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In anticipation of Russell's new introduction to his 1925 second edition of Principia Mathematica, Jean Nicod wrote a letter which is reproduced in Russell's Autobiography. In the letter, Nicod wrote: \"Since you are re-publishing Principia, I may remind you that I have proved both Permutation and Association by help of the other three primitive props (Tautology, Addition, and the syllogistic prop.), where I only changed the order of some letters. It is in the Memoir I wrote for the b.a. degree. I have entirely forgotten how it is done.\" In this paper, I surmise what Nicod had in mind.

Russell derived many of his logical symbols from the pioneering notation of Giuseppe Peano. Principia Mathematica (1910–13) made these “Peanese” symbols (and others) famous. Here I focus on one of the more peculiar notational derivatives from Peano, namely, Principia’s dual use of a squared dot or dots for both conjunction and scope. As Dirk Schlimm has noted, Peano always had circular dots and only used them to symbolize scope distinctions. In contrast, Principia has squared dots and conventions such that some dots mark scope distinctions while others symbolize conjunction. How did this come to pass? In this paper I trace a genealogy of Principia’s square dots back to Russell’s appropriation of Peano’s use of circular dots. Russell never explicitly justifies appropriating Peano’s notations to symbolize two distinct notions, but below I explain why Russell deployed Peano’s dot notations in this manner. Further, I argue that it was Cambridge University Press who squared the circular dots.

The distinctive squared dots in Principia Mathematica have two uses, to replace parentheses or brackets to indicate the scope of connectives and operators as well as to symbolize the sentential connective \"and\". The explanation of the use of dots in the Introduction shows that the punctuation dots express conjunction by symbolizing the juxtaposition of formulas, following Peano, and so they are always used as punctuation. This paper thus supports Turing's assertion that conjunction in Principia is expressed by juxtaposition.This analysis avoids Curry's proposal that an \"auxiliary\" connective for conjunction should be involved in interpreting the dot notation.

Conceptual engineers have made hay over the differences of their metaphilosophy from those of conceptual analysts. In this article, I argue that the differences are not as great as conceptual engineers have, perhaps rhetorically, made them seem. That is, conceptual analysts asking ‘What is X?’ questions can do much the same work that conceptual engineers can do with ‘What is X for?’ questions, at least if conceptual analysts self-understand their activity as a revisionary enterprise. I show this with a study of Russell's metaphilosophy, which was just such a revisionary conception of conceptual analysis.

In the paper at hand, I provide an editorial history of Isaac Newton's famous regulae philosophandi on the basis of extant manuscript material.

This paper surveys the interactions between Russell and Gödel, both personal and intellectual. After a description of Russell’s influence on Gödel, it concludes with a discussion of Russell’s reaction to the incompleteness theorems.

Sixty years after its first edition, there is an increasing consensus among scholars that the work posthumously published as Philosophical Investigations represents something that is far from a complete picture of Wittgenstein's second book project. G.H. von Wright's seminal research on the Nachlass was an important contribution in this direction, showing that the Wittgenstein papers can reveal much more than the source of specific remarks. This book specifically explores Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations from the different angles of its originary conceptions, including the mathematical texts, shedding new light on fundamental issues in twentieth century and contemporary philosophy. Leading authorities in the field focus on newly published or hitherto unpublished sources for the interpretation of Wittgenstein's later work and a Wittgenstein typescript, translated for the first time into English, is included as an appendix.

Contrary to popular belief--and despite the expulsion, emigration, or death of many German mathematicians--substantial mathematics was produced in Germany during 1933-1945. In this landmark social history of the mathematics community in Nazi Germany, Sanford Segal examines how the Nazi years affected the personal and academic lives of those German mathematicians who continued to work in Germany. The effects of the Nazi regime on the lives of mathematicians ranged from limitations on foreign contact to power struggles that rattled entire institutions, from changed work patterns to military draft, deportation, and death. Based on extensive archival research, Mathematicians under the Nazis shows how these mathematicians, variously motivated, reacted to the period's intense political pressures. It details the consequences of their actions on their colleagues and on the practice and organs of German mathematics, including its curricula, institutions, and journals. Throughout, Segal's focus is on the biographies of individuals, including mathematicians who resisted the injection of ideology into their profession, some who worked in concentration camps, and others (such as Ludwig Bieberbach) who used the \"Aryanization\" of their profession to further their own agendas. Some of the figures are no longer well known; others still tower over the field. All lived lives complicated by Nazi power. Presenting a wealth of previously unavailable information, this book is a large contribution to the history of mathematics--as well as a unique view of what it was like to live and work in Nazi Germany.

From the pyramids and the Parthenon to the Sydney Opera House and the Bilbao Guggenheim, this book takes readers on an eye-opening tour of the mathematics behind some of the world's most spectacular buildings. Beautifully illustrated, the book explores the milestones in elementary mathematics that enliven the understanding of these buildings and combines this with an in-depth look at their aesthetics, history, and structure. Whether using trigonometry and vectors to explain why Gothic arches are structurally superior to Roman arches, or showing how simple ruler and compass constructions can produce sophisticated architectural details, Alexander Hahn describes the points at which elementary mathematics and architecture intersect. Beginning in prehistoric times, Hahn proceeds to guide readers through the Greek, Roman, Islamic, Romanesque, Gothic, Renaissance, and modern styles. He explores the unique features of the Pantheon, the Hagia Sophia, the Great Mosque of Cordoba, the Duomo in Florence, Palladio's villas, and Saint Peter's Basilica, as well as the U.S. Capitol Building. Hahn celebrates the forms and structures of architecture made possible by mathematical achievements from Greek geometry, the Hindu-Arabic number system, two- and three-dimensional coordinate geometry, and calculus. Along the way, Hahn introduces groundbreaking architects, including Brunelleschi, Alberti, da Vinci, Bramante, Michelangelo, della Porta, Wren, Gaudí, Saarinen, Utzon, and Gehry. Rich in detail, this book takes readers on an expedition around the globe, providing a deeper understanding of the mathematical forces at play in the world's most elegant buildings.

The article rebutts Michael Kremer's contention that Russell's contextual definition of set-theoretic language in Principia Mathematica constituted the ontological achievement of eliminating commitment to classes. Although Russell's higher-order quantifiers, used in the definition, need not range over classes, none of the plausible substitutes provide a solid basis for eliminating them. This point is used to defend the presentation, in The Dawn of Analysis, of Russell's logicist reduction, using a first-order version of naive set theory.