Explore the vast range of titles available.

From the Publisher: A cultural history of the last forty years, The Age of American Unreason focuses on the convergence of social forces-usually treated as separate entities-that has created a perfect storm of anti-rationalism. These include the upsurge of religious fundamentalism, with more political power today than ever before; the failure of public education to create an informed citizenry; and the triumph of video over print culture. Sparing neither the right nor the left, Jacoby asserts that Americans today have embraced a universe of \"junk thought\" that makes almost no effort to separate fact from opinion.

From gruesome self-experimentation to exhausting theoretical calculations, stories abound of scientists willfully surrendering health, well-being, and personal interests for the sake of their work. What accounts for the prevalence of this coupling of knowledge and pain-and for the peculiar assumption that science requires such suffering? In this lucid and absorbing history, Rebecca M. Herzig explores the rise of an ethic of \"self-sacrifice\" in American science. Delving into some of the more bewildering practices of the Gilded Age and the Progressive Era, she describes when and how science-the supposed standard of all things judicious and disinterested-came to rely on an enthralled investigator willing to embrace toil, danger, and even lethal dismemberment. With attention to shifting racial, sexual, and transnational politics, Herzig examines the suffering scientist as a way to understand the rapid transformation of American life between the Civil War and World War I.Suffering for Science reveals more than the passion evident in many scientific vocations; it also illuminates a nation's changing understandings of the purposes of suffering, the limits of reason, and the nature of freedom in the aftermath of slavery.

Do religious arguments have a public role in the post-9/11 world? Can we hold democracy together despite fractures over moral issues? Are there moral limits on the struggle against terror? Asking how the citizens of modern democracy can reason with one another, this book carves out a controversial position between those who view religious voices as an anathema to democracy and those who believe democratic society is a moral wasteland because such voices are not heard. Drawing inspiration from Whitman, Dewey, and Ellison, Jeffrey Stout sketches the proper role of religious discourse in a democracy. He discusses the fate of virtue, the legacy of racism, the moral issues implicated in the war on terrorism, and the objectivity of ethical norms. Against those who see no place for religious reasoning in the democratic arena, Stout champions a space for religious voices. But against increasingly vocal antiliberal thinkers, he argues that modern democracy can provide a moral vision and has made possible such moral achievements as civil rights precisely because it allows a multitude of claims to be heard. Stout's distinctive pragmatism reconfigures the disputed area where religious thought, political theory, and philosophy meet. Charting a path beyond the current impasse between secular liberalism and the new traditionalism,Democracy and Traditionasks whether we have the moral strength to continue as a democratic people as it invigorates us to retrieve our democratic virtues from very real threats to their practice.

Rituals mark significant moments in our lives-perhaps none more significant than moments of lightheartedness, joy, and play. The rituals that bond humanity create our most transcendent experiences and meaningful memories. Rituals of play are among the most sacred of any of the rites in which humanity may engage. Although we may fail to recognize rituals of play, they are always present in culture, providing a kind of psychological release for their participants, child and adult alike. Ritual is central to storytelling. Story and practice are symbiotic. Their relationship reflects the vitality of the soul. Disneyland is an example of the kind of container necessary for the construction of rituals of play. This work explores the original Disney theme park in Anaheim as a temple cult. It challenges the disciplines of mythological studies, religious studies, film studies, and depth psychology to broaden traditional definitions of the kind of cultural apparatus that constitute temple culture and ritual. It does so by suggesting that Hollywood's entertainment industry has developed a platform for mythic ritual. After setting the ritualized \"stage\", this book turns to the practices in Disneyland proper, analyzing the patron's traditions within the framework of the park and beyond. It explores Disneyland's spectacles, through selected shows and parades, and concludes with an exploration of the park's participation in ritual renewal.

Background The 2022 Dobbs v. Jackson decision, which overturned Roe v. Wade , has given individual states more capacity to legislate abortion. State legislators have and continue to design and pass laws that restrict or ban abortion, often naming exceptions based on specific reasons (i.e., fetal health, woman’s health, rape). Given that these reasons often do not align with those reported by abortion-seekers, it is crucial to assess whether the U.S. public accurately understands why people seek abortions. This study explored a sample of U.S. adults’ perceptions of the three most common reasons why someone might get an abortion. Methods We analyzed open-ended data from two waves of a 2022 longitudinal survey ( n  = 681 participants; n  = 2,043 responses per wave; n  = 4,086 total responses) collected before and after the Dobbs decision in English and Spanish via Ipsos’s KnowledgePanel®. We explored three main research questions: (1) What does the U.S. public perceive to be the most common reasons for someone to seek abortion? (2) Are there differences in perceived reasons before and after the Dobbs v. Jackson decision? (3) Are there differences in perceived reasons across languages? Results Findings indicated that people perceive the three most common reasons to seek abortion to be: unwanted/unplanned pregnancy reasons , violence-related reasons , and health reasons . After the Dobbs decision, there was an increase in respondents mentioning that people have abortions for health reasons and financial reasons , and a decrease in responses related to unwanted/unplanned pregnancy reasons, not ready/unprepared reasons, and partner-related reasons . Additionally, we found significant differences in perceptions between languages (i.e., English and Spanish). We also note discrepancies between perceived reasons among our sample and reasons reported by abortion patients in national studies. Conclusions This study underscores the public’s misconceptions of reasons for seeking abortion and the importance of correcting such misunderstandings to ensure alignment of public sentiment and legislative and judicial policy post- Dobbs .

Can libertarians care about social justice? InFree Market Fairness, John Tomasi argues that they can and should. Drawing simultaneously on moral insights from defenders of economic liberty such as F. A. Hayek and advocates of social justice such as John Rawls, Tomasi presents a new theory of liberal justice. This theory, free market fairness, is committed to both limited government and the material betterment of the poor. Unlike traditional libertarians, Tomasi argues that property rights are best defended not in terms of self-ownership or economic efficiency but as requirements of democratic legitimacy. At the same time, he encourages egalitarians concerned about social justice to listen more sympathetically to the claims ordinary citizens make about the importance of private economic liberty in their daily lives. In place of the familiar social democratic interpretations of social justice, Tomasi offers a \"market democratic\" conception of social justice: free market fairness. Tomasi argues that free market fairness, with its twin commitment to economic liberty and a fair distribution of goods and opportunities, is a morally superior account of liberal justice. Free market fairness is also a distinctively American ideal. It extends the notion, prominent in America's founding period, that protection of property and promotion of real opportunity are indivisible goals. Indeed, according to Tomasi, free market fairness is social justice, American style. Provocative and vigorously argued,Free Market Fairnessoffers a bold new way of thinking about politics, economics, and justice--one that will challenge readers on both the left and right.

This article introduces a mode of social action and interaction that has so far been largely overlooked in the U.S.-dominated international relations debate between rational choice and social constructivism that focuses mainly on the differences between instrumental rationality and norm-guided behavior. Drawing on insights from a theoretical debate within the Germanspeaking international relations community, I suggest that actors have a third mode of social action at their disposal: arguing and deliberating about the validity claims inherent in any communicative statement about identities, interests, and the state of the world. Arguing and truth-seeking behavior presuppose that actors no longer hold fixed interests during their communicative interaction but are open to persuasion, challenges, and counterchallenges geared toward reaching a reasoned consensus. The preconditions for argumentative rationality, particularly a “common lifeworld” and the mutual recognition of speakers as equals in a nonhierarchical relationship, are more common in international relations than is usually assumed. Arguing processes are more likely to occur the more actors are uncertain about their interests and even identities, the less they know about the situation in which they find themselves and the underlying “rules of the game,” and the more apparently irreconcilable differences prevent them from reaching an optimal rather than a merely satisfactory solution for a widely perceived problem (“problem solving”). Moreover, arguing is likely to increase the influence of the materially less powerful, be it small states or nonstate actors such as INGOs. I illustrate these claims empirically with two plausibility probes. The first concerns the East–West talks leading to a negotiated settlement of the Cold War in Europe and German unification within NATO. The second case focuses on the implementation of international human rights norms into domestic practices of Third World states.

This article shows how “reasons of state” can sometimes influence end-of-life care decisions made by top politicians. Drawing on Ivan Illich’s concept of “medical nemesis” and the myth of Tithonus and Eos, it argues that the success of medicine in prolonging life can, paradoxically, increase suffering and raise ethical dilemmas, particularly when medicine is used to ensure the continuity of power. Through the analysis of four historical cases—Franklin D. Roosevelt, Francisco Franco, Josip Broz Tito, and François Mitterrand—the article highlights some issues related to the concealment or deliberate manipulation of information about the health of political leaders, invasive and disproportionate medical interventions, and various conflicts that can arise between clinical goals and political objectives. The article then adopts the doctrine of the “king’s two bodies”, revived in contemporary times by Ernst Kantorowicz, to interpret these dynamics as attempts to merge the leader’s mortal body with an eternal political body, generating a dangerous identification that fuels therapeutic excess. By decoupling the natural body from the political body, the study calls for transparent and ethically grounded frameworks capable of balancing privacy, continuity of government, and limits on the use of medical care.

In the textbooks, procedural due process is a strictly judicial enterprise. As the story runs, the Court in 'Mathews v. Eldridge' settled on a balancing test for determining what process is due, while in 'Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill' the Court finally decided that although the political branches may determine substantive entitlements, it is for courts to decide independently what process the Constitution requires. The notion that procedural due process might be committed primarily to the discretion of the agencies themselves is almost entirely absent from the literature.

Are there cultural differences in the way people reason about contradiction?