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Customers in the US and Canada please order from Stanford University Press at (800) 621-2736 or visit their website at www.sup.org. Over the 1980s and 1990s, most Latin American countries witnessed a retrenchment of the public sector from infrastructure provision and an opening up of infrastructure activities to the private sector. This book analyzes the consequences of these policy changes from two perspectives. First, it reviews in a comparative framework the major trends in infrastructure provision in Latin America over the last two decades. Second, it evaluates the implication of these trends for economic growth and public deficits in the region. The book shows that in most countries private participation did not fully offset the public sector retrenchment. The result was a slowdown in infrastructure accumulation, which entailed a significant growth cost and weakened the intended impact of the infrastructure spending cuts on public sector insolvency. “This fascinating book highlights a neglected cost of two decades of fiscal austerity in Latin America. The authors' careful analysis reveals that the decline in public investment in infrastructure may have been expensive not only for growth, but for long-term fiscal solvency as well. Deserves to be read by every IMF economist (and many others besides).” Dani Rodrik, Harvard University

We investigate the role that regulatory strictness plays on the enforcement of financial reporting transparency in the U.S. banking industry. Using a novel measure of regulatory strictness in the enforcement of capital adequacy, we show that strict regulators are more likely to enforce restatements of banks' call reports. Further, we find that the effect of regulatory strictness on accounting enforcement is strongest in periods leading up to economic downturns and for banks with riskier asset portfolios. Overall, the results from our study indicate that regulatory oversight plays an important role in enforcing financial reporting transparency, particularly in periods leading up to economic crises. We interpret this evidence as inconsistent with the idea that strict bank regulators put significant weight on concerns about the potential destabilizing effects of accounting transparency.

Critics argue that fair value provisions in U. S. accounting rules exacerbated the recent financial crisis by depleting banks' regulatory capital, which curtailed lending and triggered asset sales, leading to further economic turmoil. Defenders counter-argue that the fair value provisions were insufficient to lead to the pro-cyclical effects alleged by the critics. Our evidence indicates that these provisions did not affect the commercial banking industry in the ways commonly alleged by critics.First, we show that fair value accounting losses had minimal effect on regulatory capital.Then, we examine sales of securities during the crisis, finding mixed evidence that banks sold securities in response to capital-depleting charges. However, the sales that potentially resulted from the charges appear to be economically insignificant, as there was no industry-or firm-level increase in sales of securities during the crisis.

Did regulatory reforms that lowered barriers to competition increase or decrease the quality of information that banks disclose to the public? By integrating the gravity model of investment with the state-specific process of bank deregulation that occurred in the United States from the 1980s through the 1990s, we develop a bank-specific, time-varying measure of deregulation-induced competition. We find that an intensification of competition reduced abnormal accruals of loan loss provisions and the frequency with which banks restate financial statements. The results suggest that competition reduces bank opacity, potentially enhancing the ability of markets to monitor banks.

The institutions of global governance have changed dramatically in recent years. New organizational forms—including informal institutions, transgovernmental networks, and private transnational regulatory organizations (PTROs)—have expanded rapidly, while the growth of formal intergovernmental organizations has slowed. Organizational ecology provides an insightful framework for understanding these changing patterns of growth. Organizational ecology is primarily a structural theory, emphasizing the influence of institutional environments, especially their organizational density and resource availability, on organizational behavior and viability. To demonstrate the explanatory value of organizational ecology, we analyze the proliferation of PTROs compared with the relative stasis of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). Continued growth of IGOs is constrained by crowding in their dense institutional environment, but PTROs benefit from organizational flexibility and low entry costs, which allow them to enter “niches” with limited resource competition. We probe the plausibility of our analysis by examining contemporary climate governance.

We examine the impact of audit committee (AC) characteristics (e.g. AC foreign members, AC female members, AC members with multiple directorships, AC members with share ownership and AC with financial and supervisory expertise) on forward-looking disclosure (FLD) quality and quantity. Using a sample of Omani financial companies listed on Muscat Securities Market over a five-year period (2014–2018), we find that a number of AC characteristics (such as AC size, AC female members and AC with multiple directorships) improve FLD quality. We make no such observation for FLD quantity. The results suggest that the responsibility of AC extends to improving the quality of FLD. We provide an additional analysis on the impact of AC effectiveness (ACE) on FLD quality, which suggests that companies’ compliance with CG code is beneficial for disclosure quality. We also find that the impact of ACE on FLD quality is influenced by corporate performance, leverage and the quality of external auditors. Our findings carry implications for the regulatory bodies’ efforts in encouraging companies to improve disclosure quality by considering AC characteristics as well as appointing more effective AC directors.

I study the association between bank financial reporting opacity, measured by delayed expected loan loss recognition, and the intervention decisions made by bank regulators. Examining U.S. commercial banks during the 2007–09 financial crisis, I find that delayed expected loan loss recognition is negatively associated with the likelihood of regulatory intervention (measured by either severe enforcement action or closure). This result is robust to using various specifications and research designs. In additional analyses, I find evidence suggesting that this association is driven by regulators exploiting financial reporting opacity to practice forbearance. My findings contribute to the extant literature on bank opacity, regulatory forbearance, and the consequences of loan loss provisioning by suggesting that delayed expected loan loss recognition affects regulatory intervention decisions.

We examine the relation between four dimensions of national culture and earnings quality of banks using a sample of banks from 39 countries. Our main analysis, which focuses on the pre-financial crisis period 1993-2006, indicates that banks in high individualism high masculinity, and low uncertainty avoidance societies manage earnings to just-meet-or-beat the prior year's earnings. In tests of income smoothing through loan loss provisions, we find that banks in high individualism, high power distance, and low uncertainty avoidance societies report smoother earnings. Our exploratory analysis of the effects of national culture on accounting outcomes during the financial crisis period 2007-2008 indicates that cultures that encourage higher risk-taking experienced more bank troubles in the form of larger losses or larger loan loss provisions.

This paper presents a comparative analysis of three American (Enron, WorldCom and HealthSouth) and three European (Parmalat, Royal Ahold and Vivendi Universal) corporate failures. The first part of the analysis is based on a theoretical framework including six areas of ethical climate; tone at the top; bubble economy and market pressure; fraudulent financial reporting; accountability, control, auditing, and governance; and management compensation. The second and third parts consider the analysis of these cases from fraud perspective and in terms of firm-specific characteristics (ownership structure) and environmental context (coverage in media and academic literature, regulatory and corporate governance frameworks). The research analyses shed light on the fact that, despite major differences between Europe and U.S. in terms of political institutions, laws and regulations as well as managerial practices, there are significant similarities between six groups. The analysis also demonstrates that, the ethical dilemma has been coupled with ineffective boards, inefficient corporate governance and control mechanisms, distorted incentive schemes, accounting irregularities, failure of auditors, dominant CEOs, dysfunctional management behavior and the lack of a sound ethical tone at the top. Significant similarities were also observed in the analysis from the fraud triangle perspective. However, there are several major differences between the six corporate failure cases particularly with regard to ownership structure, coverage in media, and legal, regulatory and governance frameworks. This research study may have several academic and practical contributions, particularly because of multidisciplinary, international features, and comparative analyses used in the paper.

Regulatory capital guidelines allow for loan loss reserves to be added back as capital. Our evidence suggests that the influence of loan loss reserves added back as regulatory capital (hereafter referred to as “add-backs”) on bank risk cannot be explained by either economic principles underlying the notion of capital or accounting principles underlying the recording of reserves. Specifically, we observe that, in sharp contrast to the economic notion of capital as a buffer against bank failure risk, add-backs are positively associated with the risk of bank failure during the recent economic crisis. Furthermore, the positive association of add-backs with bank failure risk is concentrated among cases in which the add-backs are highly likely to increase a bank’s total regulatory capital. The evidence cannot thus be fully explained by accounting principles either, since the role of loan loss reserves according to those principles does not depend on whether the reserves generate a regulatory capital increase. Additional analysis suggests that the observed influence of loan loss reserves on bank failure risk may be an unintended consequence of their regulatory treatment as capital.