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This Article contributes toward the growing body of literature addressing the burgeoning gap between normative and empirical accounts of constitutional change in the constitutional order of the European Union. It does so by shining a light on how the European Parliament, acting through its unilateral procedural rule making powers, has managed to wield its limited formal constitutional clout to alter the balance of powers between the core Union institutions, and to define its own role in the development of the political component to the EU’s constitutional culture. Given the European Parliament cannot be dissolved, and given there is at least the potential for such rule making power to be put to unconstitutional ends, the Article also considers the extent to which judicial oversight of this particular form of informal constitutional change is possible, and the form it may take should the validity of a particular procedural rule be challenged.

The article provides a critical assessment of the 2024 reform of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, combining the analysis of the amended provisions of Protocol No 3 and the Rules of Procedure of both the Court of Justice and General Court. To that aim, the contribution takes a procedural standpoint on the topic, with a view to paving the way to the various perspectives featured in the Special Section. Focusing on the transfer of jurisdiction on preliminary references, the article discusses the rationales behind the selection of ‘areas of law’ subject to devolution, thereby disclosing that the reform leaves a ‘variable geometry’ scope to the Court of Justice for being involved in cases in any domain of EU law. That part of the analysis is complemented by assessing the new filing and distributing mechanism for preliminary references (guichet unique), the revision mechanism for preliminary rulings issued by the General Court, and the latter’s new procedural framework for treating preliminary references. While the procedure has been designed in a way to mirror that already applied by the Court of Justice, the article argues that the General Court’s distinctive features may significantly impact the way in which it deals with preliminary references. The analysis then discusses the design and consequences of the new provisions on participation in preliminary references and publication of parties’ written submissions, as well as the rationales and impact of extending the scope of application of the prior admission on appeal mechanism.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2025 10(2), 293-326 | Article | (Table of Contents) 1. Introduction: scope and purposes of the analysis. – 2. The partial transfer of preliminary references from the Court to the General Court. – 2.1. The scope of the General Court’s jurisdiction on preliminary references. – 2.2. The guichet unique mechanism. – 2.3. The procedure for hearing and determining preliminary references at the General Court. – 2.4. The revision of preliminary rulings issued by the General Court. – 3. The new rules on transparency and participation in preliminary reference proceedings. – 4. The extension of the scope of application of the filtering mechanism on appeal. – 5. Not a conclusion but… rather a way forward. | (Abstract) The article provides a critical assessment of the 2024 reform of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, combining the analysis of the amended provisions of Protocol No 3 and the Rules of Procedure of both the Court of Justice and General Court. To that aim, the contribution takes a procedural standpoint on the topic, with a view to paving the way to the various perspectives featured in the Special Section. Focusing on the transfer of jurisdiction on preliminary references, the article discusses the rationales behind the selection of ‘areas of law’ subject to devolution, thereby disclosing that the reform leaves a ‘variable geometry’ scope to the Court of Justice for being involved in cases in any domain of EU law. That part of the analysis is complemented by assessing the new filing and distributing mechanism for preliminary references (guichet unique), the revision mechanism for preliminary rulings issued by the General Court, and the latter’s new procedural framework for treating preliminary references. While the procedure has been designed in a way to mirror that already applied by the Court of Justice, the article argues that the General Court’s distinctive features may significantly impact the way in which it deals with preliminary references. The analysis then discusses the design and consequences of the new provisions on participation in preliminary references and publication of parties’ written submissions, as well as the rationales and impact of extending the scope of application of the prior admission on appeal mechanism.

The historical development of rules of debate in the UK House of Commons raises an important puzzle: why do members of parliament (MPs) impose limits on their own rights? Despite a growing interest in British Political Development and the institutional changes of nineteenth-century UK politics, the academic literature has remained largely silent on this topic. Three competing explanations have emerged in studies of the US Congress, focusing on efficiency, partisan forces and non-partisan (or: ideology-based) accounts. This article falls broadly into the third category, offering a consensus-oriented explanation of the historical development of parliamentary rules. Working from a new dataset on the reform of standing orders in the House of Commons over a 205-year period (1811–2015), as well as records of over six million speeches, the author argues that MPs commit more quickly to passing restrictive rules in the face of obstruction when legislator preferences are proximate within both the opposition and government, and when polarization between both sides of the aisle is low. The research represents, to the author's knowledge, the first systematic and directional test of a range of competing theories of UK parliamentary reform, shedding light on the process of parliamentary reform over a prolonged period of Commons history, and advancing several new measures of polarization in the UK House of Commons.

Problem badawczy artykułu jest związany z jednym z ważniejszych elementów dziedzictwa kulturowego Hiszpanii – jej różnorodnością językową. Autorka postawiła sobie dwa cele: (1) ukazanie polityki językowej Hiszpanii od szczebla regionalnego po międzynarodowy, (2) przeprowadzenie wstępnej diagnozy skutków reformy regulaminu hiszpańskiego Kongresu Deputowanych z września 2023 r., która dała możliwość posługiwania się w pracach tej izby wszystkimi językami mającymi status języków urzędowych na szczeblu regionalnym. Podstawową metodą badawczą podczas pisania artykułu była analiza dostępnej literatury przedmiotu oraz materiałów źródłowych w językach: polskim, hiszpańskim i angielskim. W świetle przeprowadzonych badań autorka doszła do wniosku, że jest jeszcze zbyt wcześnie, aby jednoznacznie ocenić skutki reformy. Już teraz jednak można wskazać plusy i minusy takiego rozwiązania. Do pozytywów należy zaliczyć m.in. promocję języków mniejszościowych i dowartościowanie ich użytkowników, do negatywów zaś – zbyt szybkie tempo wprowadzonych zmian i brak konsensusu wśród największych sił politycznych, wysokie koszty tłumaczeń, pozbawianie języka kastylijskiego (jedynego w myśl Konstytucji języka urzędowego w Hiszpanii) pozycji nadrzędnej, możliwość pojawienia się nieścisłości translatorskich oraz sporów i nieporozumień wśród polityków. The research problem of the article relates to one of the most important elements of Spain’s cultural heritage – its linguistic diversity. The author has set two objectives: (1) to show the linguistic policy of Spain from the regional to the international level; and (2) to carry out a preliminary diagnosis of the effects of the September 2023 reform of the Spanish Congress of Deputies’ rules of procedure, which provide for the ability to use all languages with official status at the regional level in the work of this chamber. The primary research method while writing the article consisted of an analysis of the available literature on the subject and source materials in Polish, Spanish, and English. In the light of the research carried out, the author has come to the conclusion that it is still too early to assess the effects of the reform unequivocally. However, pros and cons can already be identified. Positives include the promotion of minority languages and the appreciation of their users, while the negatives include the too rapid pace of change and the lack of consensus among major political forces, the high cost of translation, the deprivation of Castilian (the only official language in Spain under the Constitution) of its superior position, the possibility of inaccurate translation, and disputes and misunderstandings among politicians.

Dans le prolongement de la Révolution de juillet 1830, la Charte constitutionnelle du 4 juin 1814 fait l’objet d’une révision constitutionnelle qui a pour principal objectif de manifester son caractère éminemment contractuel, celui d’un pacte conclu entre le peuple français et le nouveau Roi qu’il a lui-même choisi. Institutionnellement, cela se traduit principalement par la volonté d’un rééquilibrage des rôles respectifs des Chambres législatives et du Roi dans l’exercice de la prérogative souveraine par excellence : celle d’édicter la loi. À une époque où les dispositions théoriques des textes constitutionnels français ne déterminent qu’assez faiblement le fonctionnement des institutions, les Règlements intérieurs des deux Chambres législatives sont dès lors un moyen privilégié pour fixer les choses en pratique, en particulier celui de la Chambre des députés. Ce n’est donc pas un hasard, si dès le mois d’août 1830, cette dernière procède à une révision de son Règlement ; révision d’autant plus importante que, de son issue, allait dépendre la possibilité d’accentuer ou non la parlementarisation du nouveau régime. Or, si ce moment révisionnel semble, a priori , propice pour rompre définitivement avec les pratiques du régime déchu, dans les faits, force est de constater que la tradition et le conservatisme l’emportent largement dans les rangs des députés. Si une révolution politique était inévitable, dans leur esprit le désordre ne peut cependant se pérenniser et les solutions retenues lors de cette révision marquent justement un coup d’arrêt à cet élan libéral à l’œuvre depuis les Trois Glorieuses. À ce titre, cet épisode est annonciateur de l’avènement de cette politique de la « Résistance » qui, tout au long du régime de Juillet, ne cessera de repousser toute velléité de changement au profit d’un conservatisme qui mènera le régime à sa perte. Following the Revolution of July 1830, the Constitutional Charter of 4 June 1814 is subjected to a constitutional revision whose main objective is to demonstrate its eminently contractual character that of a pact made between the French people and the new King they themselves chose. Institutionally, this is mainly reflected in the desire to rebalance the respective roles of the Legislative Chambers and the King in the exercise of the ultimate sovereign prerogative: enacting the law. At a time when French Constitutional texts’ theoretical statements only weakly describe the functioning of the institutions, the respective Rules of Procedure of the two Legislative Chambers are therefore a privileged way to fix things in practice, especially in the House of Deputies. Thus, it is not a coincidence if, as early as August 1830, the latter updates its internal rules; a revision even more important given that the possibility of intensifying or not the parliamentarization of the new political regime would depend on its outcome. However, if at first sight this revision seems favourable to break definitively with the practices of the ousted regime, in fact, it is clear that tradition and conservatism largely prevail in the ranks of politicians. If for most them a political revolution was inevitable, in their mind the disorder nevertheless cannot become permanent and, at that moment, the chosen solutions precisely put an end to this initial liberal impetus at work since the Three Glorious Days. For this reason, this episode can be seen as a sign of the subsequent advent of this policy of the « Resistance » which, throughout the July Monarchy, will not cease to reject any attempt of change for the benefit of a conservatism which will lead the regime to its demise.

The difficulties in negotiating a post-2012 regime of binding targets and timetables and the decisions of the US, Canada, and Russia on the Kyoto Protocol regime have led to pessimism about the future of the climate regime. Negotiation issues for different coalitions and actors are placed in a wider historical context by examining the key challenge facing the evolving long-term climate change negotiation process: the principled basis for the allocation of resources, responsibilities, rights, and risks between actors. Four theoretical approaches (problem structuring; negotiation theory; collective action and social practice models; legal theory) are applied to the climate regime. A principled approach is only a distributive approach from a narrow short-term perspective. It becomes an integrative approach from a longer-term perspective when it increases the pie, enhances the win–win opportunities and creates space for sustainable solutions to emerge. It is especially integrative when undertaken within the context of global rule of law, which is able to create predictable rules that apply to future global problems with different country interests. Will this happen? Climate justice movements and climate litigation have begun; statesmanship is still needed.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2017 2(2), 759-766 | European Forum Insight of 22 July 2017 | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. Dispositions applicables à toutes les demandes de décision préjudicielle. - II.1. L'auteur de la demande de décision préjudicielle. - II.2. L'objet et la portée de la demande de décision préjudicielle. - II.3. Le moment approprié pour opérer un renvoi préjudiciel. - II.4. La forme et le contenu de la demande de décision préjudicielle. - II.5. Les interactions entre le renvoi préjudiciel et la procédure nationale. - II.6. Les dépens et l'aide juridictionnelle. - II.7. Les échanges entre la Cour et la juridiction nationale. - III. Dispositions applicables aux demandes de décision préjudicielle nécessitant une célérité particulière. - III.1. Les conditions d'application de la procédure accélérée et de la procédure d'urgence. - III.2. La demande d'application de la procédure accélérée ou de la procédure d'urgence. - III.3. Les échanges entre la Cour, la juridiction de renvoi et les parties au litige au principal. | (Abstract) The latest version (published on the 25 November 2016) of the recommendations of the Court of Justice of the European Union to national courts and tribunals, in relation to the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings, is the actualisation of the former version of 2012. This new version introduces little change, in both the substance and the style, except for a few interesting precisions.

Over the last two decades, and culminating in a quartet of cases decided in the last two terms, the Supreme Court has erected a framework for determining when a rule is \"jurisdictional.\" This framework is important because questions of jurisdictionality routinely come up in federal litigation. Pressing the virtues of simplicity and clarity in jurisdictional mies to avoid the costs of mistaken assumptions of jurisdiction, the framework deploys clear-statement mles and formalistic, mle-based tests in an effort to be, in the Court's words, \"easy to apply\" and \"readily administrable.\" In this article, I expose the weaknesses of the Court's framework and show that the framework is neither administrable nor easy to apply, creates incoherence, and relies on shaky internal foundations. I then offer a series of fixes to the Court's framework to shore up its foundations.