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This paper reviews recent economic research in tax compliance and enforcement. After briefly laying out the economics of tax evasion, it focuses on recent empirical contributions. It first discusses what methodologies and data have facilitated these contributions, and then presents critical summaries of what has been learned. It discusses a promising new development—the analysis of randomized controlled trials mostly delivered via letters from the tax authority—and then reviews recent research using various methods about the impact of the principal enforcement tax policy instruments: audits, information reporting, and remittance regimes. I also explore several understudied issues worthy of more research attention. The paper closes by outlining a normative framework based on the behavioral response elasticities now being credibly estimated that allow one to assess whether a given enforcement intervention is worth doing.

We use the American Community Survey microdata and employ difference-in-differences (DID) models to examine how local immigration law enforcement, through 287(g) agreements and the Secure Communities program, impacts homeownership among different demographic groups. The findings indicate that 287(g) agreements significantly reduce the likelihood of homeownership, particularly among Hispanics without a college education and U.S. citizenship, with effects most pronounced in states lacking E-Verify mandates. The Secure Communities program exhibits more nuanced effects, initially showing positive impacts for specific Hispanic populations; however, these results are not robust to pre-trend analyses. Additional factors such as length of U.S. residence, English proficiency, age, and household income strongly influence immigrant homeownership outcomes, underscoring the complex interplay between policy enforcement and socio-economic assimilation. The results highlight unintended economic consequences of immigration enforcement policies, suggesting important considerations for housing stability, financial security, and integration policies aimed at immigrant and broader community well-being.

The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) uses a dynamic approach to enforcing air pollution regulations, with repeat offenders subject to high fines and designation as high priority violators (HPV). We estimate the value of dynamic enforcement by developing and estimating a dynamic model of a plant and regulator, where plants decide when to invest in pollution abatement technologies. We use a fixed grid approach to estimate random coefficient specifications. Investment, fines, and HPV designation are costly to most plants. Eliminating dynamic enforcement would raise pollution damages by 164 percent with constant fines or raise fines by 519 percent with constant pollution damages.

Claims that the VAT facilitates tax enforcement by generating paper trails on transactions between firms contributed to widespread VAT adoption worldwide, but there is surprisingly little evidence. This paper analyzes the role of third-party information for VAT enforcement through two randomized experiments among over 400,000 Chilean firms. Announcing additional monitoring has less impact on transactions that are subject to a paper trail, indicating the paper trail's preventive deterrence effect. This leads to strong enforcement spillovers up the VAT chain. These findings confirm that when taking evasion into account, significant differences emerge between otherwise equivalent forms of taxation.

This paper analyzes the relationship between bank lobbying and supervisory decisions of regulators and documents its moral hazard implications. Exploiting bank-level information on the universe of commercial and savings banks in the United States, I find that regulators are 44.7% less likely to initiate enforcement actions against lobbying banks. This result is robust across measures of lobbying and accounts for endogeneity concerns by employing instrumental variables strategies. In addition, I show that lobbying banks are riskier and reliably underperform their nonlobbying peers. Overall, these results appear rather inconsistent with an information-based explanation of bank lobbying, but consistent with the theory of regulatory capture. This paper was accepted by Amit Seru, finance.

To identify the most effective mechanisms for detecting corporate fraud, we study all reported fraud cases in large U.S. companies between 1996 and 2004. We find that fraud detection does not rely on standard corporate governance actors (investors, SEC, and auditors), but rather takes a village, including several nontraditional players (employees, media, and industry regulators). Differences in access to information, as well as monetary and reputational incentives, help to explain this pattern. In-depth analyses suggest that reputational incentives in general are weak, except for journalists in large cases. By contrast, monetary incentives help explain employee whistleblowing.

This study investigates the determinants of goodwill impairment decisions by firms applying IFRS based on a comprehensive sample of stock-listed firms from 21 countries. Multivariate logistical regression findings indicate that goodwill impairment incidence is negatively associated with economic performance, but also related to proxies for managerial and firm-level incentives. In addition, whereas goodwill impairment tends to be timely for firms in high enforcement countries, firms in low enforcement countries tend to be less responsive to declines in the economic value of goodwill; CEO compensation concerns affect the impairment decision for firms in low enforcement; and CEO reputation concerns and management preference for smooth earnings influence goodwill impairment decisions in high, as well as low, enforcement countries. We also find that private monitoring through institutional investors substitutes for public enforcement in the context of goodwill impairment when a country's enforcement regime is relatively weak.

We study the impact of the integration of women in U.S. policing between the late 1970s and early 1990s on violent crime reporting and domestic violence (DV). Along these two key dimensions, we find that female officers improved police quality. Crime victimization data reveal that as female representation increases among officers in an area, violent crimes against women in that area, and especially DV, are reported to the police at significantly higher rates. There are no such effects for violent crimes against men or from increases in the female share of civilian police employees. Furthermore, increases in female officer shares are followed by significant declines in rates of intimate partner homicide and non-fatal domestic abuse. These effects are all consistent between fixed effects models with controls for economic and policy variables and models that focus exclusively on increases in female police employment driven by externally imposed affirmative action plans following litigation for employment discrimination.

This paper theoretically and empirically analyzes the financing terms that support international trade. The choice of trade finance terms balances the risk that an importer defaults on an exporter and the possibility that an exporter does not deliver goods as specified. Analysis of transaction-level data from a US exporter reveals that importers located in countries with weak enforcement of contracts typically finance transactions, but these firms are able to overcome the constraints of such environments if they can establish a relationship with the exporter. Furthermore, the manner in which trade is financed shapes the impact of crises.