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Expectations and the Structure of Share Prices
John G. Cragg and Burton G. Malkiel collected detailed forecasts of professional investors concerning the growth of 175 companies and use this information to examine the impact of such forecasts on the market evaluations of the companies and to test and extend traditional models of how stock market values are determined.
eBook
Expectations and the structure of share prices
John G. Cragg and Burton G. Malkiel collected detailed forecasts of professional investors concerning the growth of 175 companies and use this information to examine the impact of such forecasts on the market evaluations of the companies and to test and extend traditional models of how stock market values are determined.
eBook
Monopsony in Motion
What happens if an employer cuts wages by one cent? Much of labor economics is built on the assumption that all the workers will quit immediately. Here, Alan Manning mounts a systematic challenge to the standard model of perfect competition. Monopsony in Motion stands apart by analyzing labor markets from the real-world perspective that employers have significant market (or monopsony) power over their workers. Arguing that this power derives from frictions in the labor market that make it time-consuming and costly for workers to change jobs, Manning re-examines much of labor economics based on this alternative and equally plausible assumption. The book addresses the theoretical implications of monopsony and presents a wealth of empirical evidence. Our understanding of the distribution of wages, unemployment, and human capital can all be improved by recognizing that employers have some monopsony power over their workers. Also considered are policy issues including the minimum wage, equal pay legislation, and caps on working hours. In a monopsonistic labor market, concludes Manning, the \"free\" market can no longer be sustained as an ideal and labor economists need to be more open-minded in their evaluation of labor market policies. Monopsony in Motion will represent for some a new fundamental text in the advanced study of labor economics, and for others, an invaluable alternative perspective that henceforth must be taken into account in any serious consideration of the subject.
eBook
Economic Geography and Public Policy
Research on the spatial aspects of economic activity has flourished over the past decade due to the emergence of new theory, new data, and an intense interest on the part of policymakers, especially in Europe but increasingly in North America and elsewhere as well. However, these efforts--collectively known as the \"new economic geography\"--have devoted little attention to the policy implications of the new theory.
Economic Geography and Public Policyfills the gap by illustrating many new policy insights economic geography models can offer to the realm of theoretical policy analysis. Focusing primarily on trade policy, tax policy, and regional policy, Richard Baldwin and coauthors show how these models can be used to make sense of real-world situations. The book not only provides much fresh analysis but also synthesizes insights from the existing literature.
The authors begin by presenting and analyzing the widest range of new economic geography models to date. From there they proceed to examine previously unaddressed welfare and policy issues including, in separate sections, trade policy (unilateral, reciprocal, and preferential), tax policy (agglomeration with taxes and public goods, tax competition and agglomeration), and regional policy (infrastructure policies and the political economy of regional subsidies). A well-organized, engaging narrative that progresses smoothly from fundamentals to more complex material,Economic Geography and Public Policyis essential reading for graduate students, researchers, and policymakers seeking new approaches to spatial policy issues.
eBook
Supermodularity and Complementarity
The economics literature is replete with examples of monotone comparative statics; that is, scenarios where optimal decisions or equilibria in a parameterized collection of models vary monotonically with the parameter. Most of these examples are manifestations of complementarity, with a common explicit or implicit theoretical basis in properties of a super-modular function on a lattice. Supermodular functions yield a characterization for complementarity and extend the notion of complementarity to a general setting that is a natural mathematical context for studying complementarity and monotone comparative statics. Concepts and results related to supermodularity and monotone comparative statics constitute a new and important formal step in the long line of economics literature on complementarity.
This monograph links complementarity to powerful concepts and results involving supermodular functions on lattices and focuses on analyses and issues related to monotone comparative statics. Don Topkis, who is known for his seminal contributions to this area, here presents a self-contained and up-to-date view of this field, including many new results, to scholars interested in economic theory and its applications as well as to those in related disciplines. The emphasis is on methodology. The book systematically develops a comprehensive, integrated theory pertaining to supermodularity, complementarity, and monotone comparative statics. It then applies that theory in the analysis of many diverse economic models formulated as decision problems, noncooperative games, and cooperative games.
eBook
Frenemies in Platform Markets: Heterogeneous Profit Foci as Drivers of Compatibility Decisions
We study compatibility decisions of two competing platform owners that generate profits through both hardware sales and royalties from content sales. We consider a game-theoretic model in which two platforms offer different standalone utilities to users. We find that incentives to establish one-way compatibility—the platform owner with smaller standalone value grants access to its proprietary content application to users of the competing platform—can arise from the difference in their profit foci. As the difference in the standalone utilities increases, royalties from content sales become less important to the platform owner with greater standalone value, but more important to the other platform owner. One-way compatibility can thus increase asymmetry between the platform owners’ profit foci and, given a sufficiently large difference in the standalone utilities, yields greater profits for both platform owners. We further show that social welfare is greater under one-way compatibility than under incompatibility. We also investigate how factors such as exclusive content and hardware-only adopters affect compatibility incentives.
This paper was accepted by Chris Forman, information systems.
Journal Article
A structural mathematical model on two echelon supply chain system
As the people are becoming conscious about protection of the environment from pollutant caused by human beings, businesses are adopting green technology to procure green products to save the environment from pollution. Consequently, it is a challenging task at the firm manager to capture the market providing best green quality at fair price in a given economy. The paper plans to discuss two situations in two models. In model 1, the optimal green quality and sales prices of the manufacturer and the retailer in both decentralize and centralize systems of a two-echelon supply chain system are investigated. The profit functions of the manufacturer and the retailer include procurement costs, selling prices and cost for green level development and then it is analyzed by calculus method to obtain the optimal values of the decision variables. The model 2 focuses on price competition of two substitute products where demand of the end customers depends on price and quality of green product. Both the firms of green and regular products manufacturer are corporate social responsible. In this model, profit functions of the firms 1 & 2 are formulated separately considering revenues from sales items, cost of green quality and contribution for activities of social responsibility. The main objective is to find out optimal prices and green quality in order to maximize the profit functions of individual and integrated systems. The proposed models are analyzed mathematically and numerical examples are illustrated to justify the feasibility of the model in reality.
Journal Article
OPTIMAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES WITH FINANCIAL FRICTIONS
Is there a role for governments in emerging countries to accelerate economic development by intervening in product and factor markets? To address this question, we study optimal dynamic Ramsey policies in a standard growth model with financial frictions. The optimal policy intervention involves pro-business policies like suppressed wages in early stages of the transition, resulting in higher entrepreneurial profits and faster wealth accumulation. This, in turn, relaxes borrowing constraints in the future, leading to higher labor productivity and wages. In the long run, optimal policy reverses sign and becomes pro-worker. In a multi-sector extension, optimal policy subsidizes sectors with a latent comparative advantage and, under certain circumstances, involves a depreciated real exchange rate. Our results provide an efficiency rationale, but also identify caveats, for many of the development policies actively pursued by dynamic emerging economies.
Journal Article
Platform Competition with Multihoming on Both Sides: Subsidize or Not?
A major result in the study of two-sided platforms is the strategic interdependence between the two sides of the same platform, leading to the implication that a platform can maximize its total profits by subsidizing one of its sides. We show that this result largely depends on assuming that at least one side of the market single-homes. As technology makes joining multiple platforms easier, we increasingly observe that participants on both sides of two-sided platforms multihome. The case of multihoming on both sides is mostly ignored in the literature on competition between two-sided platforms. We help to fill this gap by developing a model for platform competition in a differentiated setting (a Hotelling line), which is similar to other models in the literature but focuses on the case where at least some agents on each side multihome. We show that when both sides in a platform market multihome, the strategic interdependence between the two sides of the same platform will diminish or even disappear. Our analysis suggests that the common strategic advice to subsidize one side in order to maximize total profits may be limited or even incorrect when both sides multihome, which is an important caveat given the increasing prevalence of multihoming in platform markets.
This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy
.
Journal Article