Explore the vast range of titles available.

Low-carbon hydrogen could be an important component of a net-zero carbon economy, helping to mitigate emissions in a number of hard-to-abate sectors. The United States recently introduced an escalating production tax credit (PTC) to incentivize production of hydrogen meeting increasingly stringent embodied emissions thresholds. Hydrogen produced via electrolysis can qualify for the full subsidy under current federal accounting standards if the input electricity is generated by carbon-free resources, but may fail to do so if emitting resources are present in the generation mix. While use of behind-the-meter carbon-free electricity inputs can guarantee compliance with this standard, the PTC could also be structured to allow producers using grid-supplied electricity to qualify subject to certain clean energy procurement requirements. Herein we use electricity system capacity expansion modeling to quantitatively assess the impact of grid-connected electrolysis on the evolution of the power sector in the western United States through 2030 under multiple possible implementations of the clean hydrogen PTC. We find that subsidized grid-connected hydrogen production has the potential to induce additional emissions at effective rates worse than those of conventional, fossil-based hydrogen production pathways. Emissions can be minimized by requiring grid-based hydrogen producers to match 100% of their electricity consumption on an hourly basis with physically deliverable, ‘additional’ clean generation, which ensures effective emissions rates equivalent to electrolysis exclusively supplied by behind-the-meter carbon-free generation. While these requirements cannot eliminate indirect emissions caused by competition for limited clean resources, which we find to be a persistent result of large hydrogen production subsidies, they consistently outperform alternative approaches relying on relaxed time matching or marginal emissions accounting. Added hydrogen production costs from enforcing an hourly matching requirement rather than no requirements are less than $1 kg −1 , and can be near zero if clean, firm electricity resources are available for procurement.

We study various scenarios for taxing emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2). The question is how carbon tax policies will perform, given international trade, if countries adopt different tax rates. We investigate this question quantitatively using CIM-EARTH, a newly developed open-source computable general equilibrium model. Its qualitative predictions align with a simple economic analysis. A key quantitative prediction is that increased CO2 emissions in developing countries would undo over 20% of reductions made by the Annex B Kyoto region if it were to impose a carbon tax on producers of $105 per tonne C ($29 per tonne CO2). Adding full border tax adjustments eliminates this leakage, leaving global emissions slightly lower since Annex B countries are not importers of virtual carbon.

We consider the economics and the design of border adjustments (BAs) under a carbon tax. BAs under a carbon tax are taxes on imports and rebates on exports, based on the emissions from the production of a good. They are thought to be a method of reducing inefficiencies from a unilateral carbon price, such as shifts in the location of production, known as leakage. After examining the basic economics of BAs, we examine three design issues: which goods BAs should apply to, which emissions from the production of those goods should be taxed, and from and to which countries BAs should apply. We conclude that BAs will impose high administrative costs and need stronger welfare justifications.

We construct a tax competition model in which local governments finance business public services with either a source-based tax on mobile capital, such as a property tax, or a tax on production, such as an origin-based value-added tax, and then assess which of the two tax instruments is more efficient. Many taxes on business apply to mobile inputs or outputs, such as property taxes, retail sales taxes, and destination-based VATs, and their inefficiency has been examined in the literature; however, proposals from several prominent tax experts to utilize a local origin-based VAT have not been analyzed theoretically. Our primary finding is that the production tax is less inefficient than the capital tax under many—but not all—conditions. The intuition underlying this result is that the efficiency of a user fee on the public business input is roughly approximated by a production tax, which applies to both the public input and immobile labor (in addition to mobile capital). In marked contrast, the capital tax applies only to mobile capital and is thus likely to be relatively inefficient.

Rapid urbanization and industrialization have intensified the contradiction between water scarcity and economic growth. Achieving synergy between economic development and water conservation through taxation and subsidy policies has emerged as a critical research focus. This study develops an extended Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model incorporating a water resource module to evaluate the impacts of production tax and subsidy policies in Wenling City, Zhejiang Province, China, a typical water-scarce city. By integrating a nested Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production function for various water sources, the model captures the interactions between water supply and industrial output. Six policy scenarios of taxations and subsidies are designed. The impacts on macroeconomic aggregates, industrial output, and water usage are simulated. Results indicate that standalone taxation policies (Water Conservation Taxation Policy A1/Industrial Transformation Taxation Policy B1) reduce water usage by 3.35–3.80% but suppress Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth by 0.37–0.76%. Among combined policies, the Water Conservation Combined Policy A3 achieves the optimal synergy between water conservation and economic growth, increasing real GDP by 1.00% while reducing water usage by 4.97%. This study reveals that taxation curbs the expansion of water-intensive industries, whereas subsidies redirect production factors toward water-efficient industries. Combining these policies effectively balances water conservation and economic development objectives. This study demonstrates how differentiated tax instruments drive water conservation through industrial transformation, providing a quantitative framework for production tax policy formulation in water-scarce regions.

This paper considers the costs of reducing consumption of a good by making its production illegal and punishing apprehended illegal producers. We use illegal drugs as a prominent example. We show that the more inelastic either demand for or supply of a good is, the greater the increase in social cost from further reducing its production by greater enforcement efforts. So optimal public expenditures on apprehension and conviction of illegal suppliers depend not only on the difference between the social and private values from consumption but also on these elasticities. When demand and supply are not too elastic, it does not pay to enforce any prohibition unless the social value is negative. We also show that a monetary tax could cause a greater reduction in output and increase in price than optimal enforcement against the same good would if it were illegal, even though some producers may go underground to avoid a monetary tax. When enforcement is costly, excise taxes and quantity restrictions are not equivalent.

This study examines the effects of taxation on the incentives of multinational firms to develop and use intellectual property. We model optimal investment and production decisions by firms that engage in a patent race by making R&D investments. We investigate how taxes affect the level and efficiency of R&D investments, and how these effects depend on whether the winner of the patent race uses it by either producing in the country in which the patent was developed (the domestic country) or in a foreign country. A higher domestic tax rate decreases investment in R&D if production occurs in the domestic country, but increases investment in R&D if production occurs in the foreign country. The present value of domestic tax revenues is strictly positive if production occurs in the domestic country, but is weakly negative if production occurs in the foreign country.

This paper characterizes an efficiency-inducing policy for a polluting oligopoly when pollution abatement is technologically feasible and when environmental damage depends on the pollution stock. Using a dynamic policy game between the regulator and the oligopolists, we show that a tax–subsidy scheme can implement the efficient outcome as a regulated market equilibrium. The scheme consists of a tax on production and a subsidy that can either be on abatement efforts or on abatement costs. Both schemes prescribe a different tax rule, but both implement the efficient outcome. If firms act strategically, taking into account the evolution of the pollution stock when they decide on abatement and production, the subsidy reflects the divergence between the social and private valuation of the pollution stock associated with the abatement decision. Consequently, the tax has to correct the two market failures associated with production: the market power of the firms and the negative externality caused by pollution. Using an LQ (differential) policy game, we show that the tax increases with the pollution stock for both schemes, and that the application of a subsidy on abatement costs leads to a laxer tax rule. Interestingly, it also yields a lower fiscal deficit at the steady state. Thus, from a fiscal perspective, the policy recommendation is the application of a subsidy on abatement costs.

Time use data on work and leisure is presented for a broad group of OECD countries. The home production model explicitly accounts for taxes and public expenditures on day care and elder care, substitutes for work households perform at home. Taxes are important for matching time use patterns in Canada, the UK, and continental Europe, but cannot explain the high levels of market work and low levels of home work observed in Scandinavia. Subsidies of services like day care that substitute for home work are shown to be quantitatively important for bringing both market and home work predictions inline with the data.

How do government-supplied institutional benefits and the taxation and regulation of producers affect the propensity of private firms to enter the unofficial economy and evade taxation? We propose a model in which the incentive of firms to operate underground depends on tax rates relative to firm-specific thresholds of tax toleration that are decisively affected by quality of governance—in particular by the presence of high-grade institutions delivering services enhancing official production that anchor profit-maximizing firms to the official economy. Some key predictions of the model concerning the determinants of firms' tax toleration and tax compliance receive broad support from empirical analyses of enterprise-level data from the World Bank's World Business Environment Surveys.