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Long-standing dogma dictates that recognizing pregnancy loss threatens abortion rights--acknowledging that miscarriage and stillbirth involve the loss of something valuable, the theory goes, creates a slippery slope to fetal personhood. For decades, antiabortion advocates have capitalized on this tension and weaponized the grief that can accompany pregnancy loss in their efforts to legislate fetal personhood and end abortion rights. In response, abortion rights advocates have at times fought legislative efforts to support those experiencing pregnancy loss and, more recently, remained silent, alienating those who suffer a miscarriage or stillbirth.

This study examines how military appellate courts rationalize overturning sexual assault convictions through qualitative analysis of opinions finding factual insufficiency. Drawing from cases between 2017-2020, concerning patterns are identified in judicial reasoning that reflect persistent rape myth acceptance despite decades of statutory reform. The analysis reveals that courts frequently question victim credibility based on delayed reporting, counterintuitive victim behavior, and continued contact with perpetrators--factors that trauma research has shown to be common among sexual assault survivors. Of particular concern is courts' treatment of incapacitation cases, where judges often acknowledge significant victim impairment yet find ways to question consent capacity. The findings suggest that recent statutory changes limiting appellate courts' factual sufficiency review authority may be insufficient to address underlying attitudinal barriers to fair adjudication of sexual assault cases. We propose reforms to judicial selection, education, and oversight processes, while acknowledging significant practical and legal challenges to implementation. The study contributes to growing literature on institutional responses to sexual assault by illuminating how rape myths manifest in appellate reasoning. These findings have important implications for military justice reform and broader understanding of how gender bias influences judicial decision-making. Future research comparing military and civilian appellate approaches could provide valuable insights for both systems.

This Essay takes stock of a pivotal moment at the Court: statutory interpretation at center stage in administrative law. The U.S. Supreme Court's most recent Term saw numerous landscape-shifting administrative law decisions. The most widely discussed was the Court's elimination of 40-year-old Chevron deference in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo. The Court's decisions also effected significant change in the scope of Seventh Amendment jury trial rights and the length of time that individuals, businesses, and associations have to challenge agency actions. But taken together, the Court's decisions did not radically restructure the administrative state on constitutional grounds. Despite the substantial mindset shiftin conceptions of how courts should review agency legal determinations and conduct enforcement actions, the Court rejected or failed to reach several constitutional law challenges. Instead, the Court's leading cases tended to resolve on carefully measured statutory grounds, at times with Justice alignments that transcended typical ideological or jurisprudential lines. Also, last Term's most significant administrative law decisions may give important predictive clues about how the Court will apply statutory constraints to free-ranging administrative claims to vast regulatory power in future years.

The Typical Foundation One way of laying a foundation for admission of a videotape is standard in every American court: A witness takes the stand and testifies that the contents of the videotape represent a fair and accurate depiction of what the witness saw and heard. The trial judge overruled defense counsel's authentication objection without explanation. [...]the appellate court awarded Omar a reversal of two convictions that were based on admissible evidence. STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG is the Wallace and Beverley Woodbury University P George W ngton University Law School and is a former chair of the Criminal Justice Section.

Judicial deference to agency interpretations of their own statutes is a foundational principle of the administrative state. It recognizes that Congress has the need and desire to delegate the details of regulatory policy to agencies rather than specify those details or default to judicial determinations. It also recognizes that interpretation under regulatory statutes is intertwined with implementation of those statutes. Prior to the famous decision in Chevron, the Supreme Court had long regarded judicial deference as a foundational principle of administrative law. It grew up with the administrative state alongside other foundational administrative law principles. In Chevron, the Court gave judicial deference a particular articulation and set of express justifications that made the principle seem new and bold--and ultimately set it on a path to become convoluted and vulnerable. But judicial deference is no less a foundational principle because Chevron took on a life of its own. And foundational principles--particularly those that help to maintain balance among the branches--do not simply go away. They change and reappear in the law. The Court can try to kill Chevron, but judicial deference will find its way back to administrative law.

Free exercise now finds itself at a crossroads. In 1990, in Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court dramatically narrowed the Free Exercise Clause, holding that religious believers generally had no constitutional rights to religious exemptions from neutral and generally applicable laws. Smith was always controversial. Yet with each passing year, it seemed more and more like Smith had become a fixed part of the jurisprudential landscape. But this turns out not to have been the case. Smith now finds itself on the ropes. Two terms ago, in Fulton v. Philadelphia, several Justices called for Smith to be overruled. And a bipartisan coalition of three other Justices-Justice Breyer, Justice Kavanaugh, and Justice Barrett-wrote a striking concurrence, essentially asking for help. That concurrence seemed to reject Smith's foundations, but it also asked hard questions about the viability of any other approach. This short symposium piece considers the questions posed by Justice Barrett's concurrence in Fulton. If the Court decides to go back on Smith, it faces an array of complicated choices about how to structure free exercise doctrine. This piece offers some thoughts about how the Court should think about these choices.

What is a substantial burden on religious exercise? This question continues to stand at the very center of religious liberty debates, animating both present interpretation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as well as the trajectory of future free exercise doctrine. In this Essay, I defend the view that courts should interpret the substantiality of burdens by examining the extent of government-imposed civil penalties for noncompliance. Doing so ensures courts avoid assessing the theological substantiality of burdens-inquiries that are prohibited by the Establishment Clause's religious question doctrine. At the same time, a civil penalties approach to substantial burdens provides courts with a method for limiting religious liberty claims; that is, claimants would still have to demonstrate that the imposition of civil penalties constitutes a substantial burden and judges would have the opportunity to evaluate whether claimants had satisfied that burden. Critics have contended that the civil penalties approach to substantial burdens fails for a variety of reasons. But carefully following the underlying logic behind the approach demonstrates its ability to meet these challenges and provide courts with a meaningful and principled opportunity to evaluate claims for religious accommodations.