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The Single Transferable Vote, or STV, is often seen in very positive terms by electoral reformers, yet relatively little is known about its actual workings beyond one or two specific settings. This book gathers leading experts on STV from around the world to discuss the examples they know best, and represents the first systematic cross-national study of STV. Furthermore, the contributors collectively build an understanding of electoral systems as institutions embedded within a wider social and political context, and begins to explain the gap between analytical models and the actual practice of elections in Australia, Ireland, and Malta. Rather than seeing electoral institutions in purely mechanical terms, the collection of essays in this volume shows that the effects of electoral system may be contingent rather than automatic. On the basis of solid empirical evidence, the volume argues that the same political system can, in fact, have quite different effects under different conditions. Contributors to the volume are Shaun Bowler, David Farrell, Michael Gallagher, Bernard Grofman, Wolfgang Hirczy, Colin Hughes, J. Paul Johnston, Michael Laver, Malcom Mackerras, Michael Maley, Michael Marsh, Ian McAllister, and Ben Reilly. Shaun Bowler is Professor of Political Science, University of California, Riverside. Bernard Grofman is Professor of Political Science, University of California, Irvine.

In a Borda count, BC, M. de Borda suggested the last preference cast should receive 1 point, the voter's penultimate ranking should get 2 points, and so on. Today, however, points are often awarded to (first, second,..., last) preferences cast as per(n,n−1, ..., 1) or more frequently, (n−1, n−2,..., 0). If partial voting¹ is allowed, and if a first preference is to be given n or n − 1 points regardless of how many preferences the voter casts, he/she will be incentivised to rank only one option/candidate. If everyone acts in this way, the BC metamorphoses into a plurality vote... which de Borda criticized at length. If all the voters submit full ballots, the outcome—social choice or ranking—will be the same under any of the above three counting procedures. In the event of one or more persons submitting a partial vote, however, outcomes may vary considerably. This preliminary paper suggests research should consider partial voting. The author examines the consequences of the various rules so far advocated and then purports that M. de Borda, in using his formula, was perhaps more astute than the science has hitherto recognised.

This paper analyzes the properties of runoff electoral systems when voters are strategic. A model of three-candidate runoff elections is presented, and two new features are included: the risk of upset victory in the second round is endogenous, and many types of runoff systems are considered. Three main results emerge. First, runoff elections produce equilibria in which only two candidates receive a positive fraction of the votes. Second, a sincere voting equilibrium does not always exist. Finally, runoff systems with a threshold below 50 percent produce an Ortega effect that may lead to the systematic victory of the Condorcet loser.

In two experiments, children and adults rated pairs of faces from election races. Na ve adults judged a pair on competence; after playing a game, children chose who they would prefer to be captain of their boat. Children's (as well as adults') preferences accurately predicted actual election outcomes.

In this paper, we examine the cross-efficiency concept in data envelopment analysis (DEA). Cross efficiency links one decision-making unit's (DMU) performance with others and has the appeal that scores arise from peer evaluation. However, a number of the current cross-efficiency approaches are flawed because they use scores that are arbitrary in that they depend on a particular set of optimal DEA weights generated by the computer code in use at the time. One set of optimal DEA weights (possibly out of many alternate optima) may improve the cross efficiency of some DMUs, but at the expense of others. While models have been developed that incorporate secondary goals aimed at being more selective in the choice of optimal multipliers, the alternate optima issue remains. In cases where there is competition among DMUs, this situation may be seen as undesirable and unfair. To address this issue, this paper generalizes the original DEA cross-efficiency concept to game cross efficiency. Specifically, each DMU is viewed as a player that seeks to maximize its own efficiency, under the condition that the cross efficiency of each of the other DMUs does not deteriorate. The average game cross-efficiency score is obtained when the DMU's own maximized efficiency scores are averaged. To implement the DEA game cross-efficiency model, an algorithm for deriving the best (game cross-efficiency) scores is presented. We show that the optimal game cross-efficiency scores constitute a Nash equilibrium point.

The KEmeny Median Indicator Ranks Accordance (KEMIRA) method is one of the newest multi-attribute decision-making (MADM) methods that is used for problems in which criteria are inherently divided into two or more categories. The main disadvantages of this method are the increasing computational complexity for large-scale problems as well as the inflexibility of the method with increasing number of criteria categories. Preferential voting is a decision-making method based on a linear programming model with weight restrictions, which in combination with KEMIRA can significantly eliminate its shortcomings. This paper presents the new Voting-KEMIRA method to achieve this purpose. First, the voting model is designed as a multiple objective decision-making (MODM) problem. Then, to reduce the computational complexity, the problem is reformulated as a linear programming model. It is then solved with a goal programming approach. Finally, the new hybrid method has been implemented on a real-world problem of a hospital construction and compared to the previous method. A significant reduction of calculations in decision-making has been achieved. In the Voting-KEMIRA model, criteria weights can be calculated more accurately and it also allows for use of numerous experts in determining the weights of the criteria.

Debates about electoral reform revolve around giving voters more choice. Consequently, reformers often favor adopting the single transferable vote, a candidate-based system that allows voters to rank order candidates. Nonetheless, studies about whether lower preferences (transfers) influence STV election outcomes remain scant. To address this gap, our comparative multivariate approach tests transfers’ impact on election results in Ireland, Malta, Northern Ireland, and Scotland. We find that, on average, transfers are pivotal in the election of about one in 10 elected candidates. Hence, their impact is the exception rather than the norm. We show that when lower preferences are decisive at the candidate level, they benefit smaller and moderate parties and non-incumbents and, in Malta and Ireland, female candidates. Our results have implications for understanding the extent to which multiple preferences influence election outcomes and for debates on electoral reform.

Ever since the successful presidential campaign of Barack Obama in 2008, attention has been drawn to the political impact of social media. However, it remains to be seen whether the successful Obama campaign is the exception or the rule. Our research focuses specifically on the impact of social media on preference voting. First it seeks to establish whether candidates make use of social media during election campaigns and whether voters in turn follow politicians. Afterwards it examines to what extent social media make a difference and yield a preference vote bonus. Theoretically, two types of effects are outlined, namely a direct effect of the number of followers a candidate has and a statistical interaction effect whereby a higher number of followers only yields more votes when the candidate actively uses the social media. To carry out our analysis, we make use of a unique dataset that combines data on social media usage and data on the candidates themselves (such as position on the list, being wellknown, exposure to the old media, gender, ethnicity and incumbency). The dataset includes information on all 493 candidates of the 10 parties that received at least one seat in the Dutch 2010 election. It turns out that candidates are eager to use social media, but that relatively few people follow candidates. There is a significant interaction effect of social media usage and the number of followers, but that effect appears to be relatively small.

Proportional representation systems affect the extent to which elected legislators exhibit various attributes that allow them to earn a personal vote. The sources of variation in personal vote-earning attributes (PVEA) lie in informational shortcuts voters use under different electoral rules. List type (closed or open) and district magnitude (the number of legislators elected from a district) affect the types of shortcuts voters employ. When lists are closed, legislators' PVEA are of decreasing usefulness to voters as magnitude (and hence the number of candidates on a list) increases. When lists are open, legislators' PVEA are increasingly useful to voters as magnitude increases, because the number of candidates from which voters must choose whom to give a preference vote increases. As predicted by the theory, the probability that a legislator will exhibit PVEA-operationalized as local birthplace or lower-level electoral experience-declines with magnitude when lists are closed, but rises with magnitude when lists are open.