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This article examines the issue of specifying the sematic ranges of the concepts of discontinuing futile therapy and euthanasia and determining their relationship, which translates into resolving the question of the legal (and moral) assessment of the behaviour in question and whether it is or can be identical in both cases. It is frequently said that futile therapy is prolonged dying and euthanasia is the shortening of life. The possibility of discontinuing a futile therapy, or even an order to do so, means that assessment of the legal nature of ceasing futile therapy takes on particular importance – an indication of the normative basis for a physician’s impunity, the prerequisites of that impunity and its , and a comparison of the findings with the prerequisites and of the crime of euthanasia. It seems that the arguments for the possibility of discontinuing futile therapy are arguments for the admissibility of (active and passive) euthanasia. This means that the postulate of the statutory regulation of the prerequisites for discontinuing futile therapy must be linked to the postulate of making these provisions consistent with criminal law regulations, , in the area of euthanasia.

In this article, the consequential dispute with Kephas in Antioch, as Paul relates it in Gal 2,11–14, is examined primarily in the light of the language of the documentary papyri and inscriptions. The focus is not on theological or chronological questions, but – from a reader-oriented perspective – on the way the narrative might have been received by the addressees of the letter. The bylaws of selected ancient associations with various measures against inappropriate behavior during meetings serve to place the incident in the appropriate cultural context. With regard to the divisions caused by Kephas and Paul’s fierce reaction, the question is asked whether the pragmatic intention of the author and the reception on the part of the addressees necessarily corresponded or whether a more complex communication situation should be assumed.

Recent contributions within the system of innovation approach are marked by an instrumentalism that views innovation as a predictable and standardized process that in most aspects counters theories and empirical observations stressing the multilevel, spontaneous and complex features of innovation. Informed by the relational turn within economic geography this paper develops an alternative analytical framework. We do this stepwise: first, by elaborating on how innovation was originally defined within the systems of innovation approach; second, by outlining a relational based analytical framework based on the concept of social fields; and, finally, by demonstrating how it has been applied.

This article presents a theoretical discussion of the concept of public space with respect to its multidimensional nature, its normativity and historicity, and its relationship to private space. Based on de Certeau’s distinction between place and space, public space is analysed as a phenomenon transcending the material reality of a city. It is argued that public space is established in the process of interaction between the social reality of the city on the one hand and its regulative processes on the other. The former refers in particular to the phenomenological duality of urban public places, which are perceived as attractive and threatening at the same time. The latter includes internal and external processes of behavioural regulation. Following the classic works of Goffman and Lofland and current research on urban civility and interaction, it is argued that internal regulation establishes an ‘urban order’ that governs the rules of interaction and behaviour in the urban public space. In conclusion, an interpretative approach to the urban public space is suggested. In this view, the public space, while physically framed by the city’s material reality, is itself a process of constant production and reproduction of shared meanings attached to places. As a shared stock of knowledge, it is also subject to learning and ongoing negotiation.

Le mot éthique vient du mot grec ... , qui signifie morale, qui lui-même est un dérivé du mot ... , qui signifie manière d'être, habitudes, moeurs. Selon le Dictionnaire historique de la langue française (Rey, 1992), le mot éthique est apparu en français d'abord comme substantif, vers 1265, puis comme adjectif, en 1553. Dans le premier cas, c'est un emprunt au latin ethica, qui signifie morale (en tant que partie de la philosophie), lui-même un emprunt au grec ... , neutre substantivé de ... . Dans le deuxième cas, c'est un emprunt au latin ethicus, qui signifie qui concerne les moeurs, moral, également du grec ... . Étymologiquement, le sens du mot éthique se rapproche de celui du mot morale, qui prend sa racine de l'étymon latin mores, qui équivaut à moeurs ou encore de moralis, qui signifie relatif aux moeurs. Toutefois, les mots éthique et morale ne sauraient être considérés comme des synonymes. En effet, l'éthique est plutôt la science et l'étude de la morale et des moeurs. C'est une discipline philosophique qui réfléchit sur les finalités, sur les valeurs de l'existence, sur les conditions d'une vie heureuse, sur les notions du bien et du mal, ou sur des questions de moeurs ou de morale. L'éthique peut également être définie comme une réflexion sur les comportements à adopter pour rendre le monde humainement habitable. En cela, l'éthique est une recherche d'idéal de société et de conduite de l'existence. Elle s'actualise par des comportements qui sont issus de valeurs morales. Un code d'éthique rédigé pour guider des personnes dans l'exercice d'une profession décrit à la fois les exigences en termes de normes comportementales et les valeurs d'où sont issues ces exigences. Pour favoriser la réflexion éthique, un code d'éthique ira jusqu'à proposer une procédure à suivre pour en arriver à définir le meilleur comportement éthique possible à adopter dans une situation donnée. [Il] existe des différences fondamentales entre la déontologie et l'éthique. Ces différences sont perceptibles dans le Code de déontologie des psychologues du Québec et dans le Code canathen d'éthique pour les psychologues. De par la nature de son type de discours et son approche à l'éthique, le code de déontologie de l'OPQ ne peut prétendre à l'éthique au même titre que le code d'éthique de la SCP. Par contre, il importe de garder en tête que ces deux codes ont été établis dans des contextes différents pour répondre à des besoins différents. Le code de l'OPQ a la vertu de clairement définir les devoirs et les obligations dont doivent s'acquitter les psychologues dans le cadre de l'exercice de leurs activités professionnelles. Par contre, il s'agit d'exigences minimales : le code ne dit pas ce qu'il faut faire dans certaines situations complexes ni ne dit pas comment s'y prendre pour adopter la conduite qui convient le mieux à la situation. Le code de la SCP a été élaboré expressément dans le but de guider la conduite, la réflexion et la prise de décision éthique des psychologues. Il s'ensuit que le code de la SCP pourrait être un excellent complément au code de l'OPQ et que les psychologues et les futurs psychologues au Québec gagneraient à le connaître. Il leur appartient de l'étudier et de s'y référer. Il appartient à la SCP de faire tout en son pouvoir pour en faciliter à la fois l'accès et l'étude au profit des psychologues francophones, actuels et futurs.

Around the world, it is increasingly being recognized that for sustainability goals to be reached, efforts need to go beyond complying with standards and mitigating adverse impacts, to identifying environmental sustainability as an objective of the development process. This approach requires the integration of environmental, sustainability, and climate change considerations into policy and sector reform. Because sector reform brings about significant policy change involving adjustments in laws, policies, regulations, and institutions, it is a sensitive political process often driven by strong economic interests. Policy makers are subject to a number of political pressures that originate in vested interests. The recommendations of environmental assessment are often of little relevance unless there are constituencies that support them and have sufficient political power to make their voices heard in the policy process. While strong constituencies are important during the design of sector reform, they are even more important during implementation. It follows that effective environmental assessment in policy and sector reform requires strong constituencies backing up recommendations, a system to hold policy makers accountable for their decisions, and institutions that can balance competing and, sometimes, conflicting interests.

Two tort law tenets are broadly accepted. First, litigants are to be judged based on their conduct, not on their character. In tort law, if not in heaven, the sinner is entitled to the same treatment as the saint. Second, it’s also broadly understood that, as comparative negligence supplanted contributory fault in the latter years of the last century, compensation stopped being binary; recovery became proportional. When, as is very often the case, the plaintiff and the defendant both err, the plaintiff’s entitlement to compensation is a matter of more or less, not yes or no. Against that backdrop, this Essay identifies four doctrines—the wrongful conduct rule, the “innocence” prerequisite to legal malpractice actions, the non-innocent party doctrine, and the complicity defense—that implicitly challenge both of these bedrock principles. We show how these “wrongdoer doctrines” extinguish claims, not just because of what the plaintiff has done but, rather, who the plaintiff is. And we also explore the doctrines’ other infirmities. Namely, these doctrines subvert the basic goals of tort law, authorize character assassination, defy consistent or principled application, rest on a false premise, and operate to resurrect a stealth version of contributory fault. Finally, this Essay, written for a symposium celebrating the great tort cases of the 21st century, highlights a recent opinion out of West Virginia that unmasked one such doctrine and appropriately relegated it to the dustbin of history.

In this paper we set out to deepen our understanding of the importance of fairness in decision-making within the context of Prisoners' Dilemma games. A review of the \"historic\" Flood-Dresher experiment provides a useful empirical basis, as it allows us to look in considerable detail at how the experimental players made up their minds. We try out several game-theoretical readings of the experimental results, and find some value in Adam Smith's age-old concept of rules of conduct. We find that fairness considerations are much more than mere excuses for taking a free ride or pointers to focal points. They seem to play a considerable role both at a conscious and at a less-than-conscious level.