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"Recessions"
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Output Spillovers from Fiscal Policy
For a large number of OECD countries we estimate the cross-country spillover effects of government purchases on output. Following the methodology in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012a, b), we allow these multipliers to vary smoothly according to the state of the economy and use real-time forecast data to purge policy innovations of their predictable components. Our findings suggest that cross-country spillovers have an important impact. The findings also confirm those of our earlier papers--namely that fiscal shocks have a larger impact when the affected country is in recession.
Journal Article
Regional economic resilience, hysteresis and recessionary shocks
The notion of ‘resilience’ has recently risen to prominence in several disciplines, and has also entered policy discourse. Yet, the meaning and relevance of the concept are far from settled matters. This article develops the idea of resilience and examines its usefulness as an aid to understanding the reaction of regional economies to major recessionary shocks. But in so doing, it is also argued that the notion of resilience can usefully be combined with that of hysteresis in order to more fully capture the possible reactions of regional economies to major recessions. These ideas are then used as the basis for a preliminary empirical analysis of the UK regions.
Journal Article
Fluctuations in Uncertainty
Uncertainty is an amorphous concept. It reflects uncertainty in the minds of consumers, managers, and policymakers about possible futures. It is also a broad concept, including uncertainty over the path of macro phenomena like GDP growth, micro phenomena like the growth rate of firms, and noneconomic events like war and climate change. In this essay, I address four questions about uncertainty. First, what are some facts and patterns about economic uncertainty? Both macro and micro uncertainty appear to rise sharply in recessions and fall in booms. Uncertainty also varies heavily across countries—developing countries appear to have about one-third more macro uncertainty than developed countries. Second, why does uncertainty vary during business cycles? Third, do fluctuations in uncertainty affect behavior? Fourth, has higher uncertainty worsened the Great Recession and slowed the recovery? Much of this discussion is based on research on uncertainty from the last five years, reflecting the recent growth of the literature.
Journal Article
Escaping the Great Recession
We show that policy uncertainty about how the rising public debt will be stabilized accounts for the lack of deflation in the US economy at the zero lower bound. We first estimate a Markov-switching VAR to highlight that a zero-lower-bound regime captures most of the comovements during the Great Recession: a deep recession, no deflation, and large fiscal imbalances. We then show that a microfounded model that features policy uncertainty accounts for these stylized facts. Finally, we highlight that policy uncertainty arises at the zero lower bound because of a trade-off between mitigating the recession and preserving long-run macroeconomic stability.
Journal Article
The great hangover : 21 tales of the new recession
Presents a collection of essays commissioned by Vanity Fair magazine on the current global economic crisis by such authors as Bryan Burrough, Mark Bowden, and Mark Seal.
Book
On DSGE Models
The outcome of any important macroeconomic policy change is the net effect of forces operating on different parts of the economy. A central challenge facing policymakers is how to assess the relative strength of those forces. Economists have a range of tools that can be used to make such assessments. Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models are the leading tool for making such assessments in an open and transparent manner. We review the state of mainstream DSGE models before the financial crisis and the Great Recession. We then describe how DSGE models are estimated and evaluated. We address the question of why DSGE modelers—like most other economists and policymakers—failed to predict the financial crisis and the Great Recession, and how DSGE modelers responded to the financial crisis and its aftermath. We discuss how current DSGE models are actually used by policymakers. We then provide a brief response to some criticisms of DSGE models, with special emphasis on criticism by Joseph Stiglitz, and offer some concluding remarks.
Journal Article