Explore the vast range of titles available.

Why do democracies win wars? This is a critical question in the study of international relations, as a traditional view--expressed most famously by Alexis de Tocqueville--has been that democracies are inferior in crafting foreign policy and fighting wars. In Democracies at War, the first major study of its kind, Dan Reiter and Allan Stam come to a very different conclusion. Democracies tend to win the wars they fight--specifically, about eighty percent of the time.

Article Type: Viewpoint Purpose-This paper discusses three workable solutions of the North Korean nuclear standoff: a preemptive strike, sanctions, and negotiations. Design/methodology/approach-The approach is qualitative and expository; it consults area studies, social science, and journalism; it observes past, current, and future geopolitical events; and it makes informed policy suggestions. Findings-Findings are that a variety of hardline policies to denuclearize North Korea by the United States, its allies, and the United Nations have failed. The U.S. has threatened to strike North Korea a considerable number of times for a variety of reasons since the Korean War (1950-1953). However, the U.S. has never conducted a preventive air strike or any other type of strike against North Korea despite the fact that North Korea has test-fired missiles, nuclear weapons, and other weapons of mass destruction. Since the Korean War (19501953), the U.S., its allies, and the UN have increasingly imposed economic sanctions against North Korea as the communist country has developed more advanced weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). However, they have failed to achieve their intended purposes. This means that dialogue is the only way to solve the North Korean nuclear standoff peacefully. Practical implications-To solve or alleviate the North Korean nuclear program, the U.S. and North Korea should work jointly to produce a win-win outcome with a high-level mechanism between the two countries. Such a joint effort is possible because the two sides share more common interests than differences in this regard. Originality/value-The value of this article lies in the explanation of why \"negotiation\" is the only way to resolve the North Korean nuclear program.

Many academics and policy analysts see preemptive wars as the spark to light the powder keg and the most likely path to armed conflicts. Reiter exposes the suppositions about preemptive wars and demonstrates why preemptive wars almost never happen.

Why are countries often able to communicate critical information using diplomacy? Why do countries typically use diplomacy honestly, despite incentives to bluff? Why are they often able to deter attacks using merely verbal threats? International relations theory is largely pessimistic about the prospects for effective diplomacy, yet leaders nevertheless expend much time and energy trying to resolve conflicts through verbal negotiations and public statements.Deterrence by Diplomacychallenges standard understandings of deterrence by analyzing it as a form of talk and reaches conclusions about the effectiveness of diplomacy that are much more optimistic. Anne Sartori argues that diplomacy works precisely because it is so valuable. States take pains to use diplomacy honestly most of the time because doing so allows them to maintain reputations for honesty, which in turn enhance their ability to resolve future disputes using diplomacy rather than force. So, to maintain the effectiveness of their diplomacy, states sometimes acquiesce to others' demands when they might have been able to attain their goals through bluffs. Sartori theorizes that countries obtain a \"trade\" of issues over time; they get their way more often when they deem the issues more important, and concede more often when they deem the issues less important. Departing from traditional theory, this book shows that rather than always fighting over small issues to show resolve, states can make their threats more credible by sometimes honestly acquiescing over lesser issues--by not crying \"wolf.\"

By presenting a case study based on the argumentative analysis of news in the press, this article introduces and discusses strategic manoeuvring with contextual frames. Drawing on the linguistic notion of frame, I introduce the concept of contextual frame to refer to the news context, that is, the background against which a certain event is presented as a piece of news. I argue that newspapers and journalists make use of contextual frames in the apparently neutral genre of news reporting to propose specific interpretations of the facts at issue, which become the basis for explicit comments and editorials. To show how this works, I investigate in detail a case of newspaper coverage of a complex episode using the pragma-dialectical notion of strategic manoeuvring and the Argumentum Model of Topics (AMT) to analyse argument schemes. I show that, in the use of contextual frames, there is a prominent relation between presentational devices (the lexical choices that build up the frame) and topical potential; contextual frames provide the implicit material premises (endoxa) which are at the basis of argumentations through which newspapers interpret and comment on the news.

The Berlin crisis, the Suez intervention, the Cyprus problem, and other differences among the NATO powers have tended to weaken the alliance in the face of constant Soviet pressure. Emphasizing the 1960's, a group of experts here examines the future of NATO and American security: military strategy for limited and large scale war, the problem of deterrence, nuclear sharing, surprise attack and disarmament, the special positions of England and Germany, and alternatives to NATO. The contributors are: Klaus Knorr, Roger Hilsman, C. E. Black, F. J. Yeager, G. W. Rathjens Jr., Malcolm Hoag, M. A. Kaplan, A. L. Burns, T. C. Schelling-, Denis Healey, G. A. Craig, and P. H. Nitze. Originally published in 1959. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

In this powerfully argued book, Ian Shapiro shows that the idea of containment offers the best hope for protecting Americans and their democracy into the future. His bold vision for American security in the post-September 11 world is reminiscent of George Kennan's historic \"Long Telegram,\" in which the containment strategy that won the Cold War was first developed. The Bush Doctrine of preemptive war and unilateral action has been marked by incompetence--missed opportunities to capture Osama bin Laden, failures of postwar planning for Iraq, and lack of an exit strategy. But Shapiro contends that the problems run deeper. He explains how the Bush Doctrine departs from the best traditions of American national-security policy and accepted international norms, and renders Americans and democratic values less safe. He debunks the belief that containment is obsolete. Terror networks might be elusive, but the enabling states that make them dangerous can be contained. Shapiro defends containment against charges of appeasement, arguing that force against a direct threat will be needed. He outlines new approaches to intelligence, finance, allies, diplomacy, and international institutions. He explains why containment is the best alternative to a misguided agenda that naively assumes democratic regime change is possible from the barrel of an American gun. President Bush has defined the War on Terror as the decisive ideological struggle of our time. Shapiro shows what a self-defeating mistake that is. He sets out a viable alternative that offers real security to Americans, reclaims America's international stature, and promotes democracy around the world.

While Michael Walzer's distinction between preemptive and preventive wars offers important categories for current reflection upon the Bush Doctrine and the invasion of Iraq, it is often treated as a modern distinction without antecedent in the classical Christian just war tradition. This paper argues to the contrary that within Augustine's corpus there are passages in which he speaks about the use of violence in situations that we would classify today as preemptive and preventive military action. While I do not claim that Augustine makes an explicit distinction between the two types of war (such would be anachronistic), I will argue that based on examinations of \"De libero arbitrio\" I.v.11-12 and \"De civitate Dei\" I.30 Augustine's discussions of hypothetical cases or actual wars in history provide insights helpful for contemporary reflection on preemptive and preventive wars.

The article presents a critical assessment of the widespread conceptualization of the June 1967 War between Israel and its neighboring Arab states as a pre-emptive war both in academic and non-academic writing. Tracing the origins of the notion of pre-emptive war to international law, the article identifies three necessary conditions for such a war to be classified as pre-emptive: acute crisis combined with high alert levels; vulnerable offensive weapons; and strategic parity as regards to offensive capabilities. On the basis of a re-interpretation of the evidence produced by previous research, this article argues that the circumstances surrounding the Six Day War did not fulfill some of these necessary conditions. This conclusion also is supported by evidence related to the Israeli decision to launch a first strike.

During the 1980s and the 1990s, scholars in the field of rhetorical studies presented presidential war rhetoric as a genre of public discourse. More recently, some have questioned the genre's continued relevance given the current challenges of U.S. warfare. This essay examines whether preemption conducted in the context of the war on terror alters or reinforces the conventional substantive and stylistic expectations of war rhetoric. Analyzing the public communication strategies of the Bush administration on Iraq and the Reagan administration on the bombing of Libya, it demonstrates that despite changes in the situational exigencies, the nation's leadership uses a heavy reliance on strategic misrepresentation to maintain compliance with the genre's expectations.