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The concept of common morality is fundamental in medical ethics, and lack of universal content and characteristics of common morality is a product of its multifaceted nature. This study aimed to identify the ideas and experiences of academic faculties regarding common morality in a pluralistic setting to promote conceptual knowledge and strengthen moral reasoning and ethical decision-making. The study was conducted using a qualitative method, employing semi-structured in-depth interviews with thirteen faculty members who were selected purposively. In order to assess their ideas and experiences, the transcripts of the interviews were analyzed using the content analysis method through directed and conventional approaches. The interviews were coded manually. Two themes were reflected in the interviews: ontology and epistemology of common morality. The study indicates that the debate about the subjective or objective dependence of common morality questions the coherence of Beauchamp and Childress' common morality (CM) theory, as common morality is the result of various individual and social factor that influence moral thinking and decision-making in pluralistic environments. Additional studies are needed in order to investigate the effect of cultural, social, theoretical, ideological and individual factors on promoting clinical ethical reasoning and decision-making skills.

The use of Intelligent Assistive Technology (IAT) in dementia care opens the prospects of reducing the global burden of dementia and enabling novel opportunities to improve the lives of dementia patients. However, with current adoption rates being reportedly low, the potential of IATs might remain under-expressed as long as the reasons for suboptimal adoption remain unaddressed. Among these, ethical and social considerations are critical. This article reviews the spectrum of IATs for dementia and investigates the prevalence of ethical considerations in the design of current IATs. Our screening shows that a significant portion of current IATs is designed in the absence of explicit ethical considerations. These results suggest that the lack of ethical consideration might be a codeterminant of current structural limitations in the translation of IATs from designing labs to bedside. Based on these data, we call for a coordinated effort to proactively incorporate ethical considerations early in the design and development of new products.

Eliminating health disparities is a Healthy People goal. Given the diverse and sometimes broad definitions of health disparities commonly used, a subcommittee convened by the Secretary's Advisory Committee for Healthy People 2020 proposed an operational definition for use in developing objectives and targets, determining resource allocation priorities, and assessing progress. Based on that subcommittee's work, we propose that health disparities are systematic, plausibly avoidable health differences adversely affecting socially disadvantaged groups; they may reflect social disadvantage, but causality need not be established. This definition, grounded in ethical and human rights principles, focuses on the subset of health differences reflecting social injustice, distinguishing health disparities from other health differences also warranting concerted attention, and from health differences in general. We explain the definition, its underlying concepts, the challenges it addresses, and the rationale for applying it to United States public health policy.

The difficulty of explaining the outputs of artificial intelligence (AI) models and what has led to them is a notorious ethical problem wherever these technologies are applied, including in the medical domain, and one that has no obvious solution. This paper examines the proposal, made by Luciano Floridi and colleagues, to include a new ‘principle of explicability’ alongside the traditional four principles of bioethics that make up the theory of ‘principlism’. It specifically responds to a recent set of criticisms that challenge the supposed need for such a principle to perform an enabling role in relation to the traditional four principles and therefore suggest that these four are sufficient without the addition of explicability. The paper challenges the critics’ premise that explicability cannot be an ethical principle like the classic four because it is explicitly subordinate to them. It argues instead that principlism in its original formulation locates the justification for ethical principles in a midlevel position such that they mediate between the most general moral norms and the contextual requirements of medicine. This conception of an ethical principle then provides a mold for an approach to explicability on which it functions as an enabling principle that unifies technical/epistemic demands on AI and the requirements of high-level ethical theories. The paper finishes by anticipating an objection that decision-making by clinicians and AI fall equally, but implausibly, under the principle of explicability’s scope, which it rejects on the grounds that human decisions, unlike AI’s, can be explained by their social environments.

The search for ethical guidance in the development of artificial intelligence (AI) systems, especially in healthcare and decision support, remains a crucial effort. So far, principles usually serve as the main reference points to achieve ethically correct implementations. Based on reviewing classical criticism of principle-based ethics and taking into account the severity and potentially life-changing relevance of decisions assisted by AI-driven systems, we argue for strengthening a complementary perspective that focuses on the life-world as ensembles of practices which shape people’s lives. This perspective focuses on the notion of ethical judgment sensitive to life forms, arguing that principles alone do not guarantee ethicality in a moral world that is rather a joint construction of reality than a matter of mere control. We conclude that it is essential to support and supplement the implementation of moral principles in the development of AI systems for decision-making in healthcare by recognizing the normative relevance of life forms and practices in ethical judgment.

Background The Western-European concept of libertarian rights-based autonomy, which advocates respect for individual rights, may conflict with African cultural values and norms. African communitarian ethics focuses on the interests of the collective whole or community, rather than rugged individualism. Hence collective decision-making processes take precedence over individual autonomy or consent. This apparent conflict may impact informed consent practice during biomedical research in African communities and may hinder ethical principlism in African bioethics. This study explored African biomedical researchers' perspectives regarding informed consent and potential limitations to the principle of respect for autonomy in African communities. Methods We conducted a qualitative study based on in-depth interviews with 12 biomedical researchers, five females and seven males aged 34 to 74 years, currently working at an African university. Interviews lasted 35–40 min each and involved semi-structured open-ended interviews, which allowed participants to offer information about their perceptions and feelings regarding respect for autonomy and informed consent as practised in Africa. Empirical data from the interviews were recorded, transcribed, and analysed using thematic content analysis, together with an interrogation of relevant scientific literature about African communitarian ethics, making evaluations and drawing inferences consistent with the empirical bioethics approach. Results Based on these interviews and analysis of relevant literature, we found that informed consent is difficult to apply in an African context because it derives from a Western conception of libertarian rights-based autonomy. Most respondents pointed out that it was challenging to implement informed consent in the African setting. Furthermore, communalism, customary beliefs, spirituality, and relational autonomy are predominant in most African communities, as exemplified by the African moral philosophies of Ubuntu/Botho and Ukama , which emphasize communitarianism over individual rights. We also found that language, education, poverty, and cultural beliefs are barriers to obtaining proper informed consent in African communities. Conclusions We conclude that there are limitations to applying the principle of respect for autonomy and informed consent in African communities, especially in the context of human biomedical research. We recommend using a more relational approach, such as Ross’s prima facie duties, to implement informed consent in African communities.

We extend the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) for ethics in the workplace. Using a path modeling methodology, we find evidence that, for ethics, moral disengagement is an antecedent to the TPB predictors of attitude, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control (PBC). We show that the TPB predictors mediate the influence moral disengagement has on ethical behavioral intentions. Thus, to improve ethical behavior, reducing moral disengagement is critical. We find support for including both types of PBC (self-efficacy and locus of control) when modeling ethical behavior. We use four ethics scenarios and international data to test this model. We also evaluate potential positive influences on ethics in the workplace and find that recency of ethics training interacts with religiosity and activates it to reduce moral disengagement. We also find that principles-based ethics training enhances professionals’ self-efficacy to behave ethically. Experience, including time as a member in a professional accounting organization, increases both locus of control and self-efficacy to behave ethically. These variables—recency of ethical training, religiosity, principles-based professional ethics training, and experience—influence parts of the core TPB model, which in turn lead to improved ethical behavioral intentions.

This paper argues that the four prima facie principles—beneficence, non-maleficence, respect for autonomy and justice—afford a good and widely acceptable basis for ‘doing good medical ethics’. It confronts objections that the approach is simplistic, incompatible with a virtue-based approach to medicine, that it requires respect for autonomy always to have priority when the principles clash at the expense of clinical obligations to benefit patients and global justice. It agrees that the approach does not provide universalisable methods either for resolving such moral dilemmas arising from conflict between the principles or their derivatives, or universalisable methods for resolving disagreements about the scope of these principles—long acknowledged lacunae but arguably to be found, in practice, with all other approaches to medical ethics. The value of the approach, when properly understood, is to provide a universalisable though prima facie set of moral commitments which all doctors can accept, a basic moral language and a basic moral analytic framework. These can underpin an intercultural ‘moral mission statement’ for the goals and practice of medicine.

Over the past several decades, medical ethics has gained a solid foothold in medical education and is now a required course in most medical schools. Although the field of medical ethics is by nature eclectic, moral philosophy has played a dominant role in defining both the content of what is taught and the methodology for reasoning about ethical dilemmas. Most educators largely rely on the case‐based method for teaching ethics, grounding the ethical reasoning in an amalgam of theories drawn from moral philosophy, including consequentialism, deontology, and principlism. In this article we hope to make a case for augmenting the focus of education in medical ethics. We propose complementing the traditional approach to medical ethics with a more embedded approach, one that has been described by others as “microethics,” the ethics of everyday clinical practice.