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How strong are normative prohibitions on state behavior? We examine this question by analyzing anti-nuclear norms, sometimes called the “nuclear taboo,” using an original survey experiment to evaluate American attitudes regarding nuclear use. We find that the public has only a weak aversion to using nuclear weapons and that this aversion has few characteristics of an “unthinkable” behavior or taboo. Instead, public attitudes about whether to use nuclear weapons are driven largely by consequentialist considerations of military utility. Americans’ willingness to use nuclear weapons increases dramatically when nuclear weapons provide advantages over conventional weapons in destroying critical targets. Americans who oppose the use of nuclear weapons seem to do so primarily for fear of setting a negative precedent that could lead to the use of nuclear weapons by other states against the United States or its allies in the future.

This paper argues that the deployment of transactions data of many kinds has become the banal face of the war on terror's preemptive strike. Because the failure to predict and prevent 9/11 is partly thought to be a failure to 'connect the dots' of available intelligence, post 9/11 policies seek to register, mine and connect ever more 'dots', or association rules, in the form of credit card transactions, travel data, supermarket purchases and so on. We argue that it is in these ordinary transactions that another spatiality of exception is emerging, one in which the traces of habits, behaviours and past practices become the basis of security decisions to freeze assets, to apprehend, to stop and search or to deport. As such, these developments constitute a relatively unacknowledged violence in the war on terror, which is in need of critical questioning.

In this study, we conducted a laboratory experiment to assess preemptive striking by and towards individuals or groups. In the framework of a preemptive strike game, we set the following four conditions: one person faced another person, one person faced a three-person group, a three-person group faced an individual, and a three-person group faced another three-person group. Previous studies have revealed that greed is activated when participants belong to a group, while fear is activated when participants interact with a group, and further, that attacking behaviors in the preemptive strike game are driven by fear. These observations led to a hypothesis that high attack rates would be realized when participants interact with a group, regardless of whether the participants make decisions as individuals or a group. The results of our experiment, however, rejected this hypothesis. Among the four conditions, the attack rate was highest when a three-person group faced an individual. As possible reasons for our observation, we discuss the potential threat stemming from the imbalance in the effectiveness of attack between individuals and groups, and the (incorrect) belief by groups that single individuals would be more likely to attack out of fear.

This article discusses the current precarious state of the US economy vis-a-vis the rise of China and the US proxy war in Ukraine. It discusses the problematic of a capitalist economy and the fundamental requirement of capital accumulation to avert and circumvent capitalist cyclical crises. It also discusses the methodology of accumulation, the law of value and the necessity of geographic hegemonic control in order to sustain homeostasis within a capitalist economy. Brought into the discussion is the effect such a dynamic imposes upon not only the hegemons (US, EU, Russia, and China) within the global economy but also the population and environment that such an unrelenting mission imposes upon the ecology and geopolitical state of affairs. In response to the endogenous exigencies of capital accumulation and the exogenous threats that such projects as China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Russia's interests as an Eastern European hegemon present, US foreign policy is designed as strategies (\"strategy of containment\" in reference to Russia after World War II and now the \"strategy of denial\" to contain the influence China presents as a world hegemon). Also, policy changes that are codified, such as the Bush Doctrine and the National Security Strategy of the United States of America provided legal rationalization and protection for the US to pursue practices that contravened international law i.e. the Geneva Conventions. China has emerged as a world hegemon and is ubiquitously engaging on the world stage especially in Eastern, Western and South Asia, the Pacific, the Middle East, Africa, South and Central America, and Mexico. The country is becoming a threat to US capitalist interest with their \"natural partnerships,\" with their China--Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF), with their 1+2+3 Cooperation Frameworks, and with their 4 Action Plans within these countries. These Chinese initiatives as actions are seen to be destabilizing what the US calls \"the balance of power\" and \"the rules-based order\" within the global economy. The US is counteracting the threat to US capital accumulation with its neoliberal and neocon agenda, mostly formulated by the main actors within the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) who play an important role in formulating US foreign policy in the interest of US capital and the US military industrial complex. The US is implementing this with the postulates outlined in the 2021 book The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict by Eldridge A. Colby and his fellow cohorts within the CFR who formulated the theory and particulars of the strategy that the US is currently pursuing.

In recent years, there has been remarkable progress in our understanding of policy persistence, on the one hand, and of the psychological phenomenon of underreaction, on the other. Surprisingly, there has been no attempt to use robust findings, derived from these efforts, in order to understand the nuances of policy underreaction. Policy underreaction refers to systematically slow and/or insufficient response by policymakers to increased risk or opportunity, or no response at all. This article tries to give the concept of policy underreaction a robust analytical identity by integrating cognitive, social, psychological and emotional variables in the explanation of policy underreaction and by introducing a variation across different types of contextual sources of policy persistence as explanatory variables of this phenomenon. It develops an analytical framework that revolves around two key elements of decision making in situations of risk unfolding over time: (1) policymakers' underestimation and accurate estimation of increased risks and (2) intra-and extra-organizational sources of policy persistence. Based on these dimensions, the article identifies and illustrates four distinct modes of policy underreaction which reflect differences in the nature of implemented policy.

Article Type: Viewpoint Purpose-This paper discusses three workable solutions of the North Korean nuclear standoff: a preemptive strike, sanctions, and negotiations. Design/methodology/approach-The approach is qualitative and expository; it consults area studies, social science, and journalism; it observes past, current, and future geopolitical events; and it makes informed policy suggestions. Findings-Findings are that a variety of hardline policies to denuclearize North Korea by the United States, its allies, and the United Nations have failed. The U.S. has threatened to strike North Korea a considerable number of times for a variety of reasons since the Korean War (1950-1953). However, the U.S. has never conducted a preventive air strike or any other type of strike against North Korea despite the fact that North Korea has test-fired missiles, nuclear weapons, and other weapons of mass destruction. Since the Korean War (19501953), the U.S., its allies, and the UN have increasingly imposed economic sanctions against North Korea as the communist country has developed more advanced weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). However, they have failed to achieve their intended purposes. This means that dialogue is the only way to solve the North Korean nuclear standoff peacefully. Practical implications-To solve or alleviate the North Korean nuclear program, the U.S. and North Korea should work jointly to produce a win-win outcome with a high-level mechanism between the two countries. Such a joint effort is possible because the two sides share more common interests than differences in this regard. Originality/value-The value of this article lies in the explanation of why \"negotiation\" is the only way to resolve the North Korean nuclear program.

This paper develops a model of short-range ballistic missile defense and uses it to study the performance of Israel's Iron Dome system. The deterministic base model allows for inaccurate missiles, unsuccessful interceptions, and civil defense. Model enhancements consider the trade-offs in attacking the interception system, the difficulties faced by militants in assembling large salvos, and the effects of imperfect missile classification by the defender. A stochastic model is also developed. Analysis shows that system performance can be highly sensitive to the missile salvo size, and that systems with higher interception rates are more \"fragile\" when overloaded. The model is calibrated using publically available data about Iron Dome's use during Operation Pillar of Defense in November 2012. If the systems performed as claimed, they saved Israel an estimated 1,778 casualties and $80 million in property damage, and thereby made preemptive strikes on Gaza about eight times less valuable to Israel. Gaza militants could have inflicted far more damage by grouping their rockets into large salvos, but this may have been difficult given Israel's suppression efforts. Counter-battery fire by the militants is unlikely to be worthwhile unless they can obtain much more accurate missiles.

The North Korean nuclear issue serves as a failure of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the sense that Pyongyang has, at present, nearly achieved its program. Why do some states like North Korea succeed in nuclear armament, while others fail? Two-level silence at both intranational and international levels served as a sufficient condition for North Korea to become nuclear-armed. Under a brutal dictatorial regime, the domestic audience complied with their leader's provocative policy while simultaneously serving as an environment of silence at the intranational level. More importantly, the international community and external states, including China, South Korea, and the U.S., remained relatively less assertive to North Korea's nuclear program as opposed to the cases of Iraq and Syria, which led to the creation of a silent structure at the international level. A structure of silence at both levels provided North Korea with a window of opportunity for accelerating and completing its nuclear program. This analysis generates policy and academic implications. Various options, including daring measures, at great risk, should be on the table in order to resolve a nuclear issue. Most importantly, the finding shows that robust military measures and their willingness to implement these measures serve as the most effective and innovative tool to stop a recurring pattern of past mistakes.