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The panel approach with fixed effects and nonlinear weather effects has become a popular method to uncover weather impacts on economic outcomes, but its ability to capture long-run climatic adaptation remains unclear. Building upon a framework proposed by McIntosh and Schlenker (2006), this paper identifies empirical conditions under which the nonlinear panel approach can approximate a long-run response to climate. When these conditions fail, the obtained relationship may still be interpretable as a weighted average of underlying short-run and long-run responses. We use this decomposition to revisit recently published climate impact estimates. For spatially large panels, the estimated temperature-outcome relationship mostly reflects the long-run climatic response; this is not so for precipitation. We find some evidence of long-run climatic adaptation for crop yield outcomes in the United States and France.

Managers are required to disclose material climate risk in Form 10-K, but their decision whether or not to disclose is confounded by the lack of consensus on whether climate risk is material to the firms, as well as uncertainty about enforcement of disclosure regulations. Using the SASB Materiality Map™ to proxy for market expectations of climate risk materiality, we test whether the association between disclosing climate risk in 10-Ks and firm risk (proxied by cost of equity (COE)) varies with market expectations of climate risk materiality. Using S&P 500 firms’ decisions whether to disclose climate risk in Form 10-K for 2008 to 2016, we find that disclosing firms’ COE is 27 bps lower than nondisclosing firms’ COE. In industries where the market expects climate risk to be material, disclosing firms’ COE is 50 bps lower than nondisclosing firms’, while in industries where the market does not expect climate risk to be material, disclosing firms’ COE is 23 bps lower than nondisclosing firms’. Our results indicate that markets use expectations of climate risk materiality to infer the credibility of managers’ climate risk disclosure decisions. Our research contributes to policy-making on climate risk disclosures in regulatory filings and informs the debate around the costs and benefits of the SEC’s current proposal to enhance climate risk disclosures.

Geophysicists examine and document the repercussions for the earth’s climate induced by alternative emission scenarios and model specifications. Using simplified approximations, they produce tractable characterizations of the associated uncertainty. Meanwhile, economists write highly stylized damage functions to speculate about how climate change alters macroeconomic and growth opportunities. How can we assess both climate and emissions impacts, as well as uncertainty in the broadest sense, in social decision-making? We provide a framework for answering this question by embracing recent decision theory and tools from asset pricing, and we apply this structure with its interacting components to a revealing quantitative illustration.

According to our survey about climate risk perceptions, institutional investors believe climate risks have financial implications for their portfolio firms and that these risks, particularly regulatory risks, already have begun to materialize. Many of the investors, especially the long-term, larger, and ESG-oriented ones, consider risk management and engagement, rather than divestment, to be the better approach for addressing climate risks. Although surveyed investors believe that some equity valuations do not fully reflect climate risks, their perceived overvaluations are not large.

Strong regulatory actions are needed to combat climate change, but climate policy uncertainty makes it difficult for investors to quantify the impact of future climate regulation. We show that such uncertainty is priced in the option market. The cost of option protection against downside tail risks is larger for firms with more carbon-intense business models. For carbon-intense firms, the cost of protection against downside tail risk is magnified at times when the public’s attention to climate change spikes, and it decreased after the election of climate change skeptic President Trump.

We propose and implement a procedure to dynamically hedge climate change risk. We extract innovations from climate news series that we construct through textual analysis of newspapers. We then use a mimicking portfolio approach to build climate change hedge portfolios. We discipline the exercise by using third-party ESG scores of firms to model their climate risk exposures. We show that this approach yields parsimonious and industrybalanced portfolios that perform well in hedging innovations in climate news both in sample and out of sample. We discuss multiple directions for future research on financial approaches to managing climate risk.

Using a comprehensive database of coastal home sales merged with data on elevation relative to local tides, we compare prices for houses based on their inundation threshold under projections of sea level rise. The analysis separates the sensitivity of housing to rising seas from other confounding characteristics by exploiting cross-sectional differences in relative sea level rise due to vertical land motion. This provides variation in the expected time to inundation for properties of similar elevation and distance from the coast. In a variety of specifications and test settings, we find precisely estimated null results suggesting limited price effects.

This essay addresses the climate-change externality—its sources, its potential impacts, and the policy tools that are available to stem the rising tides and damages that this externality will likely bring to humans and the natural world. It draws upon my writings in the area, most of which are cited in the references.

We find that people revise their beliefs about climate change upward when experiencing warmer than usual temperatures in their area. Using international data, we show that attention to climate change, as proxied by Google search volume, increases when the local temperature is abnormally high. In financial markets, stocks of carbon-intensive firms underperform firms with low carbon emissions in abnormally warm weather. Retail investors (not institutional investors) sell carbon-intensive firms in such weather, and return patterns are unlikely to be driven by changes in fundamentals. Our study sheds light on peoples’ collective beliefs and actions about global warming.

We examine the economic impacts of risk disclosures in accounting reports on the real decisions made by information senders (i.e., managers of the disclosing firms). In so doing, we exploit the SEC rule enacted in 2010 regarding climate change risk (CCR) reporting in 10-Ks as a quasi-natural experimental setting in which to apply a difference-in-differences analysis. We focus on CCR because of its vast influence on economic activities and the relative ease of identifying managerial behaviors related to climate change. Our results reveal that CCR-disclosing firms tend to engage more (less) in pro-environmental (anti-environmental) activities after the SEC 2010 rule. These real effects are more pronounced in firms that are under higher pressure from climate-minded external stakeholders and when firms’ businesses are more sensitive to climate change-related risks. We also find improved environmental performance in terms of reductions in the quantity, intensity, and cost of carbon emissions surrounding the SEC 2010 rule. Overall, our findings suggest that CCR disclosures alter corporate behaviors and help curb climate change.