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31 result(s) for "Predatory pricing Europe."
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Abuse of Market Power
How should competition law deal with anti-competitive behaviour by firms with market power? In the light of recent EC and US cases, this is perhaps the most controversial current issue for competition policy. Lax policy would jeopardise the competitiveness of markets, but rigid policy would chill pro-competitive, pro-consumer conduct. This paper gives an economic assessment of evolving legal standards in the area. The importance of developing a stronger economic basis for EC law on abuse of market dominance is stressed.
Dominant market position and ordoliberalism
The ordoliberal distinction between performance competition and impediment competition may improve the understanding of the European distinction between a “dominant position” and an “abuse” of that position. Using a simple game-theory framework, I illustrate the dominant firm as a firm with, among other things, a dominant strategy in performance competition. If, due to the impediment condition, the dominant firm abandons its dominant strategy in the performance competition, then this firm is conducting abusively. In other words, the dominant firm should behave as - if it did not have economic power. It is the formulation of the ordoliberal as-if standard. As I show, such an ordoliberal standard leads to a wider concept of dominance that not only includes the economic domain but also considers the impact of private economic power on the political sphere .
Areeda-Turner and the Treatment of Exclusionary Pricing under U.S. Antitrust and EU Competition Policy
The paper begins with a \"readers' guide\" to Areeda and Turner (Harv Law Rev 88: 697-733, 1975). It continues to explain the differing receptions of the price-unit cost approach to evaluating predatory pricing in U.S. antitrust policy and EU competition policy in terms of differing views on the likelihood that prédation will occur and differing weights given to the probability of incorrectly condemning competition on the merits as predatory and incorrectly exonerating predatory behavior as competition on the merits.
Relevance of supply chain dominance : a global perspective
Background: The increasing pressure on businesses to remain competitive has made dominant practices more prevalent, particularly in the automotive and retail industries. Financial, exclusionary and exploitative practices seem to be the main occurrences in the global supply chain when analysing dominant behaviours. Objectives: The study explores the global existence of dominant supply chain behaviour and the type of dominant supply chain practices to which smaller supply chain affiliates are subjected. Method: Because of the sensitive nature of the topic, it was not possible to collect primary data. Therefore, secondary qualitative data sourced from surveys, journal articles, news reports, websites, governmental publications and academic reports were analysed and quantitised. Results: A total of 60 cases of dominance were reported in regions across the globe, with Europe and the United States experiencing the most. Although companies in African and Asian markets experienced dominance, the reporting of these incidents seems to be limited. Conclusion: It emerged that dominance is more prevalent in certain industries such as the automotive and retail sectors, mainly through resented practices. Furthermore, small firms that experience bullying have either had to close down or conform to the requirements of the bullying firm to maintain its operations.
Diversified FRAND Enforcement and TRIPS Integrity
As an integral part of the WTO trading regime and in line with the international trend of antitrust control, TRIPS harmonized intellectual property protection with competition in mind. However, diverse national FRAND enforcement practices that take either a contractual or an antitrust approach challenge TRIPS integrity. While personal property recognition for SEPs lends constitutional support to the contractual approach to FRAND enforcement, private property's in-built limitation warrants a balance with the antitrust approach for needs from others. A critical examination of the TRIPS conclusion and the analytical structure of TRIPS provisions reveal that TRIPS obligation against anticompetitive practices is imperative. The imbalance of harmonized TRIPS with un-harmonized FRAND practices reflects TRIPS birth defect and challenges TRIPS integrity. To improve balance of rights and obligations in international trade and to ensure innovation and technology dissemination that is conducive to social and economic welfare, the paper calls for a contract–antitrust balanced approach to FRAND enforcement and the resumption of WTO's competition negotiations.
“Sham” Litigation
In both the U.S. and the EU, the antitrust category of “sham litigation” (in the U.S.) or “vexatious litigation” (in the EU) enables a plaintiff, or a defendant in case this action forms part of a counterclaim, to argue that the introduction of litigation may constitute, under certain conditions, an infringement of competition law. This naturally leads to the question of what is a workable standard for establishing the existence of sham litigation, and how it is possible to distinguish between the legitimate use of the regulatory/litigation process and strategic attempts to use the process in order to restrict competition. Legal and economic literature, as well as the courts, have struggled to define operational tests enabling them to determine the boundaries of the “sham”/“vexatious” litigation antitrust category. This article examines the intellectual underpinnings of this form of abusive/anticompetitive conduct and puts forward a “mechanism design approach” with the aim to reduce the occurrence of sham litigation.
On the Effect of Market Share Dispersion on New Firm Entry
Statistical estimations based on a number of European manufacturing sectors for the period 2007–2009 indicate that market share dispersion, as represented by various indices, is positively related to new firm entry. This finding contradicts the theoretical view that all aspects of industrial concentration should discourage entry. This positive effect is explained on the basis of various empirical findings showing that share dispersion alleviates incumbents’ rivalry and reduces entry-deterrent investments such as advertising and innovation. Finally, it is shown that the Herfindahl index may be insufficient to control for share dispersion.
RESOURCE MISALLOCATION UNDER TRADE RETALIATIONS: CASE OF CHINESE SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRY
Solar energy has been the Chinese government's prime candidate to replace fossil fuels for electricity generation. To bolster the solar energy industry, the Chinese government set up a menu of incentive policies that led Chinese firms to expand production aggressively. Within several years, China swiftly dominated the global solar energy production market. However, Chinese firms' predatory pricing provoked retaliation from the U.S. and the EU with \"anti-dumping\" and \"countervailing\" investigations beginning in 2011. This paper constructed a firm-level panel dataset and measured the extent of resource misallocation prevalent in the Chinese solar industry between 2009 and 2014. Our results suggested that although substantial resource misallocation existed in 2009 and 2010, the Chinese solar industry's misallocation had improved afterward. This occurred mainly because of the improvement in output distortion patterns among Chinese firms. However, through our decomposition exercise, we found that capital distortio