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I argue that deflationary theories of truth reveal an important lesson for the broader theory of truth: although the notion of truthmaking has played an essential role in many traditional theories of truth, it can be separated from and survive the rejection of substantive theories of truth. I argue that many of the traditional substantive theories of truth (correspondence, coherence, pragmatic) are unified in defining truth in terms of the ontological grounds (or truthmakers) that are needed to account for truth. Deflationists reject the idea that a theory of truth needs such metaphysical implications, but in so doing they need not rule out the possibility of developing an independently motivated theory of truthmaking. I argue that deflationists can and should embrace truthmaker theory, once it is shorn from its connection to the traditional project of defining truth.

Recently, some philosophers have suggested that a form of robust realism about ethics, or normativity more generally, does not face a significant explanatory burden in metaphysics. I call this view metaphysically quietist normative realism. This paper argues that while this view can appear to constitute an attractive alternative to more traditional forms of normative realism, it cannot deliver on this promise. I examine Scanlon's attempt to defend such a quietist realism, and argue that rather than silencing metaphysical questions about normative reasons, his defense at best succeeds only in\\ shifting the focus of metaphysical enquiry. I then set aside the details of Scanlon's view, and argue on general grounds that that the quietist realist cannot finesse a crucial metanormative task: to explain the contrast between the correct normative system and alternative putatively normative standards.

This article examines the positions of the quietist Salafist movement regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, based on an analysis of the speeches of Salafist clerics and preachers. It highlights the movement's characteristic apoliticism and its consistent critique of jihadist groups. The analysis traces the stances of these actors before the October 7, 2023 attacks and shows that the adjustments made afterward remained marginal, without altering their fundamental orientation.

Hume criticizes Malebranche for endorsing an “abstract theory of morals” founded on reason that leaves no role for sentiment. One response in the literature argues that although Malebranche started by endorsing the kind of “abstract” morality Hume rejects, he increasingly replaced this with an incompatible “sensible” morality based on “physical motives” deriving from pleasure. However, I argue that a basis for both moralities is present in Malebranche from the start, and indeed that they are compatible parts of a single morality. In developing this argument, I draw particularly on his contribution to the dispute in early modern France over a Quietist account of “pure love.” This contribution reveals that although he did accept the sort of theory of moral truth that Hume criticized, Malebranche at the same time endorsed a theory of moral motivation that is similar in important respects to what we find in Hume.

Hilary Putnam (1926–2016) was prone to change his mind on variety of philosophical issues and almost constantly to modify his views. The last period of the development of his philosophy is known as the phase of commonsense or natural realism, eloquently presented in his 1994 Dewey Lectures. This paper is focused on three facets of his position and tries to identify three difficulties it encounters. Firstly, Putnam claims that in the contemporary realism debate we have, on the one hand, proponents of extravagant metaphysical realism, and, on the other hand, advocates of various versions of irresponsible antirealism. Unfortunately, the delineation of the debate is too coarse-grained, since there are many forms of metaphysical realism, and lumping together various antirealisms is confusing and unhelpful. Secondly, Putnam’s naïve direct realism in the philosophy of perception seems incompatible with his transactional account of perception. Thirdly, for some time Putnam was under a spell of Wittgensteinian quietism that distorted the true character of his philosophical ideas.

Scientific realism is usually presented as if metaphysical realism (i.e. the thesis that there is a structured mind-independent external world) were one of its essential parts. This paper aims to examine how weak the metaphysical commitments endorsed by scientific realists could be. I will argue that scientific realism could be stated without accepting any form of metaphysical realism. Such a conclusion does not go as far as to try to combine scientific realism with metaphysical antirealism. Instead, it amounts to the combination of the former with a weaker view, called quietism, which is agnostic on the existence of mind-independent structures. In Sect.  2 , I will argue that the minimal claim that brings together every scientific realist view is devoid of any metaphysical commitment. In Sect.  3 , I will define metaphysical realism and antirealism. Such work will be instrumental in providing a more precise statement of quietism. Finally (Sect.  4 ), I will argue that assuming quietism, it is still possible to make sense of the debate between scientific realists and antirealists.

This article focuses on contemporary Salafism in the European context and how it speaks to the categories Wiktorowicz put forth in his seminal 2006 article. Specifically, it examines how we can identify, describe, and classify the main forms of Salafist religiosity in the context of Western European countries. Furthermore, by examining the relationship to politics, preaching, and orthodoxy and orthopraxy in several European societies, this analysis contributes to the debate on the typologies of Salafism and proposes new ways of conceiving and distinguishing the forms of attachment to this vision of Islam in the context of countries where this religion is a minority. It also shows that the fundamentalist and radical currents are even more attached to it despite or because of the strong attention they receive from the public authorities and the media.

Pragmatism's heartening recent revival (spearheaded by Richard Rorty's bold intervention into analytic philosophy Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature) has coalesced into a distinctive philosophical movement frequently referred to as ‘neopragmatism’. This movement interprets the very meaning of pragmatism as rejection of metaphysical commitments: our words do not primarily serve to represent non-linguistic entities, but are tools to achieve a range of human purposes. A particularly thorough and consistent version of this position is Huw Price's global expressivism. We here critically appraise Price's understanding of a commitment to pragmatism as a rejection of metaphysics, and argue that such rejection is not as easy or desirable as Price claims. First we argue that Price's global expressivism itself draws on significant metaphysical assumptions (a ‘word-world’ dualism, and a nominalism concerning the meaning of general terms). Then we seek to resolve neopragmatist anxieties about metaphysics by arguing that metaphysics is indispensable for pragmatist philosophizing insofar as it seeks ways for human beings to realise themselves through practices of understanding reality and their place in it. If, as we argue, metaphysics consists in a maximally general inquiry into the nature and structure of reality, to try to block it seems a puzzling exercise in epistemic self-harm.

The political outlook of the so-called ‘Anonymus Iamblichi’ (DK 89) has been a subject of controversy in the scholarly literature, with some commentators judging him to be a committed democrat, while others see in him a partisan of aristocracy or even oligarchy. This disagreement is not surprising, for the text contains passages that seem to pull in opposite directions. The article suggests that we move beyond the one-dimensional oligarch-or-democrat model traditionally employed and instead approach the issue from a fresh angle, applying the more nuanced typology for understanding ancient social criticism (‘rejectionist’ vs ‘immanent’) developed by Josiah Ober. The article begins by situating the author within the social landscape of classical Athens. The resulting characterization presents the author as a representative of a distinctive social type: the Athenian ‘rich quietist’, who prefers private economic endeavours to engagement in public affairs, and who is ideologically committed to democratic government but also highly critical of how democratic society treats its wealthy citizens. This characterization helps make better sense of the seemingly contradictory political indications in the text. In particular, fragments 6 and 7 should be read as a single line of argument, which takes the form of an ‘immanent critique’ of contemporary Athenian democracy. According to ‘Anonymus Iamblichi’, democratic society rightly praises the rule of law as a distinctive democratic value, but it falls disappointingly short of that ideal in its treatment of its own wealthy elite citizens.