, he is nevertheless very clear that they should be the fundamental concept of any theory of modality as a form of quantity. Without the assumption that modal operators quantify over such modal objects, the modal system will be incapable of distinguishing an actually true proposition from a necessarily true one. Due to the fact that Prior never made any direct reference to this theory in his subsequently published papers, it remained largely unknown. The comparison of “The Craft” with some of his papers on tense logic suggests that this early theory of modality underlies his later work on temporality.

Zwart and Franssen's impossibility theorem reveals a conflict between the possible-world-based content-definition and the possible-world-based likeness-definition of verisimilitude. In Sect. 2 we show that the possible-world-based content-definition violates four basic intuitions of Popper's consequence-based content-account to verisimilitude, and therefore cannot be said to be in the spirit of Popper's account, although this is the opinion of some prominent authors. In Sect. 3 we argue that in consequence-accounts, content-aspects and likeness-aspects of verisimilitude are not in conflict with each other, but in agreement. We explain this fact by pointing towards the deep difference between possible-world- and the consequence-accounts, which does not lie in the difference between syntactic (object-language) versus semantic (meta-language) formulations, but in the difference between 'disjunction-of-possibleworlds' versus 4 conjunction-of-parts' representations of theories. Drawing on earlier work, we explain in Sect. 4 how the shortcomings of Popper's original definition can be repaired by what we call the relevant element approach. We propose a quantitative likeness-definition of verisimilitude based on relevant elements which provably agrees with the qualitative relevant content-definition of verisimilitude on all pairs of comparable theories. We conclude the paper with a plea for consequence-accounts and a brief analysis of the problem of language-dependence (Sect. 6).

Issue Title: PROPOSITIONS AND SAME-SAYING I present a puzzle concerning counterfactual reasoning and argue that it should be solved by giving up the principle of substitution for logical equivalents.[PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]

In this paper, I investigate the so-called modal solution to the problem of moral luck. I spend some time positioning the solution within the philosophical debate on moral luck. I follow Hartman [2017] in considering it a special case of the counterfactual view of the problem of moral luck. The modal solution was developed in order to block one of the main objections to the standard counterfactual position developed by Zimmerman. I defend the solution against four objections, which, I argue, are limited insofar as they involve a misapplication of the solution to cases it was not meant to cover. This should not be considered an argument for the modal solution, however, as I go on to present my own counterexample. This counterexample involves a proper application of the solution to the relevant case, which nevertheless leads to problems.

The present paper attempts to address Sam Shepard’s treatment of American family in Buried Child focusing on 'world construction.' In order to explore the process of world creation in the play, the writers draw on the works of Marie-Laure Ryan, a key theorist in 'possible worlds theory,' one of the orientations in cognitive poetics. Considering Shepard's highlighting of the bonds among the family members figuring in his plays, the interactions of characters with Textual Actual World (henceforth TAW) are of paramount importance and contribute to what Ryan calls 'tellability.' Central to our analysis is the consideration of the characters’ private worlds’ interactions and their intrafamilial and extrafamilial conflicts. Shepard is also centrally concerned with American (popular) culture and its underlying myths, hence the prominence of the theme of American Dream in his oeuvre. As such, the projection of the characters’ wish worlds is central in Shepard's play. Considering these “wish worlds” in terms of possible worlds-theory could be rewarding. Many of these wish worlds, it is argued, hinge on the notion of American family whose consideration by Shepard stems from his interest in the questions of origins, identity, selfhood, and autonomy.

It has been argued that a combination of game-theoretic semantics and independence-friendly (IF) languages can provide a novel approach to the conceptual foundations of mathematics and the sciences. I introduce and motivate an IF first-order modal language endowed with a game-theoretic semantics of perfect information. The resulting interpretive independence-friendly logic (IIF) allows to formulate some basic model-theoretic notions that are inexpressible in the ordinary quantified modal logic. Moreover, I argue that some key concepts of Kripke's new theory of reference are adequately modeled within IIF. Finally, I compare the logic IIF to David Lewis counterpart theory, drawing some morals concerning the interrelation between metaphysical and semantic issues in possible-world semantics.

This paper is predicated on the idea that some modal operators are better understood as quantificational expressions over worlds that determine not only first-order facts but modal facts also. In what follows, we will present a framework in which these two types of facts are brought closer together. Structural features will be located in (or determined by) the worlds themselves. This result will be achieved by decomposing worlds into parts, where some of these parts will have \"modal import\" in the sense that they will determine structure on other worldly parts. The main upshot of this will be a clearer grasp of the interaction between modal notions.