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Managing the new product development (NPD) is a challenging mission, and most researches would argue that design is fundamentally linked to intentional action and it cannot emerge out of complexity. In fact, its complexity is generated by a large number of entities and actors which cooperate simultaneously with an unpredictable way to understand what customers want and then design product with diverse objectives in mind. A slight change in one activity may cause tremors everywhere. Within a dynamic environment and in order to meet concurrently these challenges, several researchers have implemented design for X (DFX) techniques. Regarding the availability of numerous DFX, the decision as to which one to apply remains absent. Hence, the purpose of this paper is to present a comprehensive overview of the most prominent DFX techniques with respect to sustainability dimension as well as the cost ownership and product differentiation strategies. In addition to that, complex product necessitates the consideration of integrated DFX to optimize product life cycle from a more holistic perspective. In this respect, the paper addresses a systematic review from 1980 to 2018 by investigating and discussing the past and current research of each DFX techniques as well as for integrated ones. The key problems and issues that future DFX research should address have been identified and discussed in this paper.

The delayed product differentiation (DPD) recently rose as a hybrid production strategy able to overcome the main limits of make to stock (MTS) and make to order (MTO), guaranteeing the management of high variety and keeping low storage cost and quick response time by using the so-called product platforms. These platforms are a set of sub-systems forming a common structure from which a set of derivative variants can be efficiently produced. Platforms are manufactured and stocked following an MTS strategy. Then, they are customized into different variants, following an MTO strategy. Current literature proposes methods for platform design mainly using optimization techniques, which usually have a high computational complexity for efficiently managing real-size industrial instances in the modern mass customization era. Hence, efficient algorithms need to be developed to manage the product platforms design for such instances. To fill this gap, this paper proposes a two-step methodology for product platforms design and assessment in high-variety manufacturing. The design step involves the use of a novel modified algorithm for solving the longest common subsequence (LCS) problem and of the k-medoids clustering for the identification of the platform structure and the assignment of the variants to the platforms. The platforms are then assessed against a set of industrial and market metrics, i.e. the MTS cost, the variety, the customer responsiveness, and the variants production cost. The evaluation of the platform set against such a combined set of drivers enhancing both company and market perspectives is missing in the literature. A real case study dealing with the manufacturing of a family of valves exemplifies the efficiency of the methodology in supporting companies in managing high-variety to best balance the proposed metrics.

In a sequential model of vertical product differentiation in which consumers are loss-averse, I analyse how firms compete to sell the reference product when they set prices. I find that there are two subgame perfect equilibria: one where the reference point for all consumers is the higher-quality product; and the other where the reference point is the lower-quality product. However, applying the risk-dominance criterion, I obtain that the sole risk-dominant equilibrium is for the higher-quality firm to sell the reference product. Since the hedonic price of the higher-quality product is the highest, consumers do not suffer any psychological disutility in the risk-dominant equilibrium.

This study employs a differentiated Cournot model with both horizontal and vertical product differentiation. It scrutinizes the implications of frictions over manufacturing high quality (upstream market power) on the endogenous foreign market entry mode and product quality choice. Both high-quality exports and subsidiary sales require high-quality inputs supplied by a monopoly upstream firm, and thus are costly. Relative product quality, product substitutability, and product-specific trade costs are the key for the variation in input/output prices, sales and the markup between an exporter and a multinational, and have significant trade policy implications for high-quality exports and subsidiary sales.

Many industries are made up of a few big firms, which are able to manipulate the market outcome, and of a host of small businesses, each of which has a negligible impact on the market We provide a general equilibrium framework that encapsulates both market structures. Due to the higher toughness of competition, the entry of big firms leads them to sell more through a market expansion effect generated by the shrinking of the monopolistically competitive fringe. Furthermore, social welfare increases with the number of big firms because the procompetitive effect associated with entry dominates the resulting decrease in product diversity.

We construct a vertical product differentiation duopoly model incorporating managerial delegation and cross-ownership. By exploring the interplay of these factors, we find a U-shaped relationship between endogenous managerial delegation coefficients and cross-ownership. The difference in managerial delegation coefficients between the two firms decreases as the cross-ownership proportion increases. In an ownership structure involving cross-ownership of firms producing different quality products, managerial delegation improves firms’ profits while reducing consumer surplus and social welfare in a vertical product differentiation market. Moreover, cross-ownership intensifies the positive impact of managerial delegation on joint profits and the negative effects on consumer surplus and social welfare. Consequently, regulating cross-ownership among firms in vertically differentiated product markets is an important policy issue for competition law.

The present model analyses the possibility of stable cartels under vertical and horizontal product differentiation in the presence of cost asymmetry. This possibility is lesser for an agreement that allows the lower quality product to be produced when the quality difference (net of cost) increases or the level of horizontal product differentiation decreases. However, if side payments are allowed, and the cartel agreement does not allow the lower quality product to be produced, the result changes. In this second situation, the possibility of a stable cartel falls if the quality difference (net of cost) falls or the horizontal product differentiation increases. Welfare may increase after cartel formation if the lower quality good is not produced in the presence of side payments.

PurposeThis paper investigates the application of the product differentiation and shared efficiency approaches to understand the impact of the auditor industry specialisation (IS) on audit fees in relation to Fair Value Disclosures (FVD).Design/methodology/approachThe study uses 1,470 firm-year observations for the period 2005–2018 and is focused on Jordanian financial firms. Two competing theoretical approaches of IS proxied by audit fee-based measures were employed: firstly, the product differentiation approach measured using Market Share-based (MS) measure and secondly, the shared efficiency approach measured using Portfolio Share-based (PS) measure. The paper employs the Ordinary Least Squares regression to test the association between the proportion of fair-valued assets (using fair value hierarchy inputs) and audit fees.FindingsThe results suggest that the association between the proportion of fair-valued assets and audit fees is strengthened (weakened) when the client hires specialist auditors identified by MS (PS). This association varied across the fair value inputs. Level 1 assets were found to be only moderated by both scenarios positively (negatively) for MS (PS) experts. The results are robust after controlling the endogeneity of auditor self-selection.Practical implicationsThe results provide valuable insights for policymakers into challenges of auditing FVD. These insights present a valuable input for the development of FVD policies and practices as well as providing guidance for updating auditor prices. Additionally, the results provide a foundation for policymakers and regulators to introduce and update fair value auditing practices. The current findings are generalisable to other countries, including the Middle East and North Africa, and are particularly beneficial for those countries which have adopted the fair value model.Originality/valueThis study contributes to the theory by demonstrating the impact of the auditor industry expertise on post-implementation costs of FVD. The novelty of the study lies in introducing principle-based standards requirements of FVD to test the relationship. This approach is based on the IFRS disclosure requirements using data from the Jordanian financial sector to examine this relationship.

When would an oligopolistic entrant imitate an incumbent’s product (“me-too” entry), rather than horizontally differentiate? We allow an entrant's product choice to vary endogenously with the cost of product differentiation. Such endogenity of product differentiation significantly affects the comparison of Bertrand and Cournot duopoly. We find that if Bertrand entry occurs, products are differentiated, whereas there is a substantial region in which Cournot entry involves a homogenous product. Bertrand prices may be higher than Cournot prices; and, if product differentiation costs are low enough to induce Cournot differentiated entry, then Bertrand industry profit equals or exceeds Cournot industry profit.

This paper studies endogenous horizontal product differentiation in a mixed duopoly. In the basic model in which firms have symmetric costs, we find that (i) product differentiation arises provided differentiation costs are sufficiently low; (ii) under Cournot competition, the welfare maximizing public firm always obtains more incentive for product differentiation, and the products are more differentiated in the mixed duopoly than in the private duopoly; and (iii) under Bertrand competition, the private firm invests in product differentiation when differentiation costs are at moderate levels while the public firm does so when differentiation costs are sufficiently low. The products may be more or less differentiated in the mixed duopoly depending on the differentiation costs. Two extensions of the basic model are also examined: one with a foreign private firm and the other with asymmetric costs.