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"Presentism"
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Trouble on the Horizon for Presentism
Surface presentism is the combination of a general relativistic physics with a presentist metaphysics. In this paper, we provide an argument against this combination based on black holes. The problem focuses on the notion of an event horizon. We argue that the present locations of event horizons are ontologically dependent on future black hole regions, and that this dependence is incompatible with presentism. We consider five responses to the problem available to the surface presentist, and argue that none succeed. Surface presentism thus faces the prospect of empirical refutation based on the evidence available for the existence of black holes.
Journal Article
NEFARIOUS PRESENTISM
Presentists, who believe that only present objects exist, face a problem concerning truths about the past. Presentists should (but cannot) locate truth-makers for truths about the past. What can presentists say in response? We identify two rival factions 'upstanding' and 'nefarious' presentists. Upstanding presentists aim to meet the challenge, positing presently existing truth-makers for truths about the past; nefarious presentists aim to shirk their responsibilities, using the language of truth-maker theory but without paying any ontological price. We argue that presentists should be nefarious presentists.
Journal Article
Le nuove metamorfosi ovidiane del restauro
Today it would be necessary to render the intersection between words that give life to things and traces that continuously refer back from stone to documents, from archive documents to the independence of the work, with its autonomous temporality of continuous metamorphoses. It would be appropriate to do it by highlighting what is considered “residual”. Not only, as it is commonly said nowadays, because of the resilience of the restoration material to destruction, at least semantically. But because restoration faces the dilemma of micro-history in a world that we would like to be global and should have knock down all barriers. Globalization has accelerated the “presentism”, thus undermining even the language of actors, as well as of those involved in restoration and preservation, who have as their cognitive foundation the multiplicity of time and of the times that history entrusts to the restorer. Only recovering the space and the meaning of words that are not used solely to make homogeneous what is not can bring back to those relational knowledges, such as restoration, their theoretical foundations.
Journal Article
Statistics do sweat: Situated messiness and spatial science
David Livingstone's The Geographical Tradition remains a landmark in geographic historiography. This commentary argues that Livingstone contravened his own methodology when discussing geography's spatial science era. After situating the book in its own spatiotemporal context, I suggest elements that could enrich a contemporary account of the spatial science era sensitive to Livingstone's methodological approach.
Journal Article
\The Geographical Tradition\ and the challenges of geography geographised
After briefly reflecting on the birth of The Geographical Tradition, I focus on several key issues that snake their way through the observations of my commentators. These include presentism in historiography, the political positioning of the historian, and the role of disciplinary location in the production of subject history. I then reflect on the promises and perils of \"big history\" before moving to some thoughts on the complex interplay between translation and transformation in the circulation of texts. I close with some observations on the implications for geographers of thinking geographically about geographical knowledge.
Journal Article
The rotten core of presentism
Recently, some have attempted to reformulate debates in first-order metaphysics, particularly in the metaphysics of time and modality, for reasons due to Williamson (Modal logic as metaphysics, Oxford University Press, 2013). In this paper, we focus on the ways in which the likes of Cameron, Correia and Rosenkranz, Deasy, Ingram, Tallant, Viebahn, inter alia, have initiated and responded to attempts to capture the core of presentism using a formal, logical machinery. We argue that such attempts are doomed to fail because there is no theoretical core to presentism. There is no single view or family of views that is presentism.
Journal Article
Toutes les époques sont dégueulasses
Review of Laure Murat, Toutes les époques sont dégueulasses, Lagrasse: Verdier, 2025, reviewed by Paul-Alexis Mellet
Journal Article
Common-sense temporal ontology: an experimental study
Temporal ontology is the philosophical debate on the existence of the past and the future. It features a three-way confrontation between supporters of presentism (the present exists, the past and the future do not), pastism (the past and the present exist, the future does not), and eternalism (the past, the present, and the future all exist). Most philosophers engaged in this debate believe that presentism is much more in agreement with common sense than the rival views; moreover, most of them believe that being in agreement with common sense is epistemically valuable for a philosophical view. We studied experimentally non-experts’ ideas pertaining to the domain of temporal ontology, i.e., as we called it,
common-sense temporal ontology
, focusing on the Italian population. We found that a non-overwhelming majority of participants (~64%) favoured presentism, while two significant minorities favoured pastism (~19%) and eternalism (~17%). We think that our findings provide some support, albeit weaker than expected, for the view that presentism is more in agreement with common sense than the rival positions.
Journal Article
Present's actualizing and future's becoming possible
The paper spells out the thesis that the crucial, substantial move of presentism should be to temporalize modality. The present is not simply actual, and the future not simply possible, but the present is becoming actual, and the present's becoming actual is future's becoming possible (and past's becoming necessary). I will argue that by so temporalizing modality, as modes of becoming rather than of being, the presentists can make room for the future (and the past), can answer the triviality-objection raised against them, and can provide a specific account of presentist change.
El artículo desarrolla la tesis de que el presentismo debería temporalizar la modalidad. El presente no es simplemente actual, y el futuro no es simplemente posible, sino que el presente se convierte en actual, y este paso del presente a ser actual conlleva que el futuro se convierta en posible (y el pasado en necesario). Argumento que al temporalizar así la modalidad, como modos de llegar a ser más que de ser, los presentistas pueden dar cabida al futuro (y al pasado), pueden responder a la objeción de trivialidad, y pueden proporcionar una explicación específica del cambio presentista.
Journal Article